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 3 
Introduction 
This assai leads the reader on an analytical path to development, with institutions as 
its central focus. While its main emphasis is on the problematic nature of 
development in lagging or backward regions, contributions from the literature on 
developing countries have also been taken into account, and European countries, Italy 
and the South of Italy (the Mezzogiorno) also feature in the debate. There is no doubt 
that lagging regions in advanced countries are very different from backward regions 
in poor countries. I think that there are two basic assumptions that hold for both. First, 
the most important constraints on development are internal; second, in order to 
combat underdevelopment strong actions that break with tradition are needed. These 
two assumptions are often ignored by development literature. These studies may be 
well written, fun to read and able to communicate faithfully their authors views on 
social and economic life, but their perspective is necessarily different from that of 
people who are actively involved in social and economic development efforts or 
tackling underdevelopment. The assai offers some interpretative starting points. The 
path distances itself from five concepts that are widely held but superficial. 
The first is that economic development in a backward or lagging area depends on 
growth in advanced areas, given that capital will flow where there is an abundant 
supply of labour and because technical progress is easier for latecomers than for 
innovators. The common view is that there is spontaneous economic convergence 
simply because capital has low returns in advanced areas and high returns in 
backward areas. In advanced areas, moreover, already on the threshold of improved 
technology, technical progress is more of a struggle, whereas in backward areas all 
that is needed is to imitate others. Since this idea has no real empirical basis, those 
who hold this view claim that the differences between regions persist because markets 
work badly, segmented as they are by rules and behaviour that allow unjustified 
returns. Without these artificial distortions, they argue, resources would be 
spontaneously used where they were most productive. In this view, the most relevant 
development policy (and for many, the only possible policy) is to reduce curbs to 
maximum competition in all sectors and in all walks of life. 
There are many reasons for thinking that this is irrelevant. Many crucial resources 
are in fact attracted to advanced areas, not because there is over-regulation. If 
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anything, the opposite. Opening up markets that work well would therefore seem to 
be a result of development rather than a way to achieve it. In order to achieve 
development what is needed is more intentional public intervention: more State, not 
less. 
The path undertaken to reach this conclusion is arduous, however. Not many people 
today share the view that the State can play a relevant role. The path requires a critical 
reappraisal of four other common views. The second widespread view that we need to 
demolish, then, is the idea that -. even if we accept that economic development in a 
backward area is impeded by the fact that resources are attracted to advanced areas - 
there will always be immobile resources that can spontaneously trigger development 
and sustain it. This view is supported by the limits on mobility of resources. Taking 
into account that important resources such as the environmental, historical, cultural 
heritage of a region are substantially immobile, those who hold this view believe that 
these resources cannot be lost as a result of the capacity for attraction of an advanced 
area. They believe that these immobile resources sooner or later will stimulate those 
who know how to exploit them effectively and profitably. The reason why this view is 
unhelpful is that existing immobile resources can and often do remain inaccessible. 
Potentially profitable resources never actually become useful for development 
because the conditions for exploiting them have not been achieved, or nobody has 
ever thought of using them. A case study illustrating how this can happen is presented 
in the Appendix of Chapter Three. 
Proceeding along our path, a third commonly held view must be set aside. Even if 
they accept that the process of valorising immobile resources is not always so easy, 
economists often say that this is not a problem if in the backward area the cost of 
labour is very low. The objection is that the difficulty of valorising immobile 
resources is made up for by a particularly advantageous condition of low labour costs. 
If there were no institutions keeping wages artificially high, unemployment or under-
employment would be solved by salaries so low that the labour cost per production 
unit would be advantageous even in situations of low productivity. This, people claim, 
would help overcome other curbs on development. This approach is on the surface 
quite correct, but it neglects to take into account one feature. Low labour costs could 
well get an area out of underdevelopment, but there are no guarantees that if will keep 
that area out. 
 5 
It is thus necessary to deal with the fourth widely help view. Admitting, at this 
point, that underdevelopment in a backward area cannot be overcome spontaneously, 
even where there are low labour costs, and accepting that development needs an 
action that breaks with tradition, then, it is claimed, bottom-up collective action on the 
part of civil society can provide precisely this break. Those who hold this view 
believe that in order to trigger and sustain a development process collective goods 
such as, for example, material and immaterial infrastructures, insurance, training, and 
promotional services, are essential. They do not feel, however, that corresponding 
public action is needed. They are convinced that, collectively, civil society can 
achieve the goods and services needed. This idea ignores the serious difficulties that 
bottom-up collective action meets with if it is not supported by public action, as 
Chapter Three illustrates. 
This brings us to the fifth and final point of view that we need to deal with. 
Admitting that bottom-up collective action is unsuccessful, a break with tradition can 
be guaranteed simply by decentralising institutions, providing local authorities with 
the sufficient skills and resources to take care of their own needs. We argue that 
decentralizing on its own is not a solution. Development policies require State 
intervention to be organized in a complex institutional framework, as Chapter Five 
shows. 
 
The assai‟s five chapters are each devoted to one of these themes, while the sixth 
provides a conclusion and completes the arguments set out in the Introduction. The 
themes are: territorial imbalances, underdevelopment traps and social traps, collective 
goods and services, institutional action and institutional frameworks. Every theme is 
supported with an analytical argument and development policy proposals that emerge 
as a result. 
In Chapter One, territorial imbalances are explained. Space is an obstacle, but not 
an absolute barrier to the free movement of goods, people and firms. All that is 
needed, then, is for a process of economic growth to be triggered, after which it 
becomes cumulative and attracts activities and resources from other places. Backward 
areas not only do not receive new resources, they lose the few resources they have, 
remaining underdeveloped even when at a national level there is growth. New 
Economic Geography (NEG) illustrates these findings well by means of models of 
general economic equilibrium. The approach linked to traditional regional economics 
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based on partial economic equilibrium did not do enough to explain these cumulative 
processes. Individual agglomeration factors were identified without placing them in 
context. On the other hand, the findings of NEG imply that general equilibrium is 
inefficient when territorial development gaps are not temporary. If it is not efficient, 
how are these gaps to be closed? NEG makes one suggestion, based on its own 
models. In backward areas there are usually unexploited immobile resources that 
could be put to use in order to trigger development. The literature on industrial 
districts gives an interesting indication of the nature of these immobile resources and 
what mechanisms translate into factors of development. These include professional 
and organisational resources, which in other areas are mobile but which in these 
districts take on a special cohesion (or functional coherence), to the extent that they 
adopt the same features as immobile resources in the sense that if they were used 
elsewhere they would not be as productive. 
The first part of Chapter Two considers underdevelopment traps. While reallocating 
resources from less productive to more productive uses may trigger a process of 
growth, the related costs may be so high that growth is unlikely to take place – either 
spontaneously or gradually – because a block of a significant size would have to be 
reallocated at the same time. This argument can be countered by the observation that 
low labour costs compensate for these costs. If labour costs are low owing to 
unemployment, then total reallocation costs are not very high. Reallocation takes 
place gradually, without any thresholds and without any underdevelopment traps. But 
this means ignoring the problem of social traps, which are examined in the second 
half of Chapter Two. Low labour costs may facilitate the exit of resources from less 
productive uses but in the end they will stop them from staying in more productive 
uses. And yet, low labour costs imply an absence of barriers to entry for more 
productive uses, with the result of rapidly exhausting existing potential by impeding 
sufficient accumulation. Escaping from combined underdevelopment and social traps 
requires actions that markets are unable to support, even taking into account 
opportunities for exploiting existing resources and the low cost of labour. What is 
needed is to allow labour costs to rise and thus overcome reallocation costs that have 
thus become so significant. What is needed are collective goods, which provide an 
injection of benefits such that people and organisations are able to take on the 
reallocation costs of moving to modern and more productive market sectors, and deal 
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with the risks and difficulties inherent in transformation so that they can distance 
themselves from the static but guaranteed structure of backward societies. 
Chapter Three is devoted to the theme of collective goods in underdeveloped 
contexts. The first part of the chapter examines the possibility that collective goods 
are realised by those who need them, and concludes that this only happens under very 
strict conditions, which do not apply to backward areas. The main obstacle is the lack 
of information, which is a problem even in advanced economies but it is exacerbated 
in situations of underdevelopment. The inevitable result is that collective goods need 
to be public goods. Institutions that contribute to development by establishing public 
goods, not just by enforcing regulations, thus become central to any analysis of how 
underdeveloped areas can trigger the growth process. The chapter argues, however, 
that these active institutions cannot be considered a solution, even assuming that they 
are virtuous and not predatory. If imperfect information and uncertainty call for 
institutional intervention, this intervention will in its turn be a victim. In particular, as 
the chapter goes on to show, a central State that adopts vertical and sectorial 
interventions is especially inefficient. 
In Chapter Four the question of decentralisation is analysed, taking as given that 
institutions should be more accountable and closer to the citizenry. Applying the 
criterion of subsidiarity, it would be easy to believe that the more resources local 
institutions are endowed with, the more effective their actions will be for 
development, and the better they will be able to sustain and support the role of civil 
society. The widely held belief, in this case, is that by pursuing pluralism and 
democracy, development will automatically follow. Those who reject the orthodox 
economic view that all that is needed for development to take off is a functioning 
market often adopt this paradigm. And yet, as Chapter Four demonstrates, in 
conditions of uncertainty, the proximity of local institutions to specific interest groups 
generates a problem of consensus and increases the complexity of the institutional 
action needed. The result is that institutional action, which is anyway conditioned by 
the history, skills and experience of its managers, is undetermined and leaves plenty 
of space for „institutional entrepreneurship‟, which may or may not be successful. 
Chapter Five is based on the idea that institutional entrepreneurship can be 
encouraged, in a decentralised context, by a multi-level organisation of the State, 
where every level (multinational, national, regional, and local) interacts with every 
other. Local actions that break with tradition, as well as innovation, require skilled 
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personnel and functions that allow local systems to communicate constantly with the 
outside world in order to obtain additional resources and grasp new opportunities. 
This requires a complex institutional framework, which on one hand is essential for 
gaining resources, but on the other generates learning costs that can easily lead to 
actions that are ineffective for development. The institutional framework also 
provides a solution, however, if certain conditions are fulfilled. These are: carefully 
designed rules, a realistic expectation of results, continuous monitoring and 
evaluation. This path is very different from pure and simple decentralisation because 
it implies a strong input from the centre, and an emphasis on inter-institutional 
coordination rather than bottom-up policies per se. 
 
The assai has various readers in mind. It is aimed at students in further education, 
and in particular in graduate programmes. But it is also intended for people actively 
involved in local development. 
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Chapter One - Territorial disparities1 
Traditional growth economics is based on the principle that differences in per 
capita income among countries or among regions of the same country depend mainly 
on differences in capital endowment per worker. And yet, in a context of open 
economies, with mobile production factors, and in particular mobile capital, 
neoclassical growth economics has not been able to explain why these per capita 
differences live on, or even degenerate. In the neoclassical approach, income gaps 
lead to even gaps in the rate of returns on capital, dictating that large flows of capital 
should be sent from more advanced areas to more backward areas in order rapidly to 
reduce these disparities. With a production function in which labour and capital are 
substitutes, even when substitution elasticity is equal to one
2
, and returns of scale are 
constant, the rate of return on capital of a backward area whose per capita income is a 
tenth
3
 of an advanced area would be 215 times greater
4
. The rate of return on capital 
income would be double in an area whose per capita income is only slightly lower 
(80%) than the more advanced area.  
Evidently, the principles of neoclassical economics, especially constant returns of 
scale and decreasing returns of capital, do not reflect real life. In more recent growth 
economics, these two factors have been removed and new production factors have 
been introduced, in particular human capital. Thus up to 60% of per capita income 
differences can now be explained, whereas the traditional model only justified 25% 
(Lasagni, 2006; Psacharopoulos-Patrinos, 2002; Caselli, 2004). Regional economics
5
 
is better suited to our purposes because it focuses on the relationships between open 
economies at a territorial level. Before Krugman‟s contribution (1991), regional 
economics did not have a convincing answer to the question of why production tends 
to agglomerate in certain areas, leaving other areas behind and preserving disparities 
                                                 
1
 Sections 1,2 and part of 5 were written with Mario Menegatti 
2
 With elasticity less than one, which is more realistic to assume, the results would be even more 
surprising. 
3
 The poorest country in a sample of 78 nations had an average in the period between 1990-2000 of 3% 
of the per capita income of the richest country with purchasing power parity (Lasagni 2006). From 
1995-2000 in Italy, Calabria – the poorest region – had an average of 44% of the per capita income of 
the richest region, Emilia-Romagna. Bank of Italy data. 
4
 With a share of capital income of 30% and thus a labour income of 70%. 
5
 The appendix on European territorial imbalances contains further considerations on economic theory 
concerning growth in open economic systems. 
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in regional development.
6
 Partial equilibrium analyses identified a number of 
agglomeration factors. There were not only the natural advantages of certain regions 
to take into account - greater natural resources, historical concentrations of 
populations, favourable geographic positions – but many other factors. These 
included Marshall‟s externalities,7 Hirschman‟s linkages in economic activities,8 
cumulative processes of increasing returns of scale, a series of divergent forces 
leading to dispersion, such as the various categories of congestion costs (Christaller, 
1933; Henderson, 1974), as well as transport costs. On the other hand, general 
equilibrium analyses were anchored in mainstream international trade theory, which 
attempted to explain sectorial specialisation rather than development.
9
 General 
equilibrium models yielded indeterminate results for transport costs, non-competitive 
markets and increasing returns. In these models, restrictive (or unrealistic) hypotheses 
were often adopted: returns of scale were considered constant, space was either 
considered insurmountable (for productive factors) or, by contrast, irrelevant (for 
products).
10
 Thus, while regions in partial equilibrium analyses were allowed to be 
historically, geographically, socially and economically specific - and thus have a 
variegated profile - these specificities in general equilibrium analyses were reduced 
essentially to the different relative endowments of production factors. In the standard 
model, production factors were assumed to be immobile. This made for a rather 
peculiar vision of history. Before there was any external trade, autarchic regions were 
explained by their history; their specific history was both the cause and the 
                                                 
6
 The statement that “productive activities tend to concentrate in certain areas... thus preserving 
differences in regional development” should be discussed. In highly industrialised countries, and in the 
United States in particular, the process of economic development took place at the same time as a 
marked reduction in regional differences. It is important then to consider what conditions contribute to 
regional convergence and then see how permanent the disparities are. The Appendix contains a brief 
contribution with specific reference to Europe. 
7
 Marshall, 1920 
8
 Hirschman, 1963 
9
 The importance assigned to concepts of open economies and international specialisation in 
international trade theory justified these applications for the simple reason that regions within a country 
are, by administrative definition and for objective de facto reasons, open economies. The title of one of 
the most important contributions to international trade theory (Ohlin, 1933: Interregional and 
International Trade) indicated that the application of his theoretical framework was possible for 
regions as well as internationally.  
10
 On a similar basis, general equilibrium analysis showed that international and inter-regional trade 
could be considered a “perfect substitute” for the mobility of productive factors. The consequence was 
that powerful economic forces leading to convergence in levels of remuneration of productive factors 
(and per capita income), and therefore to development, were born precisely from the consideration of 
diverse goods produced, as well as diverse factors and diverse open economies of exchange. This was 
especially true in regions. 
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justification for their economic and social differences. Once there was external trade, 
however, history was no longer relevant. A new route was taking shape where deeply 
lying forces made those differences disappear. 
New Economic Geography (NEG), from Krugman‟s contribution in 1991 onwards, 
reconciled general equilibrium theory with the well-known results of partial 
analyses.
11
 In NEG models, space no longer had the simplified dichotic relevance 
whereby in some markets mobility was perfect and in others it did not exist. NEG 
assumed, more realistically, that spatial distance always costs something to overcome. 
The result was a richer and less simplistic definition of regional differences that 
envisaged imperfect mobility both of products and factors. Agglomeration processes 
of different production factors and products, and therefore externalities, increasing 
returns of scale and finally non-competitive markets, could thus take place. At the 
same time, solutions depended on the equilibrium of economic forces both in terms of 
concentration and in terms of dispersion.
12
 
To sum up, mainstream international trade theory, from Riccardo to Ohlin, tended 
to interpret exchanges between economies as the result of their production 
specialisations. These specialisations were explained either on the basis of different 
technologies, or on the basis of different endowments of factors - such as, for 
example, natural resources and populations – or again, on the basis of relative 
advantages in producing different goods. Goods markets were generally characterised 
by full mobility, while production factor (or resource) markets had zero mobility.  It 
                                                 
11
 It is easy to see why NEG has at times been considered “old wine in new bottles” (Smutzler, 1999, 
p.358); but it is also clear why it is important. 
12
 “Reduced to its essence, the new economic geography is a theory of the emergence of large 
agglomerations which relies on increasing returns to scale and transport costs, and emphasizes linkages 
between firms and suppliers as well as between firms and consumer. The basic story underlying this 
type of analysis can be sketched as follows. Increasing returns to scale tend to foster geographical 
concentration of production of each good. When transportation costs play a role, attractive locations for 
production are those which are close to markets and suppliers, other things being equal. Finally, 
concentration of production in some location tends to attract the mobile factors of production. Workers 
have better job and consumption opportunities where production is concentrated. The resulting 
concentration of the labour force leads to more demand for consumption goods in that location, which 
makes this region more attractive for producers. Once a region has a high share of production, this 
pattern is likely to reinforce itself: a so-called second-nature advantage for the dominant region 
develops, that is, the region becomes attractive for firms because so many other firms already produce 
there (rather than because of superior resource endowment). In other words, success bread success. 
Working against these centripetal forces which strengthen agglomerations are centrifugal forces. For 
instance, concentration of productive activities in one region may drive land rents and housing prices 
up, and may lead to environmental problems. Also, in immobile factors of productions remain in 
peripheral areas, firms from the centre may want to move there to serve these areas. The population 
and production patterns result from a balancing of these centrifugal ad the centripetal forces. 
(Schmutzler, p. 356). 
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was still not clear what role transport costs and company location played in markets, 
although these factors were recognised as being important.
13
 Traditionally, 
international trade theory focused less on agglomerations of production and the 
effects of reducing transport costs, and more on the international division of labour in 
terms of specialisation in order to stress its greater economic efficiency compared to 
autarchic structures. 
Starting with Krugman‟s contribution in the early 1990s, NEG attempted to find 
reasons for geographic location and for the tendency of industrial production to 
concentrate in some areas rather than others. NEG‟s main departure from the 
literature regarding international (and inter-regional) trade was to attribute importance 
to the distance between production location and markets in which output is sold and 
inputs are bought. Firstly, NEG took account of the fact that selling goods in a 
different location from where they are produced incurs costs related to packaging, 
preserving, and transporting goods, as well as to the documentation and 
administration of the contracts required when the buyer has no direct control over the 
quality, quantity or nature of the product, and the seller does not receive the revenues 
directly. These “transport costs” mean that from a company‟s point of view, different 
locations represent different markets, in the sense that the company provides the same 
goods at differing costs. Secondly, NEG recognised the fact that there are scale 
economies and that the structure of markets is not perfectly competitive, meaning that 
the level of demand for goods produced by one company is influenced by the location 
of other producers. Thirdly, these assumptions, together with the existence of input-
output links between companies, imply that the cost of buying intermediate goods 
used in production depends on the location of suppliers. 
These intuitions allowed NEG to identify the forces at work behind the 
agglomeration of production in certain areas, as well as to recognise the divergent 
forces that contribute to dispersion. When forces that induce firms to concentrate in 
certain areas prevail, a self-reinforcing mechanism - whereby links between 
production and demand for goods, and between production of final goods and 
production of intermediate goods, are often forged - leads to further agglomeration. 
                                                 
13
 “International trade cannot be understood except in relation to and as part of the general location 
theory, to which the lack of mobility of goods and factors has equal relevance.” Ohlin, 1933, pp.141-2 
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NEG was able to recognise when this mechanism had been set in motion and at the 
same time to identify the factors that initiated or hindered the process. 
The agglomeration mechanism described by NEG played a significant role in the 
way local development was analysed for two reasons. First, NEG evidenced that 
mobile resources tended to migrate towards more developed areas; in under 
developed regions, NEG concluded, it was preferable to concentrate interventions on 
immobile resources. Second, it stressed that, once the mechanism was set in motion, 
the process could become self-reinforcing by attracting new companies. The 
contribution of NEG to the debate on developing backward regions was by no means 
definitive, but it did forge new analytical paths. On the one hand, there was the matter 
of determining how to set the mechanism in motion; on the other, the question of 
identifying what conditions favour or hinder the mechanism once it has been 
triggered. The innovative factor in the debate, in contrast to mainstream ideas of 
economic development, was the idea that economic development in a region is a 
process that is difficult to set in motion, but that once it has been triggered, it can 
become self-reinforcing and even accelerate, unless obstacles come in its way, or 
attrition slowly blocks the mechanism. This idea contrasted with prevalent thinking in 
mainstream economic development approaches, which considered the country as a 
whole. The accepted view was that historical circumstances, more than anything else, 
determined whether local development could be set in motion very easily or with 
great difficulty.  According to this view, once it had started, development proceeded 
in a regular fashion, without any particular acceleration or any relevant slow downs. 
The justification for this view was that a local system was more open and inter-
dependent. Every local system was susceptible to being hindered or encouraged by 
other local systems. It could be hindered if it were weak,14 because it would lose 
resources to others; it could be encouraged as long as it were strong, because the 
resources of other systems would naturally flow towards it.15 When a „national‟ 
economic system was considered as a whole, the positive or negative effects of inter-
dependence in its regions were not taken into account. 
                                                 
14
 A weakness at the beginning, as we shall see, can also become a strength if there exists a potential to 
exploit and if it is effectively exploited. A historical strenght can also become a weakness if, for 
example, congestion costs become prevalent. 
15
 The NEG approach is anyway preferable for national economies in a world that is increasingly inter-
dependent. 
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Sections one and two present a simplified version of the issues examined by NEG, 
with reference respectively to the structure of models and the consequences of firms‟ 
location choices. Section three examines some important extensions. Section four 
gives two concrete examples, while section five summarises the conclusions. 
The basic model: the effects of distance and location 
The objectives of  NEG‟s analysis of development can be summarised as follows: 
 to identify the effects of distance between production and its buyers and 
suppliers and examine the consequences of location choices 
 to identify the forces that lead to agglomeration of companies in certain areas 
rather than others, as well as the forces that work against this concentration 
 to indicate the factors behind these forces. 
In order to examine the effects of distance between production and its markets, it is 
important to identify the elements that make location economically significant. With 
this aim in mind, let us simplify the matter and consider two economies (A and B) 
that produce two goods: one agricultural or „traditional‟ product (such as wheat) x, 
and one industrial or „modern‟ product (such as cars), y. We will begin by examining 
a case in which distance is irrelevant. It can be demonstrated that the distance between 
production and markets is not relevant if the following assumptions hold. 
First assumption. Both goods, wheat and cars, are produced with different 
technologies but with constant returns of scale. Put simply, a production function can 
be imagined in which the only input is labour. When there is only one input, the 
hypothesis of constant returns of scale means that the relationship between output and 
input is constant. The production functions of wheat (x) and cars (y) in cases like this 
are: 
xlx         with   0     [1] 
yly         with   0      [2] 
 
where lx e ly represent the labour used to produce each good. 
Second assumption. Each of the two goods is produced by each of the two 
economies and they make their choices on the basis of a given market price. In this 
case production takes place in perfect competition.  
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Third assumption. The optimal choice for each consumer is made on the basis 
of personal choices. Put simply, these can be summarised as follows:  
 
  ss yxyxUU  1,      with   10  s    [3] 
 
This describes the degree of utility associated with each basket of goods x and y 
consumed. We also assume that all consumers are identical and that consumers 
perceive the units produced by different companies, for each of the two goods, as 
identical. 
Fourth assumption. The goods produced in economy A can be consumed by 
economy B, and vice versa, without incurring costs other than production costs. 
If these four assumptions hold, the fact that a given quantity of goods is produced 
by economy A rather than by economy B has no effect on production costs, on the 
firm‟s profits, or on sales prices. In the situation we have just described, economies A 
and B represent a single market inside which the distance between producers and 
buyers, and the location of production companies, is irrelevant. It is as if all 
companies and all consumers were concentrated in a single area. 
The analysis conducted by NEG eliminates these assumptions. 
First eliminated assumption: the hypothesis that goods produced in one 
economy can be consumed in the same economy or in another one incurring the same 
costs. NEG stresses that goods produced in one place can be consumed in another 
only if they are transported. Some goods are impossible to transport, just as some 
goods cannot be consumed in a different place from where they are produced (take, 
for example, services provided by a hospital). If goods cannot be transported, they 
cannot be ceded to other economies. However, if both goods (agricultural and 
industrial) were impossible to transport, economies A and B would become closed 
markets with no trade between them. When goods can be transported there are certain 
costs, such as packaging, preservation and transport services (fuel, vehicle 
amortisation, labour costs for transporters, information and contracts). For a firm, 
every area represents a different market with different sales costs that include 
transport costs. In our model, with only two economies, this implies that for each 
company there are two markets: an internal market, where sales costs are the same as 
production costs, and an external market, where sales costs are equal to the sum of 
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production and transport costs.
16
 It should be stressed that this approach makes it 
possible to take account of changes in transportation costs over time. Economic 
historians have always underlined the importance of progress in technology in this 
field. Conservation has improved drastically; goods are transported faster and with 
greater security. Vehicles have grown in size, allowing for scale economies in 
transferring goods, and communications have improved in untold ways. All these 
factors have greatly reduced the cost per unit of goods transported. As we shall see, 
this dynamic has played an important role in explaining industrial agglomerations. 
Second eliminated assumption: the hypothesis that both goods are produced 
with constant returns of scale on the basis of production functions [1] and [2]. In NEG 
models this assumption is maintained as far as agricultural goods are concerned, but it 
is assumed that the technology used to produce industrial goods is as follows: 
  yly           with    0   [4] 
According to this hypothesis, the relationship between output and input is:  
yy ll
y 
       [5] 
This relationship increases as input increases and as the quantity produced 
increases. Production thus has increasing returns of scale. 
Third eliminated assumption: the hypothesis that the location of firms is 
irrelevant and that consumers perceive goods produced by different companies as 
identical. In this scenario, the quantity of industrial good y produced is simply the 
sum of the quantities produced by each company, so that, if the total number of 
companies is N: 

y  y i
i1
N
      [6] 
In [6], yi is the quantity produced by the i‟th company.   
NEG analysis assumes that consumers perceive goods produced by different 
companies as different varieties of industrial good y (though the agricultural good, 
wheat, is still assumed to be homogeneous). It also takes into account the possibility 
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 Transport costs are highly simplified in NEG analysis. It is assumed that, given a quantity of a good 
q, if the good is transported to another economy, the quantity that reaches its destination is equal to Tq 
where 0<T<1 . These are called “iceberg costs” because the good produced is like an iceberg that 
partially melts during transportation from one area to another. Moreover, in many NEG models it is 
assumed, for simplicity‟s sake, that agricultural products can be transported at no cost. 
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that, if total quantities are equal, consumers prefer to consume goods of different 
varieties. This hypothesis can be summarised analytically by assuming that:  
 


M
i
r
r
iyy
1
1
    with   10  r    [7] 
In [7], M is the number of varieties and yi is the quantity produced by the i‟th 
variety. In this structure the parameter r measures the intensity of preferences for 
variety. This intensity would be zero if r were equal to 1 (in which case [7] would be 
the same as [4]), and infinite if r were equal to 0, these two cases being excluded, 
while it is assumed that it would decrease if r increases between 0 and 1, both values 
being excluded. Where there is preference, the market for each industrial good (cars) 
is segmented into many different markets for each variety. In each of these segments, 
the producer has “market power” limited by the fact that consumers choose another 
variety if the one they had previously chosen becomes too expensive. It is assumed, 
then, that each company chooses the unit price of the variety of goods it produces,
17
 
keeping the general price index unchanged. This hypothesis, together with the 
previous ones, means the market in industrial products is no longer perfectly 
competitive; it is characterised rather by a form of competition that is called 
monopolistic. It is possible to demonstrate that optimal behaviour for a company is to 
fix the sales price by imposing a mark up on production costs.
18
  
Fourth eliminated simplification: the hypothesis that both goods are produced 
using only labour, and that workers have the same characteristics in both sectors. 
NEG assumes that workers employed to produce industrial goods have different skills 
than those employed for agricultural goods, and that workers in the modern sector in 
each of the two economies are completely mobile, in the sense that they are perfectly 
willing to move from one economy to another if, by doing so, they are paid more. 
(Agricultural workers, on the other hand, are assumed to be completely immobile.
19
) 
It also assumes, for simplicity‟s sake, that each worker has a given set of skills and 
cannot acquire other competencies, meaning that every worker belongs either to the 
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 With increasing scales of return, the optimal choice for a company would be to specialise in the 
production of a single variety of manufactured good. The number of varieties produced thus coincides 
with the number of companies N.  
18
 The demonstration of this result is omitted because it goes beyond the aim of this book. It can be 
found in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
19
 This is easy to understand in the light of the characteristics of agricultural production, which uses 
land, which is immobile, as one of its productive factors. The assumption proposed is thus a means of 
introducing typical features of the production of goods that depend crucially on immobile factors in a 
simplified context with a single input. 
 18 
modern or to the traditional sector, and cannot move from one to the other. Finally, it 
is assumed that labour markets for both type of worker are in equilibrium (i.e. that 
there is no involuntary unemployment). 
 
Having presented the assumptions proposed by NEG, we can now begin to 
examine the effects of production location and of distance between firms. In this new 
scenario, firm location is an economically relevant factor because profit levels in each 
of the two economies depend on the number of firms that have located production 
there, and because a firm that shifts from one location to another modifies the profit 
conditions of the new location. This modification takes place in two different ways. 
First, a new firm‟s arrival in a location changes the competitive context of the firms 
working there. Greater competition, in its turn, alters the characteristics of market 
equilibrium, lowering the price of goods produced and reducing profit levels. This so-
called “price effect” (PE) tends to make the market less profitable for other firms 
seeking to enter. Second, a new entry modifies the demand side because it increases 
the size of the market in which the firm has decided to produce. If a firm decides to 
come into a market, for example by shifting production from region A to region B, 
there will be a subsequent shift of workers between the two regions with an increase 
in employment and income in region B. Since part of this income is necessarily spent 
inside that economy, this will increase demand in B and generate greater profits there. 
This second so-called “market effect” (ME), which is negligible in perfect 
competition but significant in monopolistic competition, tends to make the market 
more profitable for other firms seeking to enter. 
Thus, the decision of a firm to locate its production in one area rather than another 
generates an overall effect on profits. The following can represent this effect: 
 
MEPE       [8] 
0PE  e 0ME . 
 
The overall effect is unclear: it is positive if market effect prevails over price effect, 
but negative if price effect prevails over market effect. Whether market or price effect 
prevails is an important signal to determine the future development of an economy. If 
price effect prevails over market effect, a new entry will tend to discourage other 
firms from coming in, impelling them to find a different location. In the case of the 
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two economies, if a firm chooses to locate its production in region B, shifting its 
production from region A, it will reduce the profitability of market B, making it less 
advantageous for other firms. In this case, both economy A and economy B tend to 
develop industrial goods production. If, however, market effect prevails over price 
effect, a new entry will increase the profitability of the area, persuading other firms to 
make the same move. In the case of the two economies, then, if a firm chooses to 
locate its production in region B it will make it advantageous for other firms to make 
the same choice, causing a gradual migration of firms from region A to region B. In 
this case, economy B tends to develop a significant industrial sector that produces the 
industrial goods necessary for both regions, while economy A becomes solely 
agricultural. 
When either price or market effects prevail, two different models of development 
tend to evolve in the two regions. In one, the modern sectors expand in parallel in 
both regions. In the other, the modern sector agglomerates in one of the two regions. 
This agglomeration becomes the “centre” from where goods are produced for its own 
market and for the other region, which becomes “peripheral”.20 
A third effect linked to location identified by NEG needs to be mentioned before 
analysing in more detail the features of these two models, and before examining 
which elements contribute to one prevailing over another. So far it has been assumed 
that the only input used in production was labour. In order to make the hypothesis 
more realistic, a fifth simplification could be eliminated and two inputs could be 
assumed: labour and goods produced by other firms. A further assumption, again for 
simplicity‟s sake, could be that goods produced by a firm and used as input to 
produce other goods, and industrial goods bought by consumers, are one and the same 
thing. In this case, the demand for goods of each firm would derive in part from 
consumers and in part from other firms. Firms are thus connected to one another by 
input-output links, meaning that the revenues of a firm selling the goods it has 
produced are equal to the costs incurred by other firms to produce the same goods. As 
a consequence, a new entry in an economy generates a third effect. 
As we have seen, the arrival of a new firm boosts internal demand for goods and 
increments profits (market effect). It also stimulates market competition that cuts 
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 N.B. The expressions “centre” and “periphery” are not used geographically; they refer to the 
different economic roles of the two economies. 
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sales prices and reduces profit margins (price effect). The third effect, caused by 
input-output links, is that a cut in sales price reduces the expenses of firms that use the 
goods they produce as input. For each variety of manufactured good, the negative 
effect on profit margins of a drop in revenues is partially compensated by the positive 
effect of the lower expenses incurred by the other firm. The effect on production costs 
brought about by the arrival of a new firm in a marketplace is known as the “cost 
effect” (CE).21 The overall effect of a new entry, then, is as follows:  
 
MEPE  +CE      [9] 
0PE , 0ME and 0CE . 
The overall effect is still unclear. A new entry increases the profitability of the 
market if market and cost effects are greater than the price effect. If the price effect 
prevails, however, profitability decreases. The possible effects of the location of firms 
are thus similar to those described in equation [8]. 
The basic model: dynamics 
We have seen how the choice of a firm to locate production in one region rather 
than another can have different effects on the profitability of the region. Market effect 
and cost effect tend to increase profitability, and are thus factors of attraction for other 
firms, leading to agglomeration of industrial production. Price effect, on the other 
hand, tends to reduce profitability, and is thus a factor of repulsion for other firms, 
leading to dispersion in industrial production. Having described the origin of these 
effects, it is now possible to determine which elements make certain effects prevail 
over others. 
A general analysis, even using the simplified model outlined above (two 
economies, two sectors, production functions and elementary preferences) is complex. 
It would involve examining the consequences on market, price and cost effects of the 
whole range of possibilities opened up by the different values of the parameters: α>0 
(productivity of agricultural labour), β>0  (productivity of industrial labour), 0<s<1 
(a parameter that regulates the utility of consumers according to the combination of 
wheat and cars in their basket), 0  (a parameter that regulates scale economies in 
industrial production), 0<T<1(magnitude of transport costs), 10  r  (consumer 
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 See Venables (1996) 
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preference for a variety of industrial products), as well as other parameters indicating 
the importance of input-output links among firms.  
A qualitative analysis of some results and of a few main trends is therefore 
preferable. The dynamics we examine are not the only economic development paths 
outlined by NEG; they are simply some of the possible trends that are of particular 
interest. As we have said, then, the overall effect on the profitability of a region of a 
new firm‟s entry is still unclear. It can, however, be shown that: i) a greater 
preference for variety in industrial products tends to reinforce the market effect and 
cost effect rather than the price effect, and tends to favour agglomeration
22
; ii) a 
higher proportion of industrial workers out of the total number of workers tends to 
reinforce market effect and cost effect rather than price effect, and tends to favour 
agglomeration; iii) stronger scale economies reinforce market effect rather than price 
effect but weaken cost effect against price effect, with an ambiguous consequences on 
agglomeration; iv) lower transport costs tend to reinforce the market effect and cost 
effect rather than the price effect, and tend to favour agglomeration. 
NEG is thus in a position to explain industrial agglomeration as the result of an 
increasing preference for variety (owing to growth in per capita incomes), a greater 
proportion of workers in non-agricultural sectors, and lower transport costs.  
There is empirical evidence to support this claim. Table 1 shows foreign trade as a 
share of industrial value added in several industrialised countries on average since the 
1960s. There was a significant increase in foreign trade from the 1960s to the 1990s 
(first row of the table), which could be attributed to lower transport costs. However 
there are other causes to take into account: economic growth
23
, vertical disintegration 
of productive processes
24
, and a reduction in trade barriers, to name but a few. If we 
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 Where there is perfect substitution among variables (no preference for variety) there is perfect 
competition in which price effect always prevails. 
23
 Consider two countries, a big country with a GDP of 100, and a small one with a GDP of 20. The 
highest level of exchange would be (20+20(/120=33% if the small country exported all its GDP and 
imported the same amount. If the two countries had GDPs respectively of 100 and 50, the highest level 
of exchange would be (50+50)/150=67% (Feenstra, 1998). 
24
 Feenstra (1998) has documented a marked increase in imports and exports of intermediate goods 
owing to restructuring of integrated productive processes. In many industrial sectors an increasing 
number of firms no longer finalise production from raw materials; they produce goods that correspond 
to one productive stage or another. This leads to an increase in the ratio between foreign trade and 
industrial value added that does not depend on a reduction of transport costs but on new possibilities 
offered by technologies and organisational structures. 
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apply these parameters obtained in research on Europe, a very cautious estimate
25
 of 
the share of international trade whose growth depends only on a reduction in transport 
costs can be made (second row of the table). The table shows that, while most of the 
increase depended on other causes, lower transport costs contributed significantly and 
regularly: increasing 1 percent every ten years.
26
 
The effects of a country‟s economic growth, as well as the vertical disintegration of 
productive processes, could be attributed to increasing preference for variety. In this 
case, the fourth row of the table reveals a further indicator: another variable to which 
NEG models attribute agglomeration, alongside lower transport costs. It would seem 
that this factor has caused a significant increase in international trade. 
As regards agglomeration, which could be considered an effect of these changes, 
row 5 of the table shows the Gini indices for the concentration of locations in 
manufacturing industry in Europe calculated at country level (an increase in the index 
corresponds to an increase in concentration) since the 1980s. It is evident that 
concentration has increased. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that spatial concentration, 
calculated at a country level for an 11-member European Union by sector (19 
manufacturing sectors), tends to increase above all in sectors that used to be less 
concentrated, and does not diminish significantly in sectors that are no longer 
concentrated. In row 6 of Table 1, we can see the Gini indices for unemployment 
levels at a regional level that confirm a limited but significant
27
 tendency to polarise 
in this respect.
28
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 In particular, the reduction of trade barriers has been highly relevant in Europe. The extension of this 
effect to other countries (such as Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States) probably produces an 
over-estimate, and therefore under-estimates the effects of reduced transport costs. 
26
 A cross-country confirmation was obtained by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2004), who found 
significant effects on the volume of international trade in 75 countries (in 2000-2001) owing to the 
efficiency of ports, transport infrastructure and favourable trade policies. See the empirical work of 
Overman, Redding and Venables (2001). 
27
 It is significant even though it grows only 3 percentage points from 28 to 31, taking account of the 
brief period of time taken into consideration, and of the well-known fact that unemployment rates (as a 
share of the active population) is effected by the impact of unemployment on activity rates. This means 
that when unemployment grows (or drops) activity rates diminish (or increase). Thus the 
unemployment rate increases (or diminishes) less than it would increase (or decrease) if activity rates 
were invariable. 
28
 Agglomeration processes at the European regional level are confirmed by Overman and Puga (1999). 
They calculated the distribution of 150 European regions by unemployment level in 1986 and the 
transition matrix from 1986 to 1996.  Using the data the distribution trend can be calculated (to 2012). 
It can be seen that unemployment rates lower than average are unvaried (43%), while regions with 
higher levels of unemployment rise from 29% to 37%. The number of regions with unemployment 
rates around the average, on the other hand, drops  from 28% to 20%. 
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While empirical research is not yet able to claim beyond reasonable doubt that the 
NEG model is the best possible explanation for these stylised facts in comparison 
with other possible theories, the data we have just examined is encouraging. Increases 
in spatial concentration of industry, and consequent development, do appear to be 
correlated to a reduction in transport costs and diversification of production. 
Tab. 1 – Growth in international trade in some industrialised countries (a), spatial 
concentration of industry in European countries and unemployment rates in 
European regions 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990
s 
1. International exchange of goods in % of industrial 
value added (b) 
31 38 52 56 
2. Estimate of the share dependent only on reduced 
transport costs (c) 
31 32 33 34 
3. Estimate of the effect of reduced tariffs and ceilings 
(d) 
- 2 6 6 
4. Residual: effects of the growth of a country‟s 
economy and the disintegration of productive processes. 
- 4 13 16 
5. Spatial concentration of manufacturing industry by 
country (EU-11), Gini indices 
na na 0,156 0,188 
6. Regional concentration of unemployment rates (168 
European regions) Gini indices 
na na 0,284 0,302 
Note: (a) Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States, for data in rows 1 to 4; EU-11 row 5 (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal, Spain). (b) Simple averages of data for single 
countries with reference to the sum of their exports and imports divided by two (c) (d) Calcolated on the 
basis of  Baier e Bergstrand‟sresults (for Europe). 
Sources: Feenstra (1998), Baier e Bergstrand (2001), Brülhart (1998), Eurostat, our elaboration. 
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Fig. 1 – Spatial concentration at country level (Gini indices) 1980-1990 (vertical axis 
on the right) and percentage variations (vertical axis on the left), manufacturing 
industry, EU-11 
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Source: Brülhart (1998), our elaboration. 
 
Let us go on now to examine the link between transport costs and the location of 
firms. In the model we assume that the shifting of firms and workers from one area to 
another is not instantaneous but takes place incrementally over time. Figure 2 shows 
the link between transport costs and the location of firms. 
 25 
Fig. 2 – Relation between transport costs and location in region A 
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Let us suppose that N is the total number of firms. In one of the two economies (A 
represented in the figure) a point along one of the two continuous or dotted lines 
represents a possible equilibrium of a stationary state in which the system can stop. A 
point along the continuous lines represents a stable stationary state, towards which the 
system tends to move if it is a situation of disequilibrium. A point along the dotted 
line, on the other hand, represents a state of instable equilibrium, from which the 
system tends to distance itself if it is in a state of disequilibrium. The N firms could 
thus all be in equilibrium in region A (the top continuous horizontal line 
corresponding with N), or all in region B with none in A (the bottom continuous line 
corresponding with 0), or half in one region and half in another (the middle dotted 
line corresponding with N/2).
29
 If the N firms are not along any of these lines then 
their location tends to change, shifting towards more stable equilibria, that is, in 
relation to transport costs, either all towards A or all towards B, or again half and half. 
Let us suppose then that starting with a situation in which N firms are half in 
economy A and half in economy B. Figure 2 shows the results of the model. Starting 
on the left, if transport costs are less than t1 and if we suppose, as we have done, that 
initially half the firms are localised in one region and half in another (the middle 
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 Economy B is part of the model and part of the argument, but it is not represented in the figure. 
Needless to say, the firms that are not in the figure, out of the total number of firms, would be in 
economy B. 
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dotted line), the system is in a state of instable equilibrium. All it would need is one 
firm to shift, and all the others would follow, moving production to either region A or 
region B (the top and bottom continuous horizontal lines). For example, if transport 
costs were equal to t2, the two possible states of equilibrium are F or F‟. This takes 
place, as we have seen, owing to market and cost effects prevailing over price effect. 
In other words, given that the two economies are equal to start with, and each have 
half the total number of industries, all it would need is for one firm to shift production 
from one economy to the other in order to determine an increase in demand and a 
reduction in production costs in the input-output link between firms. Since these 
effects are greater than the increase in competition, the profits of industrial firms 
increase and attract other companies. These companies increase local demand because 
of their re-location, and therefore increase profits, but they do not need to concern 
themselves with demand from the other region because transport costs are low. That 
is, they can incur transport costs without jeopardising the profit gained by re-locating.  
With transport costs higher than t1, by contrast, a sole firm (which, in the example 
above, by shifting production, made it economically advantageous for other firms to 
re-locate) can no longer initiate sustainable re-location. A whole block of firms would 
need to re-locate in order to set in motion effects of increased profitability sufficient 
to compensate higher transport costs. The higher the transport costs, the greater the 
number of firms would need to move, until – at level t3 – re-location would be 
sustainable only if all the firms in one region moved. If transport costs fall, on the 
other hand, the movement would be in the opposite direction, from right to left in 
Figure 2. The size of the block that needs to re-locate diminishes, until it is 
sustainable for a sole firm to shift production. This would create equilibrium E, on the 
border between instability and stability. 
Figure 2 thus helps us understand situations where relatively high transport costs 
have led to a distribution of firms that is not exactly divided between two regions. If 
to start with, there were slightly more firms in region A than in region B, a reduction 
in transport costs towards t1 would cause a gradual, parallel shift of firms towards 
region A, until region B were completely empty. The opposite shift would take place 
if there had been more firms initially in region B than in region A.  
To sum up, if transport costs are high, the forces that impel firms to re-locate tend 
to prevail and production is distributed over different regions. If transport costs are 
reduced, the forces that persuade firms to concentrate prevail, and production tends to 
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agglomerate. In the latter case, the fact that production is concentrated in region A or 
B depends, in the simplified structure of the model, on a single element: the initial 
distribution of the firms. Production is concentrated in the location where there were 
more firms to start with. 
Some extensions 
We have seen the implications of the mechanisms described by NEG in a 
simplified model using only two economies with identical structural features. We are 
now going to examine the effects of eliminating these simplifications in order to 
analyse the consequences of heterogeneousness among economies and with many 
different economies. 
The assumption of structural homogeneousness could be eliminated in many 
different ways.  One form of heterogeneousness that is particularly interesting is in 
the number of workers employed in the traditional sector.
30
 Workers employed in this 
sector are generally considered immobile, and thus represent a share of demand for 
goods rooted in the location where they are first produced. Since the other share of 
demand is mobile (because industrial workers are mobile), the fact that one region has 
more agricultural workers than another means that this region has a greater potential 
demand for goods, in the sense that the demand (say, for cars) has the potential to 
reach a higher level than in the other region.
31
 In this hypothetical economy, we have 
assumed production functions with labour as its single output, making population 
(labour supply) the only resource, and the agricultural population the only immobile 
resource. The agricultural population represents a share of demand for modern goods 
rooted in its territory because it is an immobile productive resource there.  
The same holds for any other resource that is needed for production and that can be 
considered immobile. If we use a more complex production function that includes 
skills linked to the territory (such as those exploited by industrial districts) or natural 
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 See Krugman, 1992 
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 See the following numerical example. There are 200 workers, 100 in industry and 100 in agriculture. 
One hypothesis would be that economy A: 50 industrial and 50 agricultural; economy B: 50 industrial 
and 50 agricultural. In this homogeneous case, if all the industrial workers went to A (or to B) the 
maximum number of workers (and thus of potential demand for cars) would be the same: 50 
agricultural and 100 industrial, equal to 150 workers. If the initial division had been economy A: 50 
industiral, 10 agricultural; economy B: 50 industrial and 90 agricultural, and if all the industrial 
workers moved to economy A, A would have 100 industrial workers and 10 agricultural workers, 
making a total of 110, while economy B would still have 90. If all the industrial workers went to 
economy B, B would have 100 industrial and 90 agricultural workers, making a total of 190, while 
economy A would only have 10 workers. 
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resources (such as climate or landscape), these resources function in the same way as 
the agricultural population functions. When these resources are exploited, whoever 
possesses them earns an income that can subsequently be spent locally and that 
sustains demand for industrial goods. Since the logic is the same, we may as well 
simplify the production hypothesis with a single function (labour) and with the 
agricultural population as the only immobile resource.  
We shall now go on to examine the effects on the location of firms of differences in 
agricultural sector populations as immobile resources. Let us imagine that transport 
costs are such that they guarantee forces for agglomeration. As figure 2 showed, 
industrial firms tend to concentrate in one of two areas, and if the two economies are 
homogeneous, firms will always locate where there were more firms to start with. 
Where there is heterogeneousness in the stock of agricultural workers, the results are 
different. In order to examine this new scenario, let us assume that there are more 
agricultural workers in region B than in region A. The simplest situation is that in 
which the initial number of modern firms is only slightly higher in one of the two 
economies, for example in region A. Let us suppose, however, that the difference is 
marginal and that the total number of workers is nevertheless greater in region B. In 
this case, the incentive for a modern firm to re-locate from B to A will be less 
pressing than its incentive to stay put, while the incentive for firms in region A to 
move to region B, where there is a greater number of agricultural workers. In region 
B, in fact, both present and potential demand for cars is higher. Agglomeration will 
thus take place in regions with a greater number of workers (including agricultural 
workers) even when this region had fewer industrial firms initially.  
The conclusion would be very different and more interesting if there were a greater 
difference in the initial number of firms in the two economies. If, for historical 
reasons, there were far more industries operating in region A, it is possible that the 
present demand for cars would be greater in region A than in region B, even though 
there were fewer agricultural workers. Nevertheless, the potential demand for cars 
would be greater in region B where most of the immobile population lives. Thus, if 
the effect of higher present demand prevails in determining location then 
agglomeration will tend towards region A. If, however, potential demand prevails, 
then agglomeration will tend towards region B.  
It is not hard to see what this result depends on. It depends on the conjectures made 
by each firm as to the behaviour of the others. If firms were able to coordinate their 
 29 
decisions and come to an agreement on where to locate production, they would 
clearly decide to concentrate in economy B. If all firms moved there, economy B 
would effectively become the region with the most workers, given that there are more 
available agricultural workers. And yet, because this kind of collaboration is not 
possible
32
, each firm would only decide to locate production in economy B if it 
thought most firms in economy A were going to move there too. If each firm, on the 
other hand, were convinced that the other firms were localising production in 
economy A, they would too. To sum up, where there is homogeneous conjecture, 
firms tend to concentrate either in A or B and there is equilibrium in their distribution. 
Where, on the other hand, there is heterogeneous conjecture, firms tend to localise in 
many different ways and there is no equilibrium in their distribution.  
The start up phase of a process of industrial growth (exogenous, triggered by an 
external event rather than by the model‟s variables) plays an important role. An 
agricultural area with little industrial development has greater potential demand for 
industrial goods but less present demand. We do not know how firms form their 
conjectures. We do know, however, that if a process of industrialisation is triggered in 
a traditional area, the forces that impel firms to agglomerate in the more industrialised 
economy (present demand) will be weakened, while the process in which firms re-
locate to the more traditional economy will be strengthened. Once the localisation and 
agglomeration process has been triggered in economy B, it will tend to be self-
reinforcing.  
The second simplification that can be eliminated is the hypothesis of a system with 
only two economies where firms can locate production. The hypothesis can be 
substituted by the assumption that localisation can take place in any number of places. 
This more realistic assumption has been examined in detail by NEG,
33
 but we cannot 
analyse it too closely here because it is highly complex. Nevertheless, some of its 
conclusions are easy to summarise. First, NEG has shown that, when transport costs 
are sufficiently low, agglomeration usually takes place in a subset of regions rather 
than in one region alone. Second, it has observed that the dimension and composition 
of this subset of regions changes when the structural parameters of the economies 
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 It is assumed that each firm makes its choices individually. 
33
 See Krugman, 1993, 1994. 
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vary, as well as when the initial distribution of firms among the various locations is 
modified.  
NEG thus provides us with a useful springboard for considering the development 
potential of, and obstacles for, lagging areas (the South) that entertain significant 
interaction with more developed areas (the North).
34
 NEG makes it clear, for example, 
how wrong the idea commonly held in Italy is that development of the South is an 
automatic consequence of development in the North. According to NEG, 
development in the North detracts from development in the South, unless something 
is done to help the South to discover and valorise its immobile resources. Another 
commonly held idea is that development in the South depends on improving North-
South transport infrastructure. The basic NEG model, as well as the example of the 
industrial sector in Europe, indicates that reduced transport costs produce greater 
divergence rather than convergence in regional disparities. And yet, NEG has 
explored more complex models showing how divergence can be avoided. These allow 
appropriate development policies to be established with a certain degree of success. If 
these policies were to intervene and modify decisively the conditions that normally 
worsen disparities, NEG would contribute to understanding how the forces unleashed 
by these policies can determine recovery in lagging areas.  
In order to illustrate in greater detail the unpredictable processes that differ from the 
basic model and reflect more complex models, we are now going to examine two 
particularly interesting examples.  
Two examples 
The first example is a comparison between the territorial concentration of 
manufacturing industry in EU-11 and in eleven countries in southern Africa. The 
second is a study of local labour markets in unified Germany. In less advanced 
countries such as those in southern Africa, the fact that transport costs are higher than 
in industrialised, for example European, countries does not mean there is a greater 
spread in production; industry tends rather to agglomerate. It would seem that the 
heterogeneity of the single areas drives agglomeration towards wealthier regions.  In 
the case of Germany, on the other hand, low transport costs do not trigger 
agglomerative processes. Agglomeration is held back by heterogeneity because the 
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 Both in the sense of under developed countries open to exchange with more industrialised countries 
and lagging regions in an industrialised country. 
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wealthier regions are also more congested, which can contribute to creating a greater 
spread of firms.  
Let us take the first example of the comparison between Europe and southern 
Africa. For industrialised countries such as those in Europe, it can be safely assumed 
that transport costs (in the wider sense) are significantly lower because infrastructure 
is highly developed. It could be expected, then, that in less developed countries the 
little industry that there is would be more widely spread over the territory.  And yet 
the opposite can also be the case, as Figure 3 shows. The graph compares the Gini 
indices for the concentration of manufacturing industries in eleven European 
countries and eleven southern African countries.
35
 
Fig. 3 – Comparison between the Gini indices (Europe and southern Africa) for 
territorial concentration of manufacturing industry in the early 1990s 
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Source: Our elaborations on the basis of data from Petersson (2000) and Brülhart (1998). 
 
It is clear that nearly all sectors are more concentrated territorially than in southern 
Africa. It can also be observed that the leather and shoemaking, clothing, metals and 
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 The eleven southern African countries are Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland, South-Africa (Petersson, 2000) 
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iron, rubber, motor vehicle, textile and chemical sectors are the most concentrated, as 
they are in Europe. The explanation for this evident anomaly, compared to the 
paradigm regarding only transport costs, must take into account many circumstances. 
The most relevant regard the marked differences in population distribution, 
urbanisation, per capita income and human development (correlated to the quantity 
and quality of labour supply for a given population). In southern African countries the 
population density per square kilometre varies from a maximum of about 600 people 
(Mauritius) to a minimum of 2 (Namibia), while in Europe the figures are 460 and 60 
respectively. The urbanisation rate varies from 50% (South Africa) to 13% (Malawi), 
with European rates ranging from 97% to 58%. Per capita income in international 
dollars for (1997) ranges from 7,380 (South Africa) to 740 (Mozambique); in Europe 
the variation is between 30,800 and 14,300. The human development index (HDI) is 
0.700 in South Africa and 0.341 in Mozambique, while in Europe the highest rate is 
0.923 and the lowest is 0.858.
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These figures reflect some of the determining factors we have already talked about:  
a region‟s population and its early industrial development (urbanisation); present and 
potential demand (per capita income and population); labour supply (HDI). Evidently 
these factors played a far more important agglomerative role in southern Africa than 
the role played by greater transport costs, which in itself, as we have seen, would tend 
to drive firms to spread out over the territory. 
Reunified Germany provides a case study of the opposite effect. If we complicate 
the model by assuming imperfect mobility of industrial labour (in as much as the 
competencies are linked to the territory and are therefore less productive elsewhere), 
as well as a certain mobility of agricultural labour, coupled with the possibility of 
increasing revenue from this sector, in addition to nominal salaries determined 
according to the local cost of land (as a proxy of housing costs), then the relationship 
between transport costs and localisation changes. 
Brakman, Garretson and Shramm (2002) applied this model, known as the 
Helpman-Hanson model
37
, to Germany after unification.  There is general consensus 
that the re-unification of Germany, which raised both hopes and fears, reduced 
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 Petersson, 2000, p.4 and UNDP, Human Development Report 
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 The model was proposed by Hanson (2001) on the basis of Helpman‟s work (1998), which is why it 
is known as the Helpman-Hanson model. Hanson has used it recently with explicit reference to the 
economic regions of the US. 
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transport costs (in the wider sense) between East and West as well as within the East. 
It then became the subject of debate whether the advantages in the long run 
outweighed the disadvantages in the Eastern regions as well as in the West. On the 
basis of our simplified model, it could be claimed that, by accentuating the 
agglomeration effects, reduced transport costs would create disadvantages in the 
lagging regions of the East and advantages in the more developed regions of the West. 
On the basis of a model in which transport costs are less significant than 
heterogeneity (as in the case of southern Africa), by contrast, there would be 
advantages for the East and disadvantages for the West, owing to the delocalisation of 
production in search of lower labour costs. 
The Helpman-Hanson model has made it possible to estimate empirically the 
relevance of transport costs compared to the relevance of territorial differences in 
wage levels, which in their turn are linked to differences in per capita income and in 
the cost of housing. In other words, this model allows us to verify empirically the 
combinations of forces that contribute to dispersion and hinder agglomeration. It 
emerges that in Germany, with its 37 districts, transport costs are relevant but forces 
for dispersion such as congestion costs are also significant. These costs are the result 
of a mechanism whereby high incomes and low availability of land drives up house 
prices that in their turn increase nominal salaries (and vice versa). The re-unification 
of Germany thus allowed Western firms to sell to the East more cheaply and therefore 
to maintain production in the West, but also to re-locate production to the East since 
in the West salaries were higher and would be driven even higher if the income gap 
between east and West continued to grow. 
The correlation between revenues per square kilometre, the cost of land, and 
nominal salaries emerges clearly at a regional level, as Figure 4 shows.  
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Figure 4 - Regions of unified Germany ranked by nominal salary per hour in the 
industrial sector, trend in revenues per square kilometre and cost of land per square 
metre (1994). Percentage indices 100 = regions with the highest rates; hourly 
salaries on the right, revenues and land cost on the left (logarithmic scale) 
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Source: our elaborations based on data from Brakman, Garretsen, Shramm 2002. 
 
The two examples contribute to the North-South debate. The comparison 
between Europe and southern Africa makes it clear why policies based on incentives 
alone are ineffective. Since the development of the South is a challenge, it is easy to 
claim that transferring funds from the North would solve the problem. These 
transfers, it is claimed, would support local demand and provide new stimulus for the 
birth of new firms. As we have seen in this chapter, the claim is based on the 
hypothesis that reduced transport costs stop Northern firms from satisfying demand in 
the South. The example of southern Africa and the more complex NEG models, are a 
warning that dispersion, and thus re-equilibrium, may well not take place, even with 
higher transport costs. Such deeply seated structural differences between North and 
South can in fact make it more advantageous for modern firms to stay in the North 
even though they have to incur higher costs to satisfy the demands of the South. 
The example of post-unified Germany also sheds light on the existence of 
agglomeration tendencies based on congestion costs. The idea that development in the 
North automatically contributes to closing the gap with the South could be defended 
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by claiming that scarce resources, such as land and housing, could keep labour costs 
higher in the North, thus impelling firms to re-locate to the South. The study of 
Germany, where the gap between East and West in terms of labour costs in relation to 
transport costs and externalities was historically very high, demonstrates that relying 
on the effects of congestion is also unrealistic. In short, congestion costs would only 
have an effect if they were very high, but in this case they would also be socially 
unsustainable. 
The conclusions reached by NEG 
So far we have examined NEG‟s most significant results, shedding light on the 
forces behind the location of firms, the possible dynamics and the elements that 
influence firms‟ choices. We have seen how forces that foster agglomeration and 
those that lead to dispersion often work together. On the subject of local development, 
NEG has shown that, all things being equal, improving infrastructure and transport 
services (both important for development in general) tends to accentuate the 
development gap between regions because these improvements support the spatial 
concentration of modern production. Concentration in one area rather than another, it 
has been shown, can depend entirely on the initial distribution of firms in the territory, 
thus signalling that local development could indeed depend exclusively on history.  
And yet, it is important to stress that the initial distribution of firms is not the only 
significant element. The endowment of immobile resources is also relevant. A lagging 
economy with few modern firms can attract other firms if there are a great number of 
workers and in general if it has valuable immobile resources. This outcome is just one 
of the possible results, however, inasmuch as there are many different forms of 
heterogeneity that contribute to different location choices made by firms. By stressing 
the importance of regional heterogeneity, our analysis carves a middle path between 
the basic NEG model and international trade theory outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter. In the latter, regional differences are paramount and transport costs are 
irrelevant, while in the former only transport costs are relevant. In the real world, both 
factors are relevant, to a variable extent in each case. The agglomeration effects of 
increasing returns for internal and externalities, despite high transport costs, are also 
important; these effects are overlooked both by international trade theory and by the 
basic NEG model.  
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Keeping this complexity in mind, as the examples given in this chapter show, NEG 
invites us to consider the necessity for international interventions that set local 
development processes in motion in lagging areas. NEG also makes it clear that these 
interventions cannot be limited to income transfers, and must aim rather at valorising 
existing immobile resources. Finally, NEG warns that it would be possible in the 
abstract to support development in the North and wait for congestion costs to make it 
impellent to re-direct development effects towards the South, but that the strategy 
would be socially and politically costly.  
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Chapter 1 Appendix 1 - Regional disparities in Europe 
The construction of Europe was a complex operation during which political 
considerations, no doubt, were paramount. It was, however, also an operation that 
progressively created a multi-regional economic space within which highly diverse 
systems were integrated until a single currency was finally adopted. The process has 
been in motion for several decades
38
, and it is interesting to appreciate how regional 
disparities have been reduced at the same time as local economic systems have 
gradually opened up. The following brief outline will show that European cohesion 
policy played an important role in building consensus for a local dimension in terms 
of the intentions it displayed and the results it obtained, but that it was much less 
relevant in terms of financial output. 
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 It might be useful to outline the main phases leading to the single currency. In September 1950, 
the EUP (European Union Payments) agreement was signed as part of the OEEC (Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation) set up on April 16, 1948 mainly to manage US aid, after 1961 to 
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as the three zones of Germany assigned to the Americans, the French and the British. In 1949 the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and in 1959 Spain, joined. In April 1951, the ECSC (European Coal and 
Steel Community) was established. In March 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed (going into force on 
Jan 1, 1958) establishing the EEC (European Economic Community) or common market and 
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community). The original six signatories were Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. In July 1969, European customs union 
was completed, removing custom tariffs between members and setting a Common External Tariff for 
imports from non-member states. In February 1971, the Council of Ministers, on the basis of the 
Werner report, resolved to establish economic and monetary union within ten years. In April 1972, the 
European Monetary Snake, was signed by EEC Council of Minsiters to reduce the fluctuation margin 
between the community currencies to +/- 2.5%, that is half of what had been agreed in Washington. 
The aim of the snake was to reduce the consequences in Europe of the instability created by the August 
1971 declaration that the dollar would no longer be convertible. In January 1973, EU-9 is created with 
the addition of Great Britain, Republic of Ireland and Denmark to the original six members. In March 
1979, EMS (European Monetary System) was created to stabilize exchange rates between members of 
the European Community. At the same time a currency that was never actually coined, the ECU 
(European Currency Unit) was introduced. This was a basket of currencies, preventing movements 
above 2.25% around parity in bilateral exchange rates other member countries. The EMS (European 
Monetary System) was a more sophisticated and complex version of the monetary snake devised to 
achieve monetary stability in Europe, but it too was strained by the differing economic policies of its 
member states, some of which withdrew from the system. January 1981, Greece joins. January 1986, 
Spain and Portugal join (EU-12). Februrary 1986, the SEA (Single European Act) made the first major 
revision of the Treaty of Rome to harmonise laws and resolve discrepancies, allowing for the free 
movement of goods, labour, services and capital. December 1991, the Maastricht Treaty was signed 
with three objectives: to develop a single market with economic and monetary union through the 
creation of a single currency by 1999, to define and consolidate cooperation in foreign policy and 
security and to find ways to for police and the judiciary to collaborate. In December 1995, the third 
phase was launched with the definition of the Euro that would enter circulation on January 1, 2002. In 
January 1997, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined (EU-15). In May 1998 the European Central Bank 
was established. In March 2002, national currencies were no longer legal tender. 
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European integration and cohesion: theory 
Although the question of regional disparities was not considered significant in the 
debate that accompanied the process of building the European Union
39
, it has 
nevertheless been a source of real concern.
40
 This corresponds to the nature of the 
definition of cohesion used: “the degree of regional disparity that is socially and 
politically tolerable within the Community” (Begg-Mayes, 1992) in which the word 
“tolerable” is ambiguous and cannot be measured a priori. Most attention was paid to 
other issues
41
, mainly the costs and benefits of integration for member states and the 
feasibility and sustainability of monetary union.  Experts and politicians soon realized 
that integration was an advantage for member states
42
 from an economic point of 
view; the only condition was that the structural adjustments in economic and social 
systems were not too strenuous.
43
 On one hand it appeared that integration could take 
place even if regional disparities worsened, or failed to be reduced; on the other there 
was real concern that if cohesion were to dip below the threshold of tolerability (a 
threshold that was obviously never reached), the opposition of civil society would foil 
political projects for integration.
44
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 “Despite the concern expressed in the Délors report about the dangers of regional imbalance 
(Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989, p.18) little attention is given to the 
effects of monetary union on regional disparities”Begg and Mayes, 1992, p.220). The regional question 
was totally absent in the 1957 Treaty of Rome and only emerged recently and very gradually 
(Cuadraro-Roura, Parellada, 2002, pp. 1-2). It did not become a critical matter until the 2001 Cohesion 
Report (CEC, 2001) and was then again scaled down after the 2004 Sapir Report that shifted the 
question back to European growth as a whole (slower than in the US), rather than on growth in its 
lagging regions. In the Treaty of Rome priority was explicitly accorded to competition among and 
within member countries, leaving regional disparities to be dealt with by national policies with 
supranational supervision to avoid interventions that would distort the market. The SEA (1986) takes a 
step forward, followed by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), when cohesion becomes the second most 
important EU objective after the creation of an economic space with no borders. 
40
 The EU Directorate for Regional Affairs was created in 1967 but only started to operate after the 
Thomas Report (CEC 1973) supported the UK on joining the common market by stressing the 
importance of addressing regional disparities, which were a significant problem in the UK at the time. 
Oddly enough, Italy played no role in this area until the recent “new programme” after the “special 
programme” had failed. 
41
 In economics, the books that survey these problems we recommend are Baldwin, Wyplosz, 2004 and 
Altomonte, Nava (2005) 
42
 1970 is the date that is conventionally thought to have marked the beginning of EMU.  This is the 
year the Werner Report was published as a supplement to the EC Bulletin in November. The Report 
agreed with the findings of the Commission and set the agenda for the process to begin. The formal 
start of the process was on February 9, 1971, when the Council of Ministers accepted the 
recommendations contained in the Werner Report. 
43
 Dehem (1972) produced a survey of the costs and risks of EMU and covered the debate at the time 
the Werner Report was issued. 
44
 Events demonstrated that concern was well founded. Referendums held in various member countries 
to ratify the European Constitution turned out resounding No‟s. Comments regarding the French 
rejection of the Constitution were based on similar considerations. 
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In the Single European Act signed twenty years ago (1986)
45
 it was declared that: 
“In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social 
cohesion. In particular the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the 
various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions. Member states 
shall conduct their economic policies, and shall co-ordinate them, in such a way as to 
attain the objectives […] The implementation of the common policies and of the 
internal market shall take into account the objectives […] and shall contribute to their 
achievement. The Community shall support the achievement of these objectives by 
the action it takes through the structural Funds (European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, European Social Fund, European Regional 
Development Fund), the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments. The European Regional Development Fund is intended to help redress 
the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions.”46 
 
At the beginning of the process that would lead to a single currency, a close link 
with development in lagging regions was forged. It has been established (Sapir et al., 
2004, pp. 37-8) that promoting economic development in the less developed European 
regions had to be included in the Treaty (while previously the issue was neglected)
47
 
owing to the fact that in the Single European Act member states were committed to 
completing the process leading to a single market, a “space with no internal borders 
with free circulation of goods, services and capital” by 1992. The issue had to be 
included because establishing a single market that removed barriers to the free 
circulation of production factors and products meant that member states effectively 
renounced all forms of protectionism (both explicit and implicit, including state aid to 
firms and state monopolies) as well as relinquishing national currency. This new 
market made national and local productive systems more open to competition. 
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 The SEA was the first revision of the Treaty of Rome. Signed in Brussels on February 28, 1986 
during the intergovernmental conference, it came into force on July 1, 1987 following ratification by 
single member states. 
46
 SEA (1986) Title II, sub-section IV: Economic and social cohesion, articles 130a, b, and c. 
47
 Article 23 of subsection IV states “A Title V shall be added to part Three of the EEC Treaty as 
follows: Title V Economic and Social Cohesion.”  
 41 
The Single European Act was not as unambiguous as it appeared, however. On one 
hand, the aim of reducing regional disparities was coupled to the achievement of the 
single market; on the other, it was linked to intentional “support” interventions. The 
theoretical backing for this position was uncertain about the possibility of reducing 
regional disparities. Simplifying a great deal, this uncertainty can be illustrated with 
two arguments: one is optimistic and the other is pessimistic about the chances of 
effectively reducing regional differences. Their relative force is difficult to evaluate a 
priori
48
, making results uncertain by definition. The two arguments can be 
summarized with two very well known graphs. 
The first regards the advantages of trade. In traditional theory of customs‟ unions, 
if you lift trade barriers in economic systems that are part of a union, trade increases 
inside, but decreases outside, the union. The benefits for single countries that 
participate in the union depend on the balance between these two opposing features 
(Johnson 1962). If we look at the matter, as we must in this context, from the point of 
view of regions - that is economic systems within countries, rather than of countries 
themselves - then Johnson‟s cautious theory does not hold in the same way. It is likely 
that many regions within a country participating in a customs‟ union would see a rise 
in the volume of their total external trade.
49
 
From the point of view of regions, then, customs‟ unions simply open unions to 
trade. If this is the case, then the traditional analysis of comparative advantages 
originally proposed by Samuelson in 1939 (see Figure 5) holds. There are two goods, 
A and B; FF indicates the frontier of production capacity in a regional economic 
system. In isolation, equilibrium – in which the marginal transformation rate between 
A and B on the supply (technology) side is equal to the marginal transformation rate 
on the utility side – will be established in x, c1 being the collective indifference curve.  
If trade is opened up, there will be benefits as long as the external price of good A 
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 That is according to common opinion among policy makers at the end of the 1980s, without taking 
into consideration new theoretical developments such as NEG and Endogenous Growth, both of which, 
it seems, have accentuated pessimism regarding the effects of integration on regional imbalances. 
49
 Suppose, for example, that for a country the volume of trade created with countries within the union 
and the volume of trade with countries outside the union is the same and the balance is zero. This 
country would be indifferent and would gain nothing from joining the union. Imagine, however, that 
there are many regions in this country. It is likely, in this case, that some of them would increase their 
trade while others, perhaps because they are on the border with other countries outside the union, 
would lose trade. The result could be that the benefits for the former were such that they made up for 
the losses of the latter, so that the country in question (considered as the sum of its diverse regional 
economic systems) decided it was worthwhile joining the union despite its zero balance between 
volume of trade created and volume of trade lost. 
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compared to good B is different from the internal, autarchic price and cannot be 
influenced by domestic policy. For example if the relative external price of A, 
indicated by line p, is less than it would be in autarchy (q). The result will be a new 
equilibrium on the production side (y), with a reduction in the quantity of A and an 
increase in the quantity of B with regard to x. At the same time there will be a new 
level of equilibrium of wellbeing given by the availability of goods (z) obtained by 
selling B outside the union and buying A at a relatively lower price. Wellbeing will 
have grown, as the graph illustrates in Figure 5, with the indifference curve c1 
becoming c2. 
Fig. 5 – Trade Gains 
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This exercise in comparative statics exemplifies an old idea: if people have to take 
care of their own needs on their own they are worse off than if they do something for 
others in exchange for a favour. What is needed is for people to be competent in 
different ways; a person who is more competent in one field will undertake that 
activity for all the others. As Hicks put it: “the gain from trade is the difference 
between the value of things that are got and the value of things that are given up” 
(Hicks, 1959, p.181, quoted by Thirlwall, 1972, p.360). There are also interesting 
consequences in terms of growth, though in the simplified graph in Figure 5 they are 
not made explicit. Imagine, for example, that the two goods A and B are actually two 
activities (as in the Grossman-Helpman model, 1991). The objective of one is to 
produce goods and services to satisfy immediate needs; the objective of the other is to 
generate “ideas”, such as new technological or organisational solutions that can be 
 43 
applied to the production of goods and services in order to increase their efficiency 
and effectiveness. In this case, the indifference curve from the consumer side would 
lie between satisfying immediate needs and satisfying them more effectively in the 
future, rather than between two goods. The division of labour according to 
comparative advantages would thus allow economic systems that are open to trade to 
gain greater benefits today without affecting growth, and vice versa. There remain the 
classic arguments, both of which were introduced by Adam Smith in his 1776 Treaty. 
These concern, first, the dynamic gains in trade, linked to increasing returns of scale 
of a dynamic and static nature, which an increase in demand would allow compared to 
the level permissible in autarchy, and, second, “vent for surplus”. 
The second argument, exemplified in Figure 6, regards adjustment costs. This 
argument concerns the effects of relinquishing economic policy tools when a country 
accepts joining monetary union. The previous exercise in comparative statics was 
highly simplified. In particular, it assumed that reducing internal production of A 
instantly brings about an increase in the production of B so that productive capacity is 
maintained to the full because imports of A are instantly balanced by exports of B. 
The exercise does not allow for construction time. Let us imagine, more realistically, 
that imports of A come in first because they are available at a lower price in the 
external competition. Owing to outside competition, there is an immediate drop in 
production of A in the domestic market but it takes time and money for resources that 
are not being used to find their way to the other sector, which must reorganise in order 
to increase its productive capacity and learn to sell on external markets. Let us 
imagine, however, that the gains in trade are positive even accounting for adjustment 
costs. The question is, since costs by definition precede gains, can a course of action 
that is efficient be implemented when the gains are greater in the long run but for the 
present the action is more costly? The traditional answer is yes, if all three tools of 
economic policy - fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy - can be exercised. A 
reduction in interest rates can accelerate private investment and thus help reallocate 
resources and reduce unemployment caused by outside competition. This requires 
devaluating currency, which cannot be done in a regime of monetary union. 
Mundell (1962, cited by Onida, 1974) first illustrated this point, exemplified in 
Figure 6. In the graph, G is public debt and i is the interest rate. Line XX indicates 
internal equilibrium with full employment and no inflation; line FF indicates external 
equilibrium of parity in the balance of payments. The initial position is at point a, 
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where, in order to have parity in the balance of payments, full employment and no 
inflation, it is necessary to exercise monetary and fiscal policies in order to obtain 
corresponding levels of public debt and interest rates. If it becomes necessary to 
reduce interest rates in order to accelerate investments in regions that are required to 
reorganise as a result of external competition, then, as the graph illustrates, the 
straight line FF must be shifted to F‟F‟. If this shift does not take place there is a risk 
of internal or external disequilibrium. Devaluating the national currency affects the 
shift, but in monetary union this cannot take place, as there is no longer a national 
currency. 
Fig. 6 – Economic adjustment policy 
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There are two alternatives, both of which are quite problematic. One can rely on 
the mobility of production factors, increasing mobility as the EU has sought to do. It 
can thus be hoped that the time and cost of adjusting is reduced, making specific 
policies, such as the reduction of interest rates, less necessary. Otherwise, one can 
count on external flows of capital (that would shift FF to F‟F‟ on its own without 
devaluating), which would make a trade balance deficit sustainable. Capital flows, 
however, do not tend to find their own way to regions that need restructuring most. It 
is therefore a matter of implementing specific economic policies in order to sustain 
countries and regions that are in the throes of adjustment financially. This is precisely 
what the EU did, but already in the 1980s general opinion was that these two 
solutions were not the best possible. Increasing mobility in productive factors implied 
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reforms in the labour market
50
 that were socially costly, and reforms in internal and 
international financial systems that met with great resistance. Any politician that 
supported these radical reforms was seriously at risk. 
At the same time it was also clear that EU economic and spending policies could 
not be determined by needs. They were the result of the – mostly political – will of 
single member countries. As far as the prospects for regional imbalances after 
European integration were concerned, it was soon clear that two opposing elements 
had to be considered: potential gains in trade and adjustment costs. It was equally 
clear that it would be impossible to predict which of the two would prevail. Hence the 
idea that European regional cohesion policy would forestall future disparities and 
perhaps even support processes leading to convergence.  
It could be added that, in the years that followed, concern about regional 
disparities was amplified by the findings of NEG
51
 as well as by further arguments 
put forward by theories of modern growth (Armstrong, 2002)
52
, specialisation 
processes (Krieger-Boden, 2002), and internal or external shocks of a political or 
institutional nature (Mazzola, Fazio, Lo Cascio, 2002)
53
. 
European integration and cohesion: policies and trends 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, research has focussed on the entity and nature of 
regional disparities within the EU in order to shed light - implicitly or explicitly - on 
the scope of cohesion policy and to clarify whether there was a real need for it. While 
fears that regional imbalances would worsen as a result of EU liberalisation (and 
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 These reforms went in the direction of deregulation and met with great resistance. Major European 
players are mostly reconsidering them. The “regionalist” approach of the SEA until a few years ago 
accepted that resistance was a reality, while the Sapir Report criticizes “policies oriented towards 
maintaining what is socially regarded as an adequate degree of cohesion may reduce the efficiency and 
growth benefits arising from market liberalisation and integration. [… because] national labour market 
regulations which limit the effective degree of intra-country labour mobility across regions, sectors 
and/or firms in an attempt to reduce interpersonal inequalities tend to run counter to the requirements 
for a dynamic economy and thus reduce growth potential. (p.72) 
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 Used by Sapir in his Report, see p.106 
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 Armstrong discusses economic theory forecasts regarding the effects of convergence and 
polarization at a regional level in the light of: neoclassical theory of convergence (absolute and 
conditioned); the theory of endogenous growth; radical post-fordist theories; social capital theory; NEG 
models, models of growth encouraged by exports. His “eclectic” hypothesis is that the prevailing 
dynamic forces could be favourable to very slow convergence among regions, but could contribute to 
divergence at local sub-regional level. 
53
 In reality, economic activity is never completely in “equilibrium”. Apart from aggregate models that 
include cumulative processes, the literature that studies the effects of disturbances is relevant. These 
disturbances can be distributed in different ways in different local systems, and different local systems 
can react in different ways to them. Under enlargement and opening markets these disturbances could 
well become more frequent and more intense. 
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enlargement) were well founded, economists were divided as to the real effects, 
especially in the long term. The debate justifies the lively (but as we shall see as yet 
insufficient) production of studies and research on the topic. From a political point of 
view, moreover, the legitimation of cohesion policies was imperative, taking 
precedence over strictly economic arguments. The hypothesis that has gained ground 
is that the objective of cohesion was supported for reasons over and above the matter 
of developing lagging regions. If it is reasonable to claim that cohesion was a 
necessary element in the Single European Act establishing the single market, then it is 
not hard to appreciate the need to legitimate a European institutional system (a new 
axis between the European and the local level against the “conservative” resistance of 
national states) that would support its implementation. The system, it could even be 
said, was more significant for the future of the EU than the rapid reduction of national 
economic and social differences (Lebessis-Paterson, 1999). 
This, together with the structural uncertainty regarding the tolerability of regional 
disparities, helps explain why there is often a gap between intentions and reality.
54
 
One important finding is how inconsequential EU policies for redressing imbalances 
were. In the US (in the 1990s) internal regional imbalances were two or three times 
smaller than in the EU where, after the 2004 enlargement, imbalances grew 
dramatically. Moreover, while in the EU imbalances grew throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, in the US they diminished (Armstrong, 2002, p.247), just as faster growth in 
the US started to diverge from slower growth in the EU (Denis, McMorrow, Röger, 
2004). This phenomenon has caused researchers and observers to claim that regional 
imbalances depend on overall growth; the gap closes when the EU enjoys sustained 
growth and widens when growth is slower.  The role of “federal” redistributive 
policy, however, cannot be neglected
55
. As Espansa (2002) pointed out, in the US the 
federal budget represents 20% of the GDP and its redistributive capacity, in advanced 
regions as much as in lagging regions, is between 20 and 30%, while the EU budget 
represents 2% of its GDP and its redistributive capacity is estimated to be between 4 
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 It could, after all, have been considered important for the EU to establish direct relations with 
regional governments, whatever the economic resources available. 
55
 This policy is neglected in the literature that examines the extent of, and reasons for, EU-US 
divergence in growth rates. See, for example, Denis, McMorrow, Röger (2004) in a report for the 
Commission that adopts an approach calculating growth, rather than considering the importance of 
local development. It may well be true that greater growth rates in the US (owing to capital 
accumulation and TFP) can be partly explained by the acceleration of growth in once backward 
regions, that this acceleration was encouraged by a federal redistributive policy, and that this policy 
was particularly successful in the last two decades. 
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and 6% 
56
. This means that in the EU the problem is not that policies are not 
redistributive.
57
 Their redistributive capacity can be expressed by the indicator 2-3 
(4% and 6% divided by 2), while the same indicator is 1-1.5 in the US and 1-1.7 in 
Canada. The problem, rather, is that the EU budget is minimal, ten times lower than 
that of other “federal” countries. The comparison would seem to highlight little 
commitment on the part of the EU to redressing territorial disparities, even 
considering the fact that EU structural funds require recipients to co-finance regional 
policies and that the total resources available for regional policies are therefore the 
sum of EU and national funds. It could be observed, then, that EU regional 
imbalances are much greater than in the US, and that policies to redress these 
imbalances are less effective in the EU, though a lower budget
58
 means that in 
absolute the difference is smaller. 
Trends in regional disparities have been modified in the EU by regional policies, 
but probably less so than in other federalist countries. Let us now examine these 
trends, which paint a highly complex picture. Despite a lack of essential data that 
makes any conclusive results difficult to come by, a few clear tendencies can be 
outlined. Research
59
 has unanimously stressed the fact that the gap between regions is 
greater than the gap between countries.
60
 There is also agreement in documenting 
reductions in regional gaps in terms of product per employee during the 1960s and 
70s, though the limited quantity and quality of available data has led to observations 
that these results are inconclusive. Research has shown that if convergence took place 
it was “conditioned”. That is, regional economic systems that started off at 
significantly different stages of development did not converge towards a single level 
of product per employee, but towards various levels according to the varying natures 
of their production structures, human capital, infrastructure, and socio- institutional 
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 In Canada the federal budget is 18% of GDP. Its redistributive power is between 20 and 30%. 
57
 Other researchers have made similar finds. For an updated bibliography, see Acconcia, Espansa, 
Leonida, Montolio (2003). 
58
 In these calculations and comparisons territorial rebalancing policies in single member countries 
rather than over the whole of the EU are not usually taken into account. These policies are generally 
allowed and maintained by the EU, within certain guidelines and limits. Whether it is necessary to 
calculate them in order to make a correct comparative evaluation against other federalist countries 
remains to be seen. These national policies, however, could be considered independent of the 
integration process. Moreover, they are different in each country.  
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 Armstrong (2002) examines 23 from Barro and Sala –I –Martin (1991) to Cuadraro-Roura, Mancha-
Navarro, Garrido-Yserte (2000). More have joined the ranks in the last few years. For an update, see 
Corrado, Martin, Weeks (2005). 
60
 Hamburg is the richest region, with a per capita income 5 times higher than the poorest in Greece. 
Germany‟s per capita income as a whole is not even twice that of Greece. 
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environment.
61
 Finally, more recent research has observed a tendency for regions to 
form groups, or “convergence clubs”, some of which coalesce across national 
barriers. Non-parametric studies, which are more reliable in their findings for multiple 
polarising processes
62
, have made similar observations. 
The complexity of these findings makes interpretation highly challenging. One 
question is: was the early tendency to converge the real long-term trend, and its 
subsequent holding back a temporary deviation, or vice versa? As yet, research has 
not been able to provide an answer (Cuadrado, Roura, Parellada, 2002). 
To conclude, the only alternative, as Corrado, Martin, Weeks (2005)
63
 pointed 
out, is to valorise trends that on average converge - though very slowly and highly 
conditioned by their starting points - in clusters that are at least in part spatially 
contiguous. In short, it would seem that regional disparities persist (convergence in 
clusters does not impede divergence among clusters, even if it contributes to average 
convergence) even when a process of economic integration has progressively led to a 
single currency and to a certain extent has redressed imbalances. 
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Chapter 1 Appendix 2 - Getting growth going: industrial 
districts 
As we have seen, NEG does not provide answers to the question of how 
development in a lagging area is set in motion. It has demonstrated that development 
can be self-reinforcing once it has been set in motion, but the trigger has not been 
found. However NEG studies of agglomeration mechanisms are a good start. NEG 
claims that one of the factors that explain development disparities between different 
areas is the mobility of firms and their resources in the modern, industrial sector. This 
mobility implies that firms and resources - all other conditions being equal - tend to 
go where there is development and abandon areas where there is none, generating 
agglomeration processes. This implication leads to two considerations. First, a factor 
or mechanism that gets growth going (whatever it is) must be strong otherwise it will 
not be successful. NEG warns that where there is underdevelopment the level of 
wellbeing, however low, is not normally guaranteed. Rather, underdevelopment is 
seen as an evolving process that tends to deteriorate.  Second, NEG sheds light on a 
way to promote development in lagging regions. If mobile resources tend to abandon 
the region, thus widening the gap with more developed regions, then the engine of 
change must lie in resources that cannot be shifted, that is, immobile resources.  
The valorisation of immobile resources in underdeveloped economies becomes a 
feasible option especially when real life does not reflect the simplifications of the 
model -, the hypothesis of full employment, or that of perfect immobility of labour in 
the traditional sector and perfect mobility of labour in the modern sector, to name a 
few. A lagging area, in fact, usually has high levels of unemployment, and large 
numbers of workers abandon agricultural areas and traditional activities rooted in the 
land. At the same time many industrial sectors rely on specific skills equally rooted in 
the territory; these workers would be less productive if they were employed 
elsewhere. 
If we introduce the concept that there is under-employment in the traditional sector 
and that some workers can move, then the lagging area is by definition impoverished 
unless it undergoes modernisation and increases its productivity. The same holds for 
the modern sector:  a contributing factor to development would be to recognise that 
labour is not completely mobile. Development strategies should therefore aim to curb 
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losses in human resources by incrementing productive employment rooted in the local 
context. 
At first sight, it would seem that the experience of Italian industrial districts, about 
which there is a vast literature reconstructing their history and describing how they 
work, might serve our purposes.  Anticipating our conclusions, the answer, however, 
is that it does not. Neither NEG nor the literature on industrial districts solves the 
problem of identifying triggers for development in lagging areas. 
Let us examine to start with the morphology of a successful local system as 
expressed in an “evolved industrial district”. After years of research starting in the 
1970s
64
, Becattini (1978, 1979) analysed industrial districts as systems with three 
levels: “the productive apparatus in the strictest sense; the institutions linking the 
productive apparatus […] to the district‟s community; the formation and transmission 
of values that are at the foundation of district-type behaviour.” (Maccadelli, Sforzi, 
1997, pp.259-62). At each of these three levels (interacting with one another) there 
are elements and mechanisms that are specific to districts. These are the distinctive 
resources that are used effectively in that district alone, any one of which, if it were 
taken away, would bring about the collapse of the whole district. In this sense, to 
adopt the concepts of NEG, the district‟s resources are immobile and defend the 
industrial district from agglomeration processes that may be taking place in other 
areas.  
At the top of the list of specific resources there is one essential feature: districts 
operate as complex units. The distinctive element of their resources is that they 
interact at all three levels: at the level of productive apparatus, of the institutions 
linking the productive apparatus to the community, and of the core values of district-
type behaviour produced and reproduced by the elementary institutions of the district 
(family, parish, infant schools).
65
 This close and specific interaction between 
productive apparatus, institutions and values can be described (in our analytical 
bridge between a paradigm of industrial districts and new regional economics) as a 
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 Becattini‟s early systematic works (1978, 1979) are always quoted. In fact, Brusco (1989, p.461) 
refers that Becattini‟s first work, when he “for the first time in Italian economic literature since the war, 
claimed that systems of small firms could be vital and competitive and that it was a mistake to interpret 
them as residue‟s of productive systems destined to failure” was in 1969, in a volume published by 
Irpet (Tuscan Regional Institute for Economic Planning) 
65
 This kind of interaction is present in all forms of economic organization because they are human 
constructs (Polany, 1957, pp.305, 307). In industrial districts it must be especially close and specific, as 
Becattini always underlines. It is therefore different in each district and different from other territorial 
economic organizations. 
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„set of immobile resources coherent with the system‟ or as the „identity‟ of the 
district. 
These resources include: 
- Teams of firms belonging to the district organised around central firms that 
maintain links among districts and with outside demand continuously topped up 
by a pool of unconnected firms.
66
 The presence of open, competitive markets for 
goods from different production phases proves that these resources are abundant. 
These could be described as „diffuse immobile resources of specifically oriented 
productive organisations.‟ 
- Price systems for diverse local markets regulated (and not completely free) 
between a minimum, to guarantee the social reproducibility of the district, and a 
maximum, to guarantee its external competitiveness. This regulation is undertaken 
by local organisations representing interest groups.  These could be described as 
„immobile resources of interested organisations to mediate between income 
distribution with social consensus and the competitiveness of the district.‟67 
- Tacit or contextual knowledge (of a productive or professional nature) and the 
capacity to renew it constantly through interaction with codified knowledge, 
which we describe as „immobile resources including knowing how to do and 
knowing how to learn as mediation between tradition and technical progress‟ 
(Becattini, Rullani, 1993). 
- A set of basic or elementary institutions  (family, parish, infant schools) and a 
political and cultural context able to transmit values such an entrepreneurial spirit, 
a healthy desire to make money, an aptitude for competing but also for 
cooperating, a keen appreciation of technical and professional improvement for 
the new generations: „immobile resources related to value systems that function as 
means of reproduction for districts.‟68 
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 The use of the term „firms‟ (rather than entrepreneurial resources) underlines the fact that they 
combine different productive factors. Firms are thus mobile resources, but immobile inasmuch as the 
specific combination is rooted in the territory. 
67
 It could be said that the conditions for districts to be reproduced are not only linked to long-term 
profit rates, but also to long term „consensus‟ rates. 
68
 In the literature on districts, the social reproduction of these values, together with the close cohesion 
between the productive, institutional and cultural levels, are generally associated not only with the 
specific entrepreneurial supply, but also to the climate of trust that reduces transaction costs. See, for 
example, Dei Ottati, 1994. 
 55 
With NEG models in mind, the concept that emerges is that in an evolved industrial 
district all these resources are immobile (in the sense that they are specific to the 
territory) and therefore safeguard evolved districts from losing their resources to self-
reinforcing agglomeration processes taking place in other territories. If anything, they 
transform these districts into centres of attraction for other areas lacking these 
resources. Another concept that becomes evident is that these districts are case studies 
in dynamic scale economies (learning by doing) supported by external demand 
(competition).  Immobile resources are thus exploited to the full: outside firms 
constantly top up teams of firms in the district; the price system achieves greater 
efficiency in allocating resources; choices involve investments and professional 
training; know-how is renewed, constantly interacting with codified knowledge; the 
political and social context is in symbiosis with a constantly evolving value system, 
which in its turn feeds the entrepreneurial spirit appropriate to and specifically sought 
by the district. A final observation is that the economic mechanism and its cultural 
dimension
69
 are intimately linked, to the extent that culture comes first; without it the 
economic mechanism could not exist. 
Having outlined the main features of evolved industrial districts, we can now go on 
to address the matter of transferring the district model as a possible solution to the 
problem of local development in a lagging area. Are immobile resources the secret?   
The literature on industrial districts has spent many years70 studying the question 
of whether the industrial district model can be replicated and what conditions (and 
resources) would allow the model to be transferred to lagging areas. As early as the 
1980s, and until quite recently, experts in industrial districts were sceptical; the 
literature contains explicit (though rare) statements to the effect that districts cannot 
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 It is clear in Becattini‟s argument that the cultural dimension relevant for a district is closer to 
Braudel‟s idea (who stresses the idea of conceiving oneself and society, know-how, market and 
production relations, as well as group and family kinships. See Tenenti, 1988, p.12), than to culture, 
mentality and religious views as such. 
70
 In Brusco‟s reconstruction (1989, pp.435, 436-7) it is necessary to go back to the early 1980s. “In the 
early 1980s the problem of designing interventions to encourage the growth of districts was raised for 
the first time. […] This issue could not be put off, because the literature on districts, both Italian and 
international, with exponents such as Sabel, Zeitlin and Piore, had expressed great interest – more 
abroad than in Italy it must be said – for the Emilia model (or the North-East-Centre model, NEC, the 
system area, the third Italy, whatever you want to call it). Experts abroad, researchers and policy 
makers, considered the problem and asked us questions concerning the transferability of the model. 
They asked us whether the model could be replicated in order to increase the productivity of, say, 
textile firms in Nottingham, or tiny knitting firms in Ridgewood, Queens, or small metal working firms 
in Detroit. Not to mention, though this has never been a concern for those responsible for public policy 
in Italy, whether the model could be used to encourage development in the backward Mezzogiono of 
Italy” (p.468). 
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be reproduced.
71
 The highly specific features of the industrial district model lead us 
inevitably to the same conclusion, precisely because their cultural identity is so well 
defined and perceived as the result of a long history and tradition.
72
 
In a 1997 interview, Giacomo Becattini said that the debate over whether industrial 
districts could be reproduced was still open, and he listed the resources that in his 
view would make it possible. In his view, a new aspect in the 1990s was 
globalisation, which provided two new directions. First, incomes continued to grow, 
creating greater and more differentiated demand for durables for personal and 
domestic use (and for the technologies used to produce them). Second, social 
integration
73
 became a more important issue, perhaps as a reaction to a growing 
perception of fear and insecurity.  
As far as resources were concerned (specific immobile resources in the backward 
area to be valorised), Becattini claimed, further interpretation was required, but an 
attempt was made to identify what was needed. Italian industrial districts developed in 
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 Perhaps, as Brusco remembers, the requests were too pressing. 
72
 Brusco is again very clear on this point. In his introduction (1989) to a new edition of a previous 
essay (Brusco, 1989), he notes: “from research on domestic production and on the metal working 
sector in Bergamo, and above all, from all the studies that contributed to the piece on the Gilbrat law 
and the Emilia model, I was always very cautious about using the term „culture‟. I was convinced that 
everything could be explained in terms of mutual economic convenience between the parties involved 
in the exchange. […] The essay that follows, however, asks the question: what is the culture of an 
industrial district and where does it come from? And yet, it does not answer the more important 
question: can this blend of consensus and know-how be reproduced? My essay, after following a 
different path, ends up converging with Becattini‟s argument” (Brusco, 1989, pp.467-8). This 
convergence was contained at the end of the essay: “The development of industrial districts in the 
Veneto and Marches – where Christian Democrat administrators are certainly less efficient than in 
Emilia – is sufficient proof that this way of organizing productive processes in a territory is closely 
linked to the way basic forces operate, throughout the social fabric. […]These are the forces that […] 
have stimulated the spread of districts. Probably, in Emilia, local institutions have accelerated their 
development. But the main referents, if we want to understand and explain what has taken place, are 
not experts in industrial policy who plan incentives for depressed areas, but Hirschman and Braudel 
(Brusco, 1989, p.486). he reference to Hirschman cannot be only to his “linkages” (that belong strictly 
speaking to the productive apparatus). It must be to his more complex work, as an economic historian, 
development economist and economist-sociologist who “questioned the parsimonious paradigm of 
traditional economics: that of the isolated individual who is moved only by personal interest and who 
chooses freely and rationally between alternative courses of action having calculated that costs and 
benefits involved. […] Hirschman contested this approach and proposed as an alternative to 
incorporate gradually into the economic discourse a series of features and tensions that are part of 
human nature and have been forgotten until now” (Meldolesi, 1988, p.10). As for the reference to 
Braudel it is clearly to the great historian-economist who dwelt on the concept of large scale social 
change over long periods of historical time (see Kinser‟s 1981 essay), but also to his idea that “the 
engine of human development should be sought [not only] in terms of technological evolution [but 
also] in terms of the evolution of productive organization, trade and the way social groups aggregate” 
(Tenenti, 1988, p.12). 
73
 By “growing demand for social integration” Becattini seems to mean a widespread need to reassert 
and defend (local) identities and sense of belongingness to reassure people in the new context of 
globalization (including factors such as immigration, loss of control over economic and social choices 
owing to super-national supervision, and cultural homologation).  
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the post-war period as a result of the region‟s entire history, territorial know-how, 
values and institutions. In many lagging areas in Italy, by contrast, there may have 
been a few factories (perhaps the result of previous failed national interventions such 
as the „special programme‟ in the Italian Mezzogiorno74), a handful of craftsmen‟s 
workshops, self-production, domestic production and some conurbations. The values 
and cultural context were inadequate, but a surrogate factor was able to take over and 
allow districts to develop even in lagging areas. This factor was the growing demand 
for social integration.  
There is no contradiction then between the claim that districts could be reproduced 
under certain circumstances and the statement that their value system could not be 
exported.  The proliferation of Italian industrial districts in the post-war period was 
simply a first wave. A second „spontaneous‟ wave is still underway today, stimulated 
by a „world demand „ for industrial districts, and sustained by the same 
entrepreneurial resources and place-based know-how that Italy‟s countless cities and 
sub-regions are so full of.
75
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 The „special programme‟ failed in its main objective, which was the industrialization of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno with industrial poles, but did leave behind various factories, each with long and 
tormented histories. In most cases, the big Italian firms have withdrawn. However, it should not be 
forgotten that in several successful industrial districts in the Centre and North-East of Italy, traditional 
big firms historically were important sources for the dissemination of technical and entrepreneurial 
know-how. An econometric study conducted at provincial level has shown that the variable 
„employees‟ in industrial firms with more than 1,000 workers after 1937 was very significant in 
explaining variations in autonomous industrial labour between 1951 and 1971 (Seravalli, 1999, pp.76-
77). Brusco made similar observations in his analysis: “Almost always at the origin of an industrial 
district there are big firms that have, even a long time before, been operational there. […] There are 
many examples, many of which are extremely clear. […] The logic of this pattern of development is 
evident: big and medium-sized firms, with their daily laboriousness,  manage to introduce the 
necessary technical and professional competencies in a largely agricultural social context with few 
links with outside markets. Workers then learn how to manage the productive process, white-collar 
workers forge links with suppliers and other elements of the market for the product. Under certain 
circumstances, blue and white-collar workers tend to transform themselves into autonomous workers, 
transferring the skills they learned in the factory to their own productive units” (Brusco, 1986, pp.482-
3).  
75
 This is one step further than Brusco‟s three types of artisans (traditional craftsmen, dependent 
decentralization, independent decentralization) who co-exist but typically are dispersed. The first group 
are usually found in “in Puglia or Sardinia [the second group] in Lombardy and Piedmont, [the third 
group] around Bologna Prato, Venice an d Ancona. These should not be seen as three stages of 
evolution; in fact there is no point in hoping that aid given to small firms in general will transform 
artisans in the South into pillars of a new industrial organization. […] Without the necessary markets 
and experience, this aid can only make traditional craftsmen richer; it will never transform them into 
something different” (Brusco, Sabel, 1981, p.113). This point of view reflects a lack of trust in 
incentives, as well as, more importantly, Brusco‟s conviction that traditional craftsmanship is of a 
completely different nature and cannot be transformed into the independent artisan of industrial 
districts.  
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This kind of „impotent optimism‟76is troublesome. The problem is that the 
approach of this analysis, based on the genesis and development of Italian industrial 
districts, almost entirely excludes the influence of intentional policies, both national 
(central government) and local - especially if these policies were never part of the 
long-term history77 of the territories involved. This is, in our view, unjustified. The 
literature of industrial districts has hardly ever conducted research into national or 
local policies supporting small firms. There are inevitable objective difficulties in 
terms of analysis and measurement78, but that does not excuse a priori judgements.79 
A symptom of this is the literature‟s cautious, slow – but nor imperceptible – march 
towards including the role of policy. And yet, there has been very little research in 
recent years.
80
 Although this marks a step forward compared to the reductive 
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 Optimism because – as, paradoxically, certain neoclassical analyses of growth pointed out – 
everything adjusts itself naturally; Impotent because there is really nothing important that can be done 
intentionally. 
77
 Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti (1993) had a great (and disastrous, in our view) influence with their 
„demonstration‟ that the institutions of the Italian regions were highly diverse, especially between 
North and South, and that this diversity correlated positively with „civic sense‟.  These findings became 
a formidable basis for arguing that, even if local institutions had done something to support 
development, what they did had in some way to be explained away by the long-term history of the area 
that left different heritage and cultural attitudes in different areas which have to do with basic 
institutions rather than intermediary institutions, with custom and tradition rather than with policy 
making. More detailed empirical research shows that the opposite can also be true. That is, politics and 
institutions can create civic sense (Arrighetti, Lasagni, Raimondi, 2000). 
78
 A very basic fact that is often completely ignored, for example, is that these policies take variable 
lengths of time, and anyway a long time, to have an effect. This means that conclusions as to their 
effectiveness are often over-hasty. A case in point is the policy of infrastructured industrial areas, 
which in the 1980s was quickly considered a failure. Today the situation is highly diversified and 
research is still underway, but the experience can by no means be judged a failure. For many of these 
areas the problem was simply that results took ten or fifteen years to come about rather than two or 
three years. 
79
 Obviously industrial policies in favour of districts (already in place) are another matter. At times 
there is a certain amount of confusion. Italian experts did not neglect the matter of industrial policy. 
Fuà focused on it it (Fuà, 1983), as did Brusco (Brusco, 1984, 1991, Brusco, Righi, 1985), and 
Becattini (Becattini, 1998, for example). These experts even inspired a national law. And yet this does 
not mean that they really believe that autonomous intentional actions of politicians and institutions are 
relevant factors among other things in the birth of industrial districts. 
80 It might be useful to consider some of the contributions. We have already mentioned Becattini. For 
him, basic institutions were local markets, local organisations representing interest groups, family, 
parishes and nursery schools. In the year 2000 Becattini published a history of Prato, which offers an 
extraordinarily rich historical reconstruction of the city. While his dominant idea of development is that 
it is spontaneous, bottom-up and supported by a specific historical context, when he poses the question 
of where competition for products made in Italy‟s industrial districts is going to come from, and what 
form it will take, his answer is that it will come from: “some replica, spontaneous or constructed, 
identical or adapted, of their organisational formula and their evolutionary path. […] Their chances are 
limited by barriers that have been largely (and understandably) unexplored. Basically, their chances lie 
in the possibility that some of the more established districts (or some specialised intermediary at a 
multinational level) finds it advantageous to use the new productive unit‟s workmanship, „exploiting‟ 
its skills, educating and providing its workers with the appropriate tools, as a master would his 
apprentices. Otherwise, its chances lie in the possibility that a government that has understood what is 
going on adopts the objective of promoting industrial districts and is in a position to implement its 
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traditional approach of the early district experts, the literature
81
 has not been able to 
get beyond the idea that policy counts, but only in creating a favourable „climate‟.  
                                                                                                                                           
policy. The government policy would need to avoid the usual traps of paternalism and aid-dependency 
and help firms inside the embryonic districts, supporting research, training, technical and market 
information, quality control, increasing access to credit, tax benefits and foreign exchange relief, and, 
last but not least, weighing in with the „international influence of the country‟ as well as its political 
and diplomatic channels so that districts gain access to markets that have been closed and protected.” 
(Becattini, 2000, p.227.). The obvious question is: did this ever take place? As we have said, optimism 
has faded, and there is a greater sense of impotence. Policies of this kind might well have been at work 
in the history of Italian districts and in the city of Prato without being trumpeted around or without 
being recognised. Again in 2000, Signorini wrote: ”If a question of public policy appears right from the 
beginning of the literature, it‟s usually at a local government level rather than at central government 
level. The question seems to refer to cultural aspects, in the widest sense, rather than to specific 
intervention policies. Local administrations, parties and social formations are, in all the classic 
literature on districts, an important part of the „climate‟ of the district. The interaction between 
administrations and entrepreneurial forces, based on a common identity and shared values can play a 
determinant role. In concrete terms, a favourable attitude on the part of local administrations can be 
translated into regulations and programmes that take into account the requirements of the district in 
order for the area to develop. It can also contribute to the creation of infrastructure (roads, transport, 
waste disposal etc), as well as support collective ventures in promotion and training. Firms on their 
own find it hard to achieve the same results in a coordinated, efficient and socially acceptable way. 
(Signorini, 2000, p.xxxiii). There is an apparent contradiction between the idea that the role of local 
politics seems to count only to the extent that it contributes to the cultural climate of the district but not 
for its specific interventions, and the brief but highly concrete list of possible interventions provided. 
Putnam might inspire an interpretation. What counts, it seems, are the shared values; all the rest 
follows. There is never any doubt that the opposite may also be true. In 2001, Dei Ottati wrote: “We 
have just seen how the collective capital of trust is essential for the formation and reproduction of 
districts as vital socio-economic systems. Even though it depends on its past, inasmuch as it is based on 
belonging to the same social culture, this kind of trust is not independent of human action. […] It is 
anyway the result of a „political‟ action in a wider sense. This statement is of vital practical importance, 
because it opens the door to the possibility of drafting intervention policies to revitalise industrial 
districts that are failing and to help new successful districts to come about in regions that are still 
economically depressed” (Dei Ottati, 2001, p.177). Here, finally, there is a different idea, though the 
phrase „political action in a wider sense‟ dilutes the strength of the claim. E believe it is „political‟ in 
the closest sense (Arrighetti, Seravalli, 1997).  
81
 Industrial districts in Italy, according to the ten-year data collected between 1951 and 1991 that can 
now be compared, absorbed a share of industrial workers of  35-40% of the total (Brusco, Paba, 1997, 
p.320). If we adopt a wider definition (that includes firms operating just outside the borders of the 
specialisation filière), “in 1996, 44.8% of workers in Italian manufacturing were employed in districts. 
[…] Between 1991 and 1996 the weight of districts in terms of workers employed there increased by 
1.5% (Iuzzolino, 2000, p.19). In 1996, in 17 provinces the weight of workers in districts was more than 
80% of the total manufacturing sector, and in 34 provinces it was more than 60% (data in Iuzzolino, 
2000, p.13). In 2001, the preliminary analyses of the Census data with reference to local labour systems 
were published, revealing that for the first time the relative weight of workers had shifted in favour of 
medium-sized firms, which do not share the same features as industrial districts. These data are 
important, though industrial districts were probably still doing better (and had done better) than the rest 
of the industrial system. “The firms that survive do so for longer […] The market is highly particular. 
Young workers enter the system relatively early, and consider the first stages of their employment as 
apprenticeship. Investments in human capital are successively repaid, both in terms of salaries and in 
terms of contractual and negotiating power” (Casavola, Pellegrini, Romagnano, 2000, p.65). As far as 
exports are concerned, although a “worrying weakness in the model of Italian specialisation - which 
mostly leans on traditional sectors, […] and which does not have the advantages of concentration; […] 
which suffers from high congestion and an inadequate ratio between circulating vehicles and the road 
network - is one of the factors that negatively influences trade balances, nevertheless, industrial 
districts have played an essential role in compensating all these weaknesses” (Gola, Mori, 2000, p. 81). 
“The profitability of firms in industrial districts is significantly higher than that of single firms. 
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The industrial district paradigm, then, is doubtless useful, but only partially so. 
Looking more in general at the local development of small firms in Italy, the 
usefulness of the model is limited both by the fact that it neglects other typologies of 
production and by the fact that it underestimates intentional policies. These two 
failings have been revealed by historical reconstructions of the features of Italian 
economic development. The limits of the district approach are the result of the idea 
that immobile resources are geographically and historically specific. In this view, they 
are the result of the cohesion and functional coherence of their territory; the product 
of the area‟s elementary institutions. All of these features call to mind cultural 
connotations rather than intentional actions. Thus, some important immobile 
resources that play a recognised role in economic development, such as public or 
collective goods in the widest sense, are absent. The limited role of intentional 
policies also conceals the starting and finishing point of development. The paradigm 
of industrial districts is more successful in tracing both the relationships among agents 
of the district and their origins, but it has not managed to solve the problem of their 
transferability.  
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Chapter Two - Underdevelopment Traps and Social 
Traps82 
Underdevelopment is hard to combat; the only thing to do is fight the forces that 
tend to preserve or aggravate it.  A community or territory has at its disposal 
immobile resources, which are potential features of - though not necessarily forces for 
- local development, while competition between economic agents on it own does not 
generate adequate incentives for development. 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the reasons for this market “failure”. We shall 
see how a single person or a sole firm cannot valorise resources or opportunities, 
because underdevelopment traps and social traps act together to create obstacles for a 
lagging area‟s development, or to drive an area that has been struggling to escape it 
back into underdevelopment. 
The first section presents a simple graph that illustrates underdevelopment traps. 
The second section shows that this issue has occupied, and continues to occupy, an 
important place in economic literature. The third section deals with the objection that 
these traps can be overcome by means of reduced labour costs, and argues that it is 
precisely the reduced cost of labour that creates social traps, which in their turn curb 
the development of a significant modern sector. In the fourth section, combined social 
and underdevelopment traps are discussed using a classical model with endogenous 
techniques. The fifth and final section examines consequences for development 
policies. The appendix illustrates the mechanism of social traps by means of a 
simulation of an artificial, multi-agent economy.  
Underdevelopment traps, the mechanism 
The concept of underdevelopment traps can be used in a context of backwardness 
where it is assumed there are immobile resources (natural and human) with low or 
inexistent productivity that could be put to better use. In this mechanism, the 
transition from unoccupied to more productive immobile resources does not take 
place incrementally. The transition only takes place if a sizeable block of resources 
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 Section 4 and the Appendix were written with Alessandro Arrighetti, who also played a role in 
section 5 and in other points, to the extent that he could almost be considered co-author for this chapter. 
For the model in Section 4 Paolo Epifani made useful suggestions.  
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shifts at the same time - but nobody knows how big the block needs to be before the 
transition takes place. The situation becomes a trap because a small number of 
immobile resources cannot exit low productivity, while individual holders of 
resources cannot come to spontaneous agreement to transfer a block of sufficient size, 
since nobody knows how many would need to move.  
In advanced economic systems, these reallocations take place all the time, without 
any difficulty because the market stimulates them. Resources are disinvested from 
activities with low profit margins and reinvested in activities with higher margins. 
There is, therefore, a substantial difference between advanced economic systems and 
lagging ones. In advanced systems, the opportunity for resources to be used is wider 
and more articulated than in backward ones. A sole firm can disinvest from one 
activity and invest in another without incurring excessive costs. There are already 
many different operators in all fields and thus knowledge and skills can be easily 
acquired. In lagging areas, by contrast, economic activities are not very articulated. 
Traditional activities usually dominate the scene, together with some form of 
industrial activity in embryonic form. A firm that wants to leave a traditional activity 
and invest in the modern, industrial sector will find it difficult, if not impossible to 
acquire, without sustaining elevated costs, the knowledge and skills that are 
indispensable for his new activity. It would have been easier if others before him had 
already successfully made the transition from the traditional to the modern sector. In 
this case, one firm would benefit from the experience of others.
83
 It could be said, in 
short, that in a lagging area there are direct costs associated with the transfer from 
traditional to modern activities as well as future externalities associated with modern 
activities. 
The mechanism can be represented very simply in Figure 7. V represents marginal 
productivity (of a generic resource pertinent to a single agent); Ltr represents the 
share of agents in the traditional sector (with low marginal productivity), and Lm the 
share of agents operating in the modern or industrial sector (with high marginal 
productivity. Let us assume that differences in marginal productivity (AB) depend on 
the presence of externalities in the modern sector, as well as the transfer costs for 
shifting from the traditional to the modern sector. The two bold lines (to the left and 
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 In a recent study on development in emerging countries (Hausmann, Hwang, Rodrick 2005) the 
central theoretical hypothesis is that “the local cost discovery [that] generates knowledge spillovers.” 
See pp.1-2. 
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right of the vertical line V) represent for a sole firm the alternative payoffs. Until a 
share of firms less or equal to Lm* transfers to the modern sector, a sole firm will still 
find it advantageous to stay in the traditional sector. The threshold of Lm* is not 
known to the agents, which means there cannot be collaboration. 
It is thus clear that the actions of single economic agents deciding independently, 
even if they have the resources to sustain their actions, cannot get growth going. What 
is needed is a “Big Push” to reallocate resources in a sizeable block. 
Underdevelopment traps in economic literature 
That it is hard to get growth going and that development requires an intentional 
“Big Push” has long been recognised in economic literature. There are, however, 
some different paradigms – today the majority – that consider incremental approaches 
or look at markets. 
84
 
In a well-known essay, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) proposed a path for 
economic development based on intentional interventions
85
 calling externalities into 
play. Rosenstein-Rodan claimed that this was the only path: in his view, development 
based on existing wealth was impossible because “Capital must be supplied internally 
at the expense of standard of life and consumption which are already at very low 
level.”86 Rosenstein-Rodan‟s contribution was influential mostly because of its 
argument for “balanced development” by means of public initiatives supporting 
different firms and sectors simultaneously. Hirschmann opposed his argument using 
his concept of linkages that favoured “unbalanced development” (with partial 
initiatives and spontaneous contagious effects). Rosenstein-Rodan‟s essay did 
contemplate this possibility, but his main emphasis was on externalities, “Marshallian 
economies external to the firm” 87 (see p.206, point 7) as well as other externalities 
associated with a drop in the perceived risk.
88
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 Among empirical research conducted by reducing growth rates to their component parts, works such 
as Young‟s (1995) have claimed that development in emerging countries should be attributed to the 
availability of workers. Other research has stressed the role of the “total productivity of factors” or of 
technological and organizational change. The idea of traps belongs to the second category because it 
claims that development is not possible only on the basis of vast availability of labour. A recent 
contribution, containing a survey of the debate, claims that with new methods it is possible to prove 
that technical and organizational change is dominant (Khan, 2006). 
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 He was anyway clearly thinking of small firms and of „light‟ sectors, technologies employing a great 
number of workers, not large firms or intense capital sectors (see pp.203-4 and p. 206). 
86
 Idem. See p.203 
87
 These are indicated in pp. 259-62 of the Principles of Economics (Marshall, 1890) and regard 
common knowledge, the division and specialization of labour, a labour market with a strong 
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Basically, Rosenstein-Rodan‟s idea is that in lagging countries and regions nothing 
can change while the modern sector remains relatively small. He maintains that there 
is a threshold beyond which everything contributes to development and before which 
nothing can change. In this sense, then, it is clear that, in Rosenstein-Rodan‟s 
approach, the primary objective of policy was to focus on getting growth going, 
recognising that this cannot take place on its own and that neither the market nor 
incremental steps determine its outcome. 
Economic development literature has always gone back to this point, from 
Leibenstein (1957) and Nurkse (1953) to the early formalisation provided by Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), and by Krugman (1993), up until the proliferation
89
 of 
works published in the 1990s. Considering Hoff and Stiglitz‟s survey (2000), these 
works provide a detailed exploration of the various characteristics of complementarity 
between agents or processes and the risk of coordination failures with a stable 
underdevelopment equilibrium. 
In the more recent literature on the subject, transfer costs, externalities and 
underdevelopment traps have been examined.  According to these works, traps are 
caused by: low capita income in the population, which is therefore unable to sustain 
sufficient demand for new final goods; an insufficient demand for specialised 
equipment owing to the small number of firms interested in using it; an insufficient 
supply of qualified labour owing to the small number of firms demanding it; an 
insufficient level of professionalism in the labour force owing to widespread lack of 
knowledge and a low standard of living; an insufficient financial savings owing to the 
                                                                                                                                           
professional and qualified component. A less known element is when Marshall quotes Hobson: “The 
mutual influences of the localization of industry, the growth of towns and habits of town life, and the 
development of machinery are well discussed in Hobson's Evolution of Capitalism” Marshall 1890, p. 
262, who evidently knew Hobson‟s work before its publication after the „Principles‟. Hobson had in 
mind an evolutionary dynamic in which good salaries in local systems that grow allow a cumulative 
process that proceeds from the differentiation and qualification of labour, another aspect of 
externalities “The arts of production and consumption will [...] be found inseparable: not merely will 
they be seen to be organically related, but rather will appear as two aspects of the same fact [...].  Just 
in proportion as our tastes become so qualitative that we require to put our own spontaneity, our sense 
of beauty and fitness, our vital force, into what-ever work we do, and likewise require the same 
elements of spontaneity and individuality in all we enjoy, the economic conditions of a perfect society 
will be attained.” (Hobson 1894, p. 380) 
88
 “His subjective risk estimate is [in a depressed area] bound to be considerably higher than the 
objective risks. If the industrialization of international depressed areas were to rely entirely on the 
normal incentive of private entrepreneurs, the process would not only be much slower, the rate of 
investment smaller and (consequently) the national lower, but the whole economic structure of the 
region would be different   [than that of substantial international investment].” Rosenstein, Rodan, 
1943, p.206-7 
89
 Hoff and Stiglitz‟s survey (2000) takes into account 43 works published since 1990. 
 67 
insufficient productive use of financial resources; an insufficient capacity to combat 
corruption owing to the reduced number of firms that can effectively be controlled; an 
insufficient drive for change (of behaviour, attitude, beliefs, workplace, etc) owing to 
the minimal number of subjects that have already changed; an insufficient capacity 
for discriminated groups (including women) to take action, which perpetuates 
discrimination. 
Underdeveloped areas are thus characterised by many traps,
90
 which join forces to 
become powerful agencies for conservation: low per capita income, limited modern 
sector activities, lack of savings, unqualified labour, low level education and training, 
a static tradition hostile to change, corruption, criminality, discrimination. The very 
existence of these factors leads one to consider development strategies requiring 
highly decisive intentional policies. 
Social traps 
One possible objection to the concept of underdevelopment traps, from the point of 
view of valorising immobile resources, is that transferring them from less productive 
to more productive uses can in fact cost very little. In this case, there would be neither 
the high transfer costs assumed by the model, nor traps, nor the need for decisive 
intentional policies. 
This objection has often been justified in economic development literature,
91
 by 
observing that in backward areas the modern sector can make under-utilised or 
unoccupied resources in families or in society more productive. It is true that most 
artisan or commercial enterprises in rural societies are characterised by the fact that 
they are set up by individuals who were not employed efficiently in the agricultural 
sector and who as a consequence created their own work opportunities by establishing 
micro-enterprises in crafts or services (Haggblade, Hazel, Brown, 1989; Grosh, 
Somolekae, 1996; Mead, Liedholm, 1998; Weijland, 1999). The effect of this 
unproductive segment of the population on the overall labour supply is that 
opportunity costs are very limited and the reservation wage is very low. 
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 Empirical research based on multiple equilibria is still not very common (neither is work on traps). 
There have been some encouraging results, however, in Graham and Temple (2001). 
91
 This is the main element, for example, of the dualistic model of Nobel prize winner Arthur Lewis 
(see Lewis, 1979). 
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It could be claimed, then, that low labour costs compensate for training costs and 
that this is simply a cheap way to reallocate under-utilised workers to new activities. 
If this were the case, a new and growing modern sector could gradually develop, 
creating enough efficient firms to push the area beyond the threshold indicated in the 
paradigm of underdevelopment traps. 
All this is perfectly reasonable if looming over this optimistic picture there were not 
social traps. Social traps make linkages impossible between low initial transfer costs 
for resources from the traditional to the modern sector (owing to under-utilised 
resources) and the creation of a sufficiently strong modern sector.  Going back to 
Figure 7, while underdevelopment traps can be seen as impeding the shift of resources 
from traditional to modern sectors, social traps can be seen as an obstacle to resources 
staying in the modern sector where they have already been transferred. Put in another 
way, the former are mechanisms that do not allow exit processes to take place, while 
the latter are mechanisms that do not allow resources to stay away from 
underdeveloped territories. 
The reason for the existence of social traps is that pursuing a limited advantage in 
the short term causes more serious harm in the long term.
92
 Imagine a closed local 
market with a multiplicity of enterprises working in the traditional sector (Ltr=1 in 
Figure 7). Subsequently, a generic innovation that is perfectly reproducible
93
 takes 
place in various stages, and this opens up the opportunity for a new sector to work 
alongside traditional activities. Given the fact that the income received is additional in 
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 A single member of the community exploiting natural resources is the most common example of 
social traps. The over-harvesting (beyond the natural replenishment level) of fish species or forest 
reserves, or over-grazing, allows short-term benefits for the individual, but in the long term it leads to 
impoverishment and finally to the depletion of the common resource. Positive reinforcement in the 
present soon becomes long-term negative loss to society if other members of the community imitate the 
behaviour of the individual. On the other hand, rational agents have no choice but to do so. If there are 
no regulations or obstacles to this behaviour, the fear of no longer having access to a resource in the 
future will persuade all the agents to accelerate their exploitation in order to accumulate advantage 
before it is too late. The result is the over-exploitation of a resource and, in the long run, its depletion. 
In a context of social traps, individually rational behaviour can lead to collectively irrational behaviour. 
The literature on social traps is vast. Essential references are Hardin, 1968, 1982 and Ostrom, 1990. 
93
 Imagine that in a backward area where there is only traditional activity, an innovation (of product or 
process) brings about the early stages of modern sector activity, and thus becomes the first of a series 
of innovations. Let us also imagine that the first step is easy to achieve, without sustaining additional 
costs, while further steps are not as easy, and require hefty investments. This hypothesis is what 
actually happens in real life. Backward economies have the advantage of being able to imitate the 
technical and organizational solutions adopted by more advanced economies. However, owing to 
barriers of tacit knowledge and the need to adapt to circumstances, assimilation of innovations takes 
place over time and with experience, each step preparing the way for the one that follows. See Boggio, 
Seravalli, 2003.Ch.4 
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nature, and given natural risk aversion when a new enterprise has not been 
experimented and when its outcome is uncertain, previously under-utilised resources 
will be employed in the early stages. Imagine, however, that to start with there is only 
one firm starting this new activity, temporarily in a monopolistic capacity, operating 
at average marginal costs equal to C‟, and making maximum profits equal to π1. This 
could be represented by the grey area (P1-C‟)Q1 in Figure 8. 
Costs are made up of variable exogenous costs C” and the prevailing wage 
according to current local parameters (C‟-C”)=w. The absence of barriers to entry 
(investment in fixed capital is limited) and the perfect reproducibility of the 
innovation increase production and reduce prices, causing an erosion of π1. The level 
of production Q2 corresponds to a level attainable in perfect competition where prices 
are the same as costs and profits are zero. For a single firm, demand shifts from d1 to 
d2 because total demand d1 is sub-divided among all firms. If no other firms came in 
beyond the level of perfect competition, the firms present would pay the prevailing 
wage for the labour they employed. Since this labour supply is assumed to be 
unoccupied, the prevailing wage paid represents a flow of additional income that 
could sustain in part the demand for products in the same modern sector. There would 
thus be a two-fold effect on demand. The entry of new firms would reduce demand 
for each producer. Distributed additional income would, on the other hand, increase it. 
Taking both these effects into account, one could imagine that, for each producer, 
demand would be situated somewhere between d1 and d2. In this case, profit margins 
would still be positive (π1 would not be annulled completely). With positive profit 
margins, firms in the modern sector would persevere in their innovations.  
What actually happens is that new firms continue to arrive, pushing the threshold 
beyond the level of perfect competition because they are not forced to pay the 
prevailing wage. A wage below the prevailing level, however modest, is still a source 
of increased family income for people who have been unemployed and the labour 
opportunity cost is almost zero. The entry process for new firms could continue (in 
theory) as long as the curve of the n
th
 firm‟s residual demand (d3) has average costs 
net of labour costs (C”) in a hypothesis of zero reservation wage. There would thus be 
a higher than optimal entry of productive units, with a limit level of Q3 of total 
production. Demand in the modern sector is not therefore sustained significantly by 
income distributed within the same sector, and firms do not make enough profits to 
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allow them to go onto the next stage of innovation and to undertake a development 
path, 
This is true because a sole producer tends not to consider general welfare, but only 
its own profits. Overall demand in the modern sector is at the end of the process 
practically unaltered; it is simply distributed among the new entries. The new firms do 
not distribute additional income, or, if they do, they do so to a very small extent. 
In development models with unlimited labour supplies (Lewis, 1979) this effect is 
not considered, and the unit productivity of labour in the modern sector (value added 
per employee) stays above the standard wage (C‟). In these models a constant 
reservation wage is a factor that helps increase profit, accumulation and development. 
The difference compared to the social traps situation depends on differing 
assumptions about two features. First, Lewis‟s models do not allow the reservation 
wage to be below the prevailing wage. Second, they take as given that barriers to 
entry are high, which means that it is not so easy for new firms to come in. These 
models reflect a context of dualism, where economic and social systems have a 
„community based‟ traditional sector. In this context, the whole social system is based 
on the distributive principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his need”. The unit wage in the traditional sector is thus equal to the average 
productivity of labour, even for those who are unoccupied or under-utilised. The 
reservation wage is fixed at that level even when the productivity of these workers is 
lower, or inexistent. Lewis‟s models do not consider that capitalistic market 
approaches are predominant even in regions and in backward areas (indeed, 
traditional agriculture is obliged to buy seeds, fertilisers, transformation services, 
storage and transport on the market), and that communitarian rules and practices can 
only survive marginally. In the modern sector, these models assume large and 
medium sized firms and neglect the fact that often in the real world firms are small, 
even very small. Dualistic models envisage a world with two completely different 
social and economic systems: one genuinely communitarian and one based on 
advanced industrial capitalism. It is more realistic to imagine that hybrid systems co-
exist in lagging regions: the traditional sector could be modernising and moving 
towards the market, while the modern sector could still be primitive and unstructured.  
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The mechanism of social traps can be seen in many case studies,
94
 and in the 
Appendix there is a good example, backed up with a multi-agent simulation on the 
Swarm platform. What both this exercise and real case studies show is that there is a 
link between the macro dimension (distributed income) and productivity at a micro 
level. Incremental innovation (a significant and stable increase of productivity in the 
modern sector) is held back by low levels of distributed income, owing to the absence 
of barriers to entry and the lack of rigidity (verso il basso) in the cost of labour. As 
early as 1894, Hobson discovered the same phenomenon, as Marshall then pointed 
out. 
Combined traps: a model inspired by classical economics 
This problem brings us back to the central issue in classical economics. It is 
possible to build a very simple dynamic model, in the spirit of classical development 
economics, which evidences the nature of traps at a level of entire economic 
systems.
95
 Underdevelopment and social traps combined create a threshold under 
which economic development cannot take place and beyond which it gets going very 
quickly.
96
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 McCormick (1998) has studies the cluster of mechanical firms in Kamukunji (Kenya). The local 
system comprises 2,000 metal workers and manufacturers. Its position in an industrial area and near the 
regional bus station gives access to markets for factors and products. Low-income residents in Nairobi 
and neighbouring cities are their main consumers. Most firms use productive methods based on manual 
ability and basic technology; only 10% has enough electricity to run more technologically advanced 
machines. Consequently, productive processes are slow, the products are low quality and the few firms 
that have electricity work on commissions rather than in a market. The low technological level of the 
craftsmen does not generate spillover and does not create an accumulation of knowledge and implies 
low barriers to entry, which, together with low skills, translate into a multiplication of mini units that 
does not allow any firm to grow enough to become efficient. 
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 The classical school is relevant here because it flourished during the Industrial Revolution. The 
beginning of modern economic development is central to the social context of the time as well as to its 
thinking. 
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 The processes of economic development that were successful (both after the second world war and 
between the eighteenth and nineteenth century) all had an initial phase of acceleration when GDP 
growth rates are particularly high. It is possible now to see why this is plausible, by means of a recent 
sample of a number of countries. Taking into account the yearly series (1995-2000) of real per capita 
income and equal purchasing power of 45 backward countries, for each one a different base year is 
selected so that they are aligned according to their initial “development stage” defined in 
correspondence to a quota of 70% of the rural population. From the base year, the growth rates in per 
capita income for every country are calculated together with the differences from average world 
growth. On the basis of the results (for every country it is possible to have growth rates for ten years 
from the base year) the 45 countries are divided into groups. The first group includes all countries that 
since the base year have always registered a positive difference from world growth rates; the second 
group comprises countries that have always registered a negative difference; he third group embraces 
countries that have changed trend. The last group includes only 8 countries out of 45, and describes 
cases where a weakly positive initial stage of development is soon aborted. Most countries either grow 
well (especially in the early years after the base year) or continue to decline.   
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As regards the theoretical construction of the model, the question that the classical 
school of economics considered crucial was where surplus ended up. Surplus means 
the part of total output that does not need to be reinvested in the productive process in 
order to keep production at the same level. Surplus can be consumed completely 
without compromising the firm‟s future output (or the surplus itself). If, however, a 
part of the surplus is reinvested in the firm, the volume of production can be 
increased. The question of surplus – how much there is and what happens to it - is in 
fact crucial in the take-off phase of development. With no surplus, growth simply 
does not get going. Second, in the classical approach, goods consumed by workers to 
survive and reproduce are not considered surplus; they are seen as necessary to 
maintain pre-existing levels of production. This consideration is relevant for those 
dealing with the problem of getting growth going in a lagging area. The systemic 
presence of vast swathes of poverty means that unsatisfied subsistence needs cannot 
be neglected. A third peculiarity of the classical „model‟ is that, as in Ricardo‟s essay 
on the price of grain, it only envisages circulating capital, while aggregate models in 
subsequent literature foresaw only fixed capital. The consequences on the crucial 
matter of surplus in the classical model are not particularly relevant. However, in 
contemporary macroeconomic models, which envisage only fixed capital with no 
depreciation or proportional depreciation, the problem of surplus is not so simple. 
The basic model: constant techniques 
We consider that the traditional sector is dominant in a lagging area. All the other 
variables refer to the traditional sector. The embryo of modern activity is considered 
external to the productive system described in the model.  
In the first version of this model (constant techniques), unlike the  model that 
ensued, it is supposed that in order to obtain one unit of traditional output in time t+1 
you need (at time t) aM   (constant) output units as means of production, and aL   
(constant) output units to pay workers. Let a=aL+aM  . If this is the case, then a  is the 
physical capital that must be advanced to time t in order to obtain an output unit after 
a year, that is at time (t + 1). This is the unit cost. To produce in time (t + 1), the 
quantity qt+1, the capital to advance to time t will thus be aqt+1.  
Let us call Kt   the capital invested in traditional output. Thus: 
Kt=aqt+1   
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After a year, this capital no longer exists because it has been completely used up by 
means of production totally absorbed by the annual production cycle and by means of 
subsistence that have been consumed. Capital is thus only circulating capital, meaning 
that it doesn‟t last longer than the production period, in this case one year. 
If a=1, in order to reproduce in time (t +1) the quantity of output produced a year 
before (in time t) the output must be re-employed completely (Kt=qt). The system just 
manages to achieve simple reproduction; that is, to reproduce itself at pre-existing 
levels, without any possibility of growth. 
If, on the other hand, a<1, then to reproduce in time (t +1) the quantity of output 
produced in time t all that is needed is to re-employ some of the production. In this 
case the system is able to generate a surplus; that is, to produce more than is necessary 
to achieve simple reproduction.  
If we indicate surplus with St  we have: 
 
St +1=qt+1-aqt+1=(1-a)qt+1    [10] 
 
Thus the rate of surplus over capital is: 
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Let us call the growth over time of Kt  (equal to the output growth rate, since it is 
proportional to the capital invested) „capital accumulation‟. The capital necessary to 
set a new productive cycle in motion can be taken from output revenue. If this capital 
is higher than in the previous cycle, „capital accumulation‟ takes place. 
Let g(t) be the rate of growth capital between time t and (t+1), defined as: 
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If the output at time (t + 1) were completely reinvested in production, that is if 
Kt+1=qt+1 , then the situation would be: 
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Which is equal to the surplus rate. 
 
This is another way to express the condition we have already indicated. The 
necessary minimum condition for a system to be able to reproduce itself, that is, in 
order for its growth rate not to be negative, is that 0<a≤1. If this condition is satisfied, 
both the surplus and the output growth rate are positive. 
Let us now suppose that only part of the surplus is invested for capital 
accumulation; that is, the given share , with (1>>0). The other part can be 
employed in the „external‟ modern sector. 
 
Kt+1=Kt+St+1=Kt+(1-a)qt+1= Kt+(1-a)Kt/a  
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Formula [14] is illustrated in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: The time path of movement of capital  
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As long as a is less than 1, the capital will continue to grow (whatever the starting 
level was and whatever the value of a<1) if  is positive. In this case the contribution 
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of the traditional sector to the modern sector in terms of continuous flow of resources 
will also be positive. 
The rate of capital growth and of the output will thus be: 
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Formula [16] is illustrated in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Growth rate in the basic model 
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If a<1 then the growth rate will be positive, for a value of  that is not zero. 
Whatever the rate is, even if it is very low, it will be proportionate to the parameter 
(1-a/a).  Remember that this parameter represents the surplus rate on the capital. For 
every given technology, then, there will be a given constant growth rate. 
If we now abandon the hypothesis of a constant unit cost per product of the 
advances in circulating capital that we assumed in the first version of the model, and 
if we suppose, by contrast, that the unit cost increases, then the surplus – even when it 
existed at a given time – could disappear. A hypothesis of this kind is incorporated in 
Riccardo‟s model in which less fertile land, where unit costs depend on quantities 
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produced, leads to a decreasing unit surplus on land. Riccardo‟s model in this version 
stresses that new growth can be held back, or rather that growth rates can diminish as 
new growth and development takes off owing to the presence of indispensable 
resources with a given availability whose supply costs increase as demand increases. 
In this case we can talk about a brake on growth, opposed by a force that sustains 
growth, as Adam Smith pointed out, and as history has proved: the division of labour 
which favours technical progress. 
Our hypothesis reflects the idea that the forces that sustain growth prevail, creating 
a self-reinforcing mechanism. Let us assume more precisely that, wherever there are 
the conditions for surplus and growth in the traditional sector (producing wheat), a 
part of the surplus is spent on the modern sector and thus continues to sustain 
demand. The modern sector can thus escape the trap created by the absence of barriers 
to entry and is able to be more innovative. If the modern sector produces technologies 
used by the traditional sector (ploughs and fertilisers), one consequence is a 
continuous improvement of productivity in wheat production. 
Second version: endogenous costs 
Let us suppose then that the traditional sector has endogenous unit costs, rather than 
given ones as in the previous model, and that these are subject to reduction if the 
accumulation rate is positive. 
Let 
aLt=aL(Kt) with  a negative derivative of : aL’<0 
aMt=aM(Kt) with  a negative derivative of: aM’<0 
 
For example, indicating with A a scale factor of (A>Kt): 
 
tt
ML
t
t
M
Mt
t
L
Lt
K
aA
A
K
aa
a
K
Aa
a
K
Aa
a





 
 
This implies that: 
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The instantaneous growth rate is thus: 
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where: 
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Figure 11 shows the comparison between equations [18] and [16] 
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Figure 11 - Growth rate in a model with endogenous production costs 
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A positive growth rate is only possible where >0 if the potential technology is at 
least as efficient as the level that leads to units costs lower than a certain threshold not 
just lower than one. Moreover, the instantaneous growth rate for every technology 
must be lower than the rate in the basic model. It will be the same as that in the basic 
model only asyntotically when a=0. 
The development process can begin (with capital growth) if a further necessary 
condition is fulfilled in addition to the conditions a<1, >0 in the previous model. 
That is: 
 
a kt; or rather  aKt/A. 
 
The potential unit cost of production must be lower than a positive value greater 
than zero. However, equation [17] could be written: 
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This shows a performance of capital as described in Figure 12. 
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Fig. 12 - The temporal path of movements of capital with endogenous production 
costs. 
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We can thus confirm that capital growth can only take place above the technology 
threshold a=Kt /A, but that, beyond that threshold, the growth rate will increase (point 
E represents an unstable stationary equilibrium. If the threshold condition is fulfilled, 
there is not only the possibility of growth but growth is accelerated. Under the 
threshold, on the other hand, growth tends to slow down and go into decline. 
Development policies 
Analyzing combined traps, as we have said, allows us to shed light on specific 
policies that might help avoid them. We have seen that these policies must aim to 
support competitiveness by sustaining labour productivity. 
Creating access to external markets (national or international) for traditional 
products such as transformed agricultural products, by activating trade channels that 
are stable over time, could help trigger virtuous growth patterns.
97
 A significant 
increase in demand for these products would rapidly lead to a depletion of labour 
stocks with low opportunity costs. Industrial activity would then express a demand for 
labour that could be satisfied only by people who were previously employed in the 
traditional sector. Their inclusion in the modern sector would lead average costs to 
increase to a level above the average subsistence costs. The most relevant 
consequences would be: the number of small firms would decrease relatively; the unit 
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 A similar approach is developed in Humphrey and Schmitz (1996). 
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volumes of production would increase and therefore more firms would be closer to 
the optimum level of activity; there would be higher wages. Foreign demand, 
however, can only be sustained if local firms are competitive. 
We shall now see that competitiveness can only be achieved with the help of pubic 
and collective goods. A combination of underdevelopment traps and social traps 
presents us with the problem of lack of information. Resources cannot be reallocated 
from less to more productive uses when there is no information available. If the 
agents involved know enough, they can solve their own problems of reallocation. 
What they need to know is quite evident. They need to know how many resources 
they must transfer from the traditional to the modern sector in order to repay the 
transfer costs with the returns from externalities. As visualised in Figure 7, they need 
to know what Lm* is; following the classical model in the previous section, they need 
to know what A is. If all the agents involved have this information, they are able to 
avoid the two consequences of these traps: one of these is that no resources are 
reallocated; the other is that too many resources are reallocated too fast. It would not 
be difficult, in fact, for the agents to stipulate an agreement among themselves 
because they would be able to measure the advantages. 
With imperfect information, the critical threshold is unknown, which means that the 
agents involved cannot make an agreement or pursue a fixed path to reach it. One 
solution seems fairly easy, or at least logical. This solution is to consider imperfect 
information a missing good (information) that can be produced or bought by 
sustaining the cost of producing it or buying it, just like any other useful good. We 
would then simply add the cost of information to the cost of transferring resources 
from the traditional to the modern sector and then adjust the threshold of resources 
that need to be transferred in order to reach equilibrium between costs and benefits. 
With inadequate information the threshold cannot be known, but once the necessary 
cost of acquiring information has been sustained, the threshold can be predicted. On 
the basis of this shared knowledge it would not be difficult for the agents involved to 
come to an agreement among themselves and thus avoid the traps.  
And yet, unfortunately, this is not possible. As Stiglitz (and much of the literature) 
has pointed out, information is not a good like any other because it is „relational‟ in 
nature. The most relevant information is transmitted, or created, by the very behaviour 
of the agents involved; it modifies their behaviour and everybody knows this. “A 
simple lesson emerges: some individuals wish to convey information; some 
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individuals wish not to have information conveyed (ether because such information 
might lead others to think less well of them, or because conveying information may 
interfere with their ability to appropriate rents). In either case, the fact that actions 
convey information leads people to alter their behaviour, and changes how market 
function. This is why information imperfections have such profound effects.” 
(Stiglitz, 2003, p.19) 
Let us now look at how the information mechanism behaves in the case of traps. 
Imperfect information implies that: a) not all the agents involved know the threshold 
level, perhaps none do; b) each agent has different information of conjectures about 
what the level is. If we assume the most favourable case where one agent knows 
precisely what it is and the others have no idea, a solution could only be reached if the 
agent in the know reveals his information and if the others believe him. What really 
happens, however? 
The fact that most agents do not know what the threshold level is will make them 
doubt whether the agent who claims to know is telling the truth. What will the agent 
in the know do? He could transfer his resources from the traditional to the modern 
sector, thus signalling to the others that he is credible. The others could then follow 
his example, but the agent in the know could never be sure whether they will do so, or 
whether they will do with the right timing. Knowing this, his actions will be very 
risky. The risk is inherent in the fact that if the others do not follow his example he 
will not enjoy the benefits of externalities that would be able to equal his transfer 
costs; if they follow him too fast or with too many resources his profits as a temporary 
monopolist will rapidly be reduced and he will not be able to stay in the modern 
sector and introduce innovations. Alternatively, he could decide to do nothing to 
avoid the risk, actively hiding information, or he could transfer his resources but be 
prepared to be the first to go back on his steps, leaving the others to learn from their 
own mistakes. Everybody knows that this is the way things work, so information 
becomes something to interpret. The result is that a mechanism is established that 
tends to lead to the exact opposite of what is needed to create an efficient equilibrium 
requiring neither too many nor too few resources to be transferred. Faced with the 
actions of one agent, the others will conclude either that he has grabbed an 
opportunity and that they should hastily follow in order to exploit it themselves 
(social traps), or that he is taking a risk but that he knows how to get out of it and will 
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leave all the damage in his wake, and that at this point it would be better to avoid the 
whole venture (underdevelopment traps). 
An efficient equilibrium would require an agent with no information to be sure that 
an agent with information acts without taking into account the fact that he has 
information and the others do not. In real life, an agent with no information is 
absolutely sure that the actions of the other agent are dictated above all by the fact 
that he is in the know while the others are not. 
The conclusion is that there is no way to establish an effective exchange between 
greater transfer costs that are certain today and benefits that are uncertain in the 
future. The only way is to create one or more goods of collective utility,
98
 which must 
give rise to an increase in productivity for all resources and for all the agents involved 
so that each party is able to sustain the transfer costs today, rather than when a 
transfer of a block of resources equal to the critical threshold has already taken place. 
These considerations focusing on the central role of public or collective goods 
contrast with the dominant, mainstream approach that still thinks it is the market that 
guides economic growth.  
A multi-agent simulation 
An artificial economy such as a “Swarm” studies the interactions between micro-
behaviour and macro-phenomena involving a large but circumscribed set of agents. 
The virtual agents behave and make decisions on the basis of imposed routines. They 
are subject to cognitive and computational limitations, but they have the capacity to 
learn over time owing to their memory of the results of the interactions. The 
simulation is based on adaptations of the procedures proposed by Bruun and Luna 
(2000). The system comprises initially self-employed agents. These agents can create 
innovative firms and coordinate heterogeneous workers; they produce outputs 
designed to satisfy the demand for consumer goods. The entrepreneur‟s remuneration 
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 With reference to backward contexts, a significant role is often attributed to sustaining the 
productivity and competitiveness of public goods of a physical nature, such as infrastructure, 
telecommunications, transport etc. Immaterial public goods, however, should not be overlooked. 
Looking at the development stages that precede the successful consolidation of European district 
systems, it soon becomes clear that basic education and techniques - as well as contexts where the 
division of labour between firms and collaboration among firms was encouraged - were essential 
ingredients of their success. These resources are at times the result of explicit programmes, but more 
often they are the unconscious result of intuition. Even more often they are the result of a slow 
accumulation of institutional interventions that have become public goods. In the majority of cases it 
has been the non-excludability of these resources that has most contributed to the enrichment and 
reinforcement of the districts and to the accelerated take-off of local systems. 
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is what is left of his earnings after labour costs. Profits and wages represent the GDP 
of the economy. GDP in its turn generates demand for consumer goods that are 
exchanged. At the end of a pre-established period the firm can go bankrupt. In this 
case, its losses are redistributed among the community and thus reduce the income 
available for consumption. The existence of a negative differential between supply 
and demand and of qualitative mismatches between production and consumption 
increase the bankruptcy rate. Firms learn over time to adapt the quality and quantity 
of supply to demand. If innovation is profitable it generates a flow of new entries. The 
flow of new entries is a function of the costs sustained to set up new firms (imitation 
of innovation). Setting up a new firm takes place in two stages: in the first, the stage 
of a potential firm, the entrepreneur employs labour and sustains the relative costs but 
is not sure whether he will succeed in placing his output on the market; in the second, 
once he has observed the match between supply and the features of the demand, the 
firm is established and becomes effective. 
The hypothesis that needs to be verified is whether or not a high level of imitation 
of innovation gives rise to an excess of new entries with the result of creating an 
aggregate supply greater than the actual demand. The mismatch between quantities 
supplied and demanded triggers a process whereby firms exit the sector. Selection 
remains inefficient. Firms learn that profitability is overall inexistent, but they also 
realise that the failure of a pre-existing firm can give rise to temporary profits in a 
sub-local consumer niche. A part of the demand satisfied by the failed firm is in fact 
redistributed among potential firms in the vicinity. The absence of entry costs and the 
positive probability of making profits mean that firms try repeatedly to enter. The 
effervescence of these attempts reduces the availability of workers for the incumbent 
firms, holds back their growth and increases the probability of their failing. Over 
time, and through learning, the propensity to enter diminishes, but it stays high 
enough to influence negatively the economic result of the firms already on the market.  
The results of the simulation seem to confirm the hypothesis. On the basis of a 
relatively limited number of periods (2,000), the trends are quite explicit. The 
system‟s GDP tends rapidly to contract, and at the same time the initially very high 
number of successful firms decreases. In the initial phase, the high failure rate in the 
system does not dissuade potential firms from trying to enter; rather, it stimulates 
them. The presence of an increasing number of attempts to create new firms 
contributes to stressing the precariousness of incumbent firms and accelerates their 
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exit. Over time, with fewer successful firms, the propensity of new entries to set up 
firms in the system is still very high. The selection process is incomplete because 
achieving an optimal number of firms is hindered by the fact that new firms 
repeatedly try to come into the system. Finally, there are alarming tendencies even in 
terms of income distribution. The Gini indices of inequality display a tendency to 
increase, although there are marked oscillations. 
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Chapter Three - Collective Goods99 
In order for economic development to take place, economic, social and institutional 
transformations must first be tackled. These include reallocating resources to more 
productive uses, widening markets, introducing new technologies, accumulating fixed 
and human capital, and changing forms of governance and organisation. Bringing 
about these changes is a challenge because they break with consolidated practice, and 
because the transformations need to take place more or less simultaneously.
100
 
Each change seems to have its own specific set of problems, but there is a common 
element: people must accept that a portion of their own satisfaction relies on others, 
and that they an give up “autarchy” in exchange for improving their wellbeing.101 It 
is, after all, a matter of reallocating resources from traditional to more modern 
activities, where the vertically integrated production process has more steps.
102
 These 
resources must be allocated over time, sacrificing current needs in the hope of 
accruing greater satisfaction in the future. Because there is a threshold of resources to 
be invested, below which results are nil, actors must come to an agreement. 
Moreover, it is not a question of reallocating either resources or time, but of 
reallocating both, since, as we have said, transformations must be simultaneous. The 
relevance of thresholds and the lengthening of productive processes show that the root 
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 Section 1, and the sub-section Informative and coordination costs and Appendix 2 are written with 
Alessandro Arrighetti, and Appendix 1 with Lidia Seravalli. 
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 Documented economic history has shown that often changes have taken place in one of the areas 
without lasting development taking place. It then becomes clear a posteriori that changes in 
complementary areas did not take place. There is a very clear example in the long history of 
extraordinary interventions in the Italian Mezzogiorno, where large firms brought new technologies 
and new capital to various areas with the effect of causing a transferal of labour from agriculture to 
industry, and the opening of new markets. This was not sufficient, however, to set in motion 
development processes that were sustainable in the long term because social and institutional changes 
did not take place to accompany these transformations. The new large firms were isolated, dependent 
on powers that were far away from the firm‟s location, while society and local institutions were 
dependent on aid and clientelism. Del Monte and Giannola (1997) write: “Our hypothesis is that, 
starting in the second half of the 1970s, the weight of the indirect negative effects of public 
intervention determine an accentuation of the malfunctioning of institutions, which, in addition to other 
negative exogenous factors accentuates the loss of efficiency in the economic system of the 
Mezzogiorno.” (p.131) 
101
 Barrington Moore Jr (1969) notes that the first and foremost problem of modernization was how to 
give bread to those who no longer produced grain. 
102
 We can include in this category: the re-allocation between hidden unemployment and employment, 
between agricultural and industrial employment, between material transformation activities and 
creative, organizational or governmental activities, between  productive activities for domestic or 
international demand, etc. 
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problem is relying on others
103
: while the disadvantages are clear and immediate, the 
advantages are less tangible, further in the future and anyway dependent on others. It 
is thus impossible, or at least highly improbable, for development to come about as a 
result of autonomous, decentralised, or spontaneous decisions. Actors should work 
together as a team, but each one has a specific vision of the future, which is very 
different from the others‟, especially in view of the fact that there are no institutional 
institutions or support to help them come to an agreement. 
The solution lies in collective goods and services. It could be said that the modern 
age spelt the demise of the collective (community) good and that in its place we now 
have a series of collective goods. When community ties within small social circles are 
no longer solid, collective goods and services play three important roles. First, they 
reduce risk; then, they provide technical intermediation; finally, they help a group of 
people come to an agreement. There are three immediate reasons why decentralised 
and autonomous decisions tend not to contribute to development. To start with, 
trusting others is risky in terms of personal wellbeing. The higher the provision of 
collective goods (given the level of private resources that are needed to produce 
them), the greater the opportunities for trust. Secondly, in order to be able to rely on 
others you have to provide and gain information about, communicate, and transport 
whatever the division of labour technically requires. In this sense, collective goods 
and services are a key factor in ensuring that the division of labour actually takes 
place. Finally, a common outlook is essential. Collective goods and services 
contribute to bringing expectations and behaviour into line simply because they are 
collective; everybody uses the same services and are equally advantaged or 
conditioned by them.
104
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 Even in traditional community life people had to rely on others. However, relying on others in 
modernity is very different in two ways. First, our wellbeing now depends on many others outside the 
tightly-knit community where ties are broken. Second, we have to rely on others despite the fact that 
the prevailing individualism has broken the ties of solidarity; we do not rely on others out of solidarity 
but out of convenience. In Bell (1993) there is a brilliant explanation of communitarianism, in contrast 
to the “neo-Kantian liberalism of the Left” attributed to Rawls, which highlights these aspects. 
104
 An example from Italian economic history: the Autostrade del Sole. It is a commonplace to hear that 
the Italian model of development was predicated on private transport, and that the construction of this 
motorway made an important contribution. Another smaller example: technical training in Emilia 
Romagna. It has been shown that the development of mechanics in central Emilia Romagna (which 
was predominantly agricultural until the beginning of World War II) was significantly driven by the 
promotion of technical training by local administrations, who were far ahead of their time in terms of 
demand. 
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This chapter focuses on what kind of collective services are useful for development. 
It is divided into two sections. The first section examines the proposition that in 
conditions of imperfect information and therefore of incomplete markets, the goods 
and services essential for development that are lacking cannot be supplied through 
spontaneous collective action in a backward area. In other words, we show that 
essential goods and services that have not come about as a result of individual 
initiative cannot successfully be provided by collective action without the support of 
state intervention. The second section illustrates the limits and inefficiencies of state 
intervention, given the premise that the role of the state in the provision of public 
goods and services is essential. These limits and inefficiencies are thus an inevitable 
corollary. The chapter concludes that it is not a matter of achieving the impossible. It 
is more a question of recognising that state intervention is necessary - despite its 
limits and inefficiencies - because single agents cannot carry out individual initiative, 
and because bottom-up initiatives lead to sub-quality collective services. 
The limits of collective action 
A backward area lacks many of the goods and services that would be useful for 
developing and increasing the productivity of its existing resources, which are often 
unused or misused. Providing these missing goods and services could help the lagging 
area become more productive. Likewise, land is often little or badly cultivated, and 
natural resources are underused or inaccessible. Again, providing access to wider 
markets, as well as to internal and external financial resources that an inefficient 
credit system does not allow them to tap, could valorise these resources. Similarly, 
endangered cultural values and traditions could be re-evaluated in order to provide a 
valid defence against the tyranny of exported models and sharpen competition. 
Valuable and fast-vanishing skills honed through traditional activities could be saved, 
not to mention customs  - already disappearing with the advent of corrupt local 
administrations in cahoots with organised crime - such as honesty, wisdom and 
respect for those who undertake to administer public services. The appendix presents 
a case study of how a potentially relevant resource was not valorised, causing the 
majority of the population to live in poverty. In this case study it was easy to identify 
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the collective services that encourage development: cooperative firms or networks of 
firms that reduce the fragmentation of the productive process.
105
 
In a lagging area each of the following fields - and the list could be much longer - 
lacks essential structures and activities: schools, professional training institutes, 
hospitals and clinics, water supply and drinking water, waste collection, services 
providing technical, administrative and promotional assistance, communication, 
logistics, material infrastructures and networks. Similarly, entrepreneurial, 
organisational and co-operative skills are hard to come by. 
Often this endless list of seemingly inexistent services is reduced and prioritised at 
a local level. Some of these deficiencies are particularly heart-felt or especially long-
standing; and yet, nothing gets done. In all these cases the market is incomplete. 
However real a need is, even when the need has been perceived and expressed, 
nothing happens. Or rather, nobody makes a big enough offer to fulfil the need. In 
many lagging areas these goods or services are not altogether absent; they are simply 
prohibitively expensive or, rather, access to them is restricted to a small minority, 
perhaps through familistic, clan or criminal ties. Indeed, the small circle of those who 
benefit from whatever goods and services exist strenuously defends the system, which 
is based on a monopolistic provision of services at exorbitant prices entailing 
significant rent positions. Incomplete markets do not occur in lagging areas for 
“innocent” reasons; they are common and deeply-rooted in backward areas because 
landed interests there wish to preserve the status quo. 
Thus incomplete information, which some individuals or groups have an interest in 
maintaining, has the effect of obscuring the fact that everyone could pay a price to get 
goods or services that do not yet exist on the basis of the greater income that would 
accrue if those goods and services were to be created.
106
 There is no such thing as an 
“effective demand”, while “potential demand” exists and is often explicit. In a 
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 It could be considered surprising that a cooperative firm is considered part of the category of 
collective goods and services. Despite many schools of thought that consider a cooperative a firm just 
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above all a „public good‟ that cannot be realized or sustained without support that is external to the 
mechanisms of the capitalistic system. These supports include: the active support of the community, 
the contribution of participants beyond the call of short-term convenience, public support. I think the 
considerations made in Seravalli (1988) are still valid, as Fiorentino and Scarpa (1998) confirm. 
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backward areas, money-lending is common and the only guarantees are in kind (at worst one‟s life), or 
belonging to criminal organizations.  
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situation of this kind, collective initiatives are needed; if they are to be efficient they 
must also have the following requisites. 
Minimum endowment – a slow increase in the endowment of goods and services is 
not efficient. A minimum level must be guaranteed to start with; otherwise the 
benefits are gradually eroded by an increased demand that outstrips the new supply. 
Critical mass – the presence of strong interest groups requires goods and services to 
benefit a good number of agents, otherwise they rapidly decline. 
External domination – trade channels outside the community must be sought, 
infrastructure (transport and communication) must also be provided. At the same 
time, many collective goods and services require the collaboration of actors outside 
the community (governmental organisations, national and multinational firms, 
international organisms). This brings about heterogeneous rules of conduct, patterns 
of behaviour and restrictions that force agents to collaborate. 
It is important to take these characteristics into account when evaluating the 
possibility of implementing either of the following solutions: bottom-up collective 
action to achieve collective goods, or delegated action to build public goods. 
Bottom-up collective action: building cooperative norms 
There is a vast literature on the subject of collective action, and it would be hard to 
summarise it here. The literature, however, delineates two main paradigms: Axelrod‟s 
evolutionary approach to the formation of cooperative behavioural norms (Axelrod, 
1997, especially Ch.3), and Buchanan‟s economic club theory (Buchanan, 1989). 
Taken singly, these paradigms have their limits
107
 but together they provide a useful 
tool. 
In order to appreciate the nature of the two solutions for providing bottom-up 
collective goods without state intervention, it is important to remind ourselves of the 
specific difficulty arising from imperfect information. As Stiglitz pointed out (1988, 
2003-2004), and as we have also already said, imperfect information does not only 
lead to information costs, as if information were a good like any other that can be 
produced by sustaining costs which are at the margin equal to their utility. 
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 The evolutionary paradigm regarding cooperative norms leaves the social environment undefined. 
The club goods paradigm assumes a representative agent. The emergence of cooperative norms can 
provide an operative basis for the fiction of the representative agent (when we make a commitment we 
all reveal our preferences). Defining on this basis the dimension of the group and of the collective good 
can also help define the social environment. 
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Information, on the contrary, depends on agents‟ behaviour (that others will have to 
interpret), which in its turn gives rise to uncontrollable externalities, except in 
particular contexts. There are two negative effects: one is adverse selection (who acts) 
and the other is moral hazard (how one acts).  
When the issue is creating collective goods or services (infrastructure), adverse 
selection means that - given the uncertainty of individual agents regarding the 
behaviour of others, and given their uncertainty regarding the final outcome (technical 
and financial choices that are often anything but obligatory, utility of the enterprise 
that only becomes clear after the event, unsure future maintenance costs) - if anyone 
declares that they want to participate in a collective enterprise, or shows signs of 
wanting to join, they are likely to be considered superficial, lightweight or 
untrustworthy by others, especially by those who are most interested. Those interested 
parties are likely to think that the other parties acted only in order to draw them out, 
dump the responsibility for the enterprise on them, and then reap the benefits. The 
result is that the most interested and reliable parties, for whom the „infrastructure‟ is 
most necessary, withdraw from the enterprise. Moral hazard then takes place when 
participating members have been selected and the parties that want to obtain 
immediate benefits behave inconsiderately (over-demanding or excessively cautious), 
causing the overall cost of the infrastructure to rise. Such different mechanisms as 
adverse selection and moral hazard thus work hand in hand to throw obstacles in the 
path of collective action. 
The evolutionary paradigm presents a solution. Without leaning on the paradigm of 
rational expectations
108, it relies on the hypothesis that “That what works well for a 
player is more likely to be used again, whereas what turns out poorly is more likely to 
be discarded. As in the game theory, the players use their strategies with each other to 
achieve a payoff based upon their own choice and the choices of others. In an 
evolutionary approach, however, there is no need to assume a rational calculation to 
identify the best strategy. Instead, the analysis of what is chosen at any specific time 
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 Game theory assumes the players are fully rational and choose the strategy that gives the highest 
expected utility over time, given their expectations about what the other players will do. Recent work 
by economists has shown great sophistication in dealing with problems of defining credible threats and 
of showing the consequences of requiring actors‟ expectations about each other to be consistent with 
experience that will be generated by resulting actions. Although deductions about what fully rational 
actors will do are valuable for their own sake, empirical examples of changing norms suggest that real 
people are more likely to use trial-and-error behaviour than detailed calculations based on accurate 
beliefs about the future. Therefore, I have chosen not to study the dynamics of norms using an 
approach that depends on the assumption of rationality. (Axelrod, 1997, p.47) 
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is based upon an operationalization of the idea that effective strategies are more likely 
to be retained than ineffective strategies. Moreover, the evolutionary approach allows 
the introduction of new strategies as occasional random mutations of old strategies.” 
(Axelrod 1997, p. 47-48). Once a norm has been defined such as: “A norm exists in a 
given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are 
often punished when seen not to be acting in this way” (idem, p. 47), if in a local 
context a norm is established by evolutionary means (trial and error handed down 
through the generations) this could give rise to the complete internalisation (within 
the local context) of the externalities stemming from incomplete information, and thus 
avoid the mechanisms of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Let us suppose that this norm dictates that one must keep a promise until all the 
people to whom the promise was made recognise that it is impossible to keep any 
longer, or that the commitments made have all been fulfilled. If a norm of this kind is 
established in a social context where a collective good needs to be realised, nobody 
will make a commitment light-heartedly and therefore everybody can relax. 
Moreover, nobody, once committed, will withdraw from the agreement, making 
everybody equally reliable. This situation is extremely beneficial for the collective 
good, as well as analytically interesting. There is still imperfect information regarding 
technical and financial choices, the utility of the enterprise that only becomes evident 
after the event, and future maintenance costs; there also continues to be asymmetry 
between agents. This imperfect information, however, could be dealt with as if it 
really were a good like any other that can be produced according to its cost in relation 
to its utility. In other words, while a reduction in the cost of imperfect information is 
not possible in general, it becomes possible in a context where a norm that avoids the 
risks of adverse selection and moral hazard has been introduced. In this context, then, 
we must identify: 1) what obstacles in the way of collective action are created by the 
very process that established the norm, and 2) what information and coordination 
costs need to be accounted for in order to calculate whether collective action is 
worthwhile. 
There is thus a clear analytical path to follow, with the following steps: 
1) Examine the process that leads to a norm being adopted whereby a promise is 
a promise; 
2) Identify what conditions must be satisfied in order to establish this norm as 
well as the consequences in terms of constraints to collective action; 
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3) Calculate the information and coordination costs needed to sustain the 
achievement of collective action. 
A promise is a promise 
Following Axelrod (1997), we define behaviour as „vindictive‟ or „eccentric‟ when 
it is based on a cost-benefit analysis. You are vindictive if you punish behaviour that 
does not correspond to a socially recognised norm, and eccentric if your behaviour 
does not take social norms into account at all.
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 In the social context we are assuming 
here, the distribution of vindictive and eccentric characters is random. Let us suppose, 
then, that by chance somebody decides to behave according to the idea that a promise 
is a promise, and that this behaviour turns out to be advantageous. Axelrod 
demonstrates that the norm „a promise is a promise‟ will at first spread rapidly, but 
that it will not become an established code of behaviour on the basis of three 
assumptions (an evolutionary mechanism, a random distribution of vindictive and 
eccentric behaviour, the greater benefits of a kept promise). What happens, he shows, 
is that, to start with, eccentric behaviour declines rapidly because it is very costly. 
Once the number of eccentrics has been reduced, they drag the vindictives down with 
them, because their behaviour is also relatively costly. At that point eccentric 
behaviour makes a comeback and becomes dominant, creating a stable equilibrium 
that does not allow the norm to become established. 
The result is very different when a meta-norm is introduced along similarly 
evolutionary lines, according to which „you must punish whoever fails to punish 
violations of the norm.‟ In this case the norm „a promise is a promise‟ can be 
established. We shall now examine the conditions that allow this meta-norm to be 
introduced. 
Conditions and consequent constraints 
There are two basic requirements for a meta-norm to be introduced: dominance and 
reputation. By „dominance‟ we mean the presence in a social context of a group that 
counts more, either in terms of numbers or of power, than other social groups or than 
the group formed by the rest of society. By „reputation‟ we mean that a way of 
                                                 
109
 The social context is by implicit hypothesis based on identity. The cost sustained by those who 
punish people who do not respect the norm is the disapproval of the eccentrics, while the benefits are 
the approval of the vindictives.  
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behaving adopted by an individual in a certain context transmits signals that are 
interpreted as belonging to his or her „nature‟ and that can therefore be used to define 
within that context his or her expected behaviour in other contexts. 
Where there is dominance, a meta-norm is more likely to come about as the 
members of a dominant group can more easily punish other members of the same 
group (even if they do not punish those who do not respect a norm). Reputation 
reinforces dominance because networks and relationships among individuals are 
stronger within their own social group; it is advantageous for individuals to build a 
reputation in order to facilitate these multiform relationships. 
And yet, these two mechanisms tend to establish norms that benefit the dominant 
group rather than the social context as a whole. In our case, for example, it is more 
likely that a norm is established whereby „a promise is a promise only for the 
members of one‟s own group until… etc.‟ than a norm dictating that „a promise is a 
promise for everyone, period‟. In this instance, the norm is established by restricting 
its sphere of application, unless the mechanism of reputation succeeds in widening it 
(that is, if the network of relations were stronger among groups rather than within 
groups – but that is highly unlikely). 
It can be concluded, then, that to establish a norm that internalises the externalities 
deriving from imperfect information in view of collective action as well as 
neutralising the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard, implies accepting 
constraints in terms of size and quality of the collective good. It becomes clear, in 
other words, that it is realistic to imagine successful bottom-up collective action when 
it is a matter of providing „infrastructure‟ that is useful above all for the dominant 
group and for which that group has made a commitment. It is far less likely that a 
collective action is successful if it is needed by the whole social context and 
everybody‟s commitment is needed. A good example of this observation can be seen 
in Appendix 1. 
Information and coordination costs 
The problem of coordination regards the ability of agents to identify a single 
solution (the precise nature, size and location of the equipment) that mutually satisfies 
the requirements and plans of each of the individuals involved in the decision. This is 
a huge problem when, owing to the complementarity of individual actions and 
therefore increasing returns, there is no such thing as an optimal solution. In this case 
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what usually takes place is called „coordination failure‟ (see, for example, 
Leijonhufvud, 1968; Cooper, John, 1987; Colander, 1992; Boitani, Delli Gatti, 
Mezzomo, 1992; Van Es, Garretsen, 1992). Economic agents who fail to harmonise 
their decisions as individuals simply do not make choices that have the potential to 
increase their wellbeing.
110
 In more analytical terms, the problem of coordination 
imposes specific information costs once the commitment has been made to avoid 
making discordant choices. These costs vary according to the number of agents and 
the characteristics of the group involved in the choice.
111
 One can conclude then that: 
 
1) Agents can undertake collective action after defining the harmonisation of 
individual behaviours and selecting which of the many possible actions to 
undertake; 
2) Synchronisation and selection costs affect the value of the coordination payoff 
and thus significantly condition whether the collective action is undertaken or 
abandoned. 
Given the relevance of these synchronisation and selection costs it is therefore 
necessary to examine the factors that determine them. 
Synchronisation costs 
Synchronising the courses of action of individuals is subject to constraints (costs) 
that vary according to the nature of the equipment and the characteristics of the 
agents. Independently of the solution that has been found to be most effective, the 
synchronisation of decisions is itself conditioned by the presence of technological as 
well as information constraints (distorted communication, ambiguous signals, 
physical distance). The variety of contributions and heterogeneous time scales 
deriving from division of labour or role specialisation makes it very difficult to make 
cooperative decisions. These difficulties are amplified as participation widens. One 
result is that, except in the case of groups with a high degree of overlapping (Hardin, 
1982), and cases where the same good is reproduced over time in an identical form 
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 See Bulow, Geanakoplos, Klemperer, 1985, Artus, 1993. 
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(Lewis, 1969), agents are required to engage increasing resources as the group gets 
bigger and more heterogeneous. The consequence is that, already at this preliminary 
stage, incentives for collective action – meaning the difference between the payoffs 
for coordination and the payoffs for non-coordination – diminish. 
Selection costs 
Identifying a cooperative solution is conditioned to start with by the cost of 
acquiring and transferring the information that is relevant for the agents involved. 
Each agent must communicate whatever information might influence the outcome of 
the coordination solution (Arrow, 1974). Plans can only be drafted after enough 
information has passed hands regarding each individual‟s contribution, the features of 
the technology used, and the resources required for realising the infrastructure. The 
more homogeneous the information, resources, and technology are, the lower the 
transferral costs; the more heterogeneous, the higher the costs.  Becker and Murphy 
(1992) have demonstrated that coordination costs increase alongside increases in 
division of labour and specialisation. Specialisation increases productivity but reduces 
the overall knowledge level, making communication and interaction between holders 
of differentiated knowledge more difficult. Moreover, the kind of specific knowledge 
possessed by individual agents must provide appropriate skills for drafting and 
evaluating plans. Finally, practical alternatives need to be identified and prioritised, 
with resources invested in research and development for alternative technologies with 
which to realise the required infrastructure. Only a complete picture of all possible 
alternatives allows for plans to be drawn up and decisions to be made.
112
 Selection 
costs, moreover, are not usually limited to setting up projects; they generally extend to 
their implementation and efficient renewal (maintenance). Finally, widening the field 
to n agents
113
 will determine an increase in average benefits and will reduce the costs 
of setting up the enterprise, but at the same time it will amplify the coordination 
problems. Any increase in participants requires additional information to be gathered 
and transferred to each agent, as well as a re-prioritisation of the possible alternatives. 
Widening the number of participants also tends to increase their heterogeneousness in 
terms of information and skills in evaluating projects. The risk is that the benefits of 
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 Schelling, 1980, p.84) pointed out the role of difficult communication and scarce information in 
conducting coordination games. 
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 The absence of opportunism continues to be assumed. 
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collective action in realising an infrastructure are annulled by the rising selection 
costs as more participants join the enterprise. This theoretical conclusion is well 
illustrated in Appendix 1. 
Bottom-up collective action: club goods 
Solving coordination problems by means of a decentralised and cooperative 
decision-making mechanism depends on two factors: a) the probability that the 
agreement, once reached, is subject to sanctions (we looked at this with reference to 
the emergence of evolutionary norms); and b) the possibility that the level of 
information, knowledge and contractual costs required to draft a project is not so high 
that it annuls the payoffs for cooperation. 
We have seen that for both these factors, the difficulties multiply with an increase 
in number of participants, in heterogeneousness and in the number of alternative 
technologies available for setting up the equipment. The case study in Appendix 1 
clearly shows this conclusion. It could be said, then, that when the infrastructure is 
simple (or well established) and useful for a restricted group - especially a dominant 
group - of participants in a social context, then cumulative circular causative links can 
be established that allow club goods to be established by means of bottom-up 
collective action without institutional intervention. When this happens, 
synchronisation and selection costs are reduced, the nature, cost and expected utility 
of the infrastructure are defined early on, the norms regarding the value of promises 
are promptly established and propagated. All these factors clearly contribute to the 
success of collective action. 
Unfortunately, however, club goods are not what lagging local systems need the 
most. As we have seen, club goods guarantee minimum endowments, critical mass, 
nor external domination – features needed for infrastructure to make a difference to 
development. These features and the mechanisms we have described, if anything, help 
explain why there are collective goods and services in lagging areas, and why these 
are usually minimal and reserved for a restricted circle of people (those who are rich 
or influential, belong to a privileged family or clan, or are affiliated to criminal 
organisations). 
By contrast, a number of collective goods are produced by means of bottom-up 
collective action in more advanced areas. It would seem that some of the constraints 
to collective action become less stringent in a well-developed or advanced context. 
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Networks of relationships among agents, as well as appropriate specialisation and 
division of labour, extend in all directions not just within a given social context. This 
gives the mechanism regarding reputation a greater chance to combat that of 
dominance, and makes it more likely that a meta-norm leading to greater respect for 
keeping promises is adopted throughout the community. Technological alternatives 
and private knowledge will also be better known and/or more easily communicated, 
while selection and synchronisation costs will be lower. 
But in this case, the causative links are reversed. It is not collective action 
promoting development but the other way round. In order to make this clear, a graph 
such as that in Figure 13 could be useful. In this graph the dimension-effectiveness of 
the collective good in relation to the level of development is seen both from the 
„demand‟ side of cooperative norms (required in relation to the dimension and 
technical nature of the infrastructure needed) and from the „supply‟ side representing 
the establishment of such norms. 
Figure 13 - Collective bottom-up action with opportunism 
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There are two conditions of equilibrium in which the two mechanisms – 
evolutionary and „technical‟ – are complementary and reinforce one another. These 
are the equilibrium of backward areas and the equilibrium of advanced areas. The 
former (P0) only allows bottom-up collective action to set up small or ineffective 
collective goods, while the latter (P1) allows for more compelling action. In the area 
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between the two equilibriums, supply and demand for norms favouring cooperative 
behaviour do not meet. In order to emerge from underdevelopment, collective action 
would have to lie in this area, which, as we have argued, is highly unlikely. In 
backward areas, in fact, if norms of cooperative behaviour are established, they are 
likely to be among a restricted group of agents that is too small to create the necessary 
infrastructure and therefore make a difference for development. Setting up the 
necessary infrastructure at that point would be subject to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
It is important to highlight the fact that even when these norms are established 
among the entire community and are therefore potentially powerful enough, there are 
no guarantees that coordination failure will not take place. Excluding uncertainty 
about the cooperative attitude of the participants, there would still be difficulties 
inherent in the high information costs involved in setting up the project. In this case, 
the absence of opportunism does not annul the problem of coordination, a point that 
the literature has largely ignored. If we assume that participating agents are perfectly 
trustworthy then there is no need for enforcement, but information costs are still high. 
A decentralised solution does not simply entail neutralising the effects of not keeping 
promises, or, more in general, the risk of free riding.
114
 Considering the characteristics 
of collective action, non-opportunistic agents could come across many obstacles on 
their path to achieving collective action.  
As Figure 14 shows, a solution that allows opportunism to be reduced by shifting 
the curve of cooperative norm supply upwards does not solve the problem of 
collective action in backward areas. Once coordination costs and opportunism have 
been introduced, the dimension-effectiveness of the infrastructure no longer depends 
only on the supply and demand of cooperative norms. It could be put forward that 
these norms determine the size of the collective that can take action, while the 
dimensions of the infrastructure also depend on information costs. In Figure 14 we 
imagine (fourth quadrant) that the greater the collective that potentially takes action, 
the higher the coordination costs. What could happen, in this case, is that the 
dimensions of the infrastructure are anyway no greater than those of club goods even 
when far-reaching cooperative norms are established. If the dimension of the 
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contracts that are able to eliminate moral hazard do not necessarily avoid coordination failure. 
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infrastructure depends positively on the size of the collective but negatively on 
coordination costs it can be imagined that the ratio between dimension of 
infrastructure and coordination costs rises only very slightly (third quadrant). The 
result is that in any case the dimension of the infrastructure is reduced. 
Many generous development efforts predicated on the basis of a sense of solidarity 
among local populations can be seen as aiming to shift the curve of cooperative norm 
supply upwards. Often those who support these efforts, however, neglect the 
information and coordination costs function. The result – as we often see –is that local 
actions can be successful on a small scale, but often fail with large-scale projects. 
Institutional authority 
There are quite severe limits to bottom-up collective action, then. It is 
unsuccessful when it is needed and has some chances of success when development is 
already underway. Setting up collective goods or services requires institutional 
support or substitution. The only way to achieve this is to channel the decision- 
making process into one decisional authority (concentrated decisional mechanisms), 
which acts on behalf of individual agents. This delegated action can take the form of 
incentives and direct support for collective action that reduce coordination costs.
115
 It 
can also, more in general, produce public goods directly. Whatever the case, public 
intervention, unlike private action, is by definition „for everyone‟ and „for ever‟. The 
pre-requisite for centralised decision-making is non-excludability: people would not 
transfer decision-making power to an authority that might then exclude them from the 
potential benefits of the decision. Similarly, an institutional action is obliged to 
provide continuity over time. This is clearly a „functionalist‟ assumption, but it does 
not take away from the fact that in many backward areas  - and even in some more 
advanced ones - institutions (or the State) are captured by interest groups and by no 
means guarantee continuity over time in their provision of public goods. This 
pathological state of affairs seriously impedes development. 
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consortiums of associations. If this is true in an industrialised country, it is all the more true in a 
developing country. See the examples in Appendix 2. 
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It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the institutional product is not only made up 
of regulatory goods. Current economic literature, which considers as being uniquely 
to “constrain and regularize behaviour” (Scott, 1995, p.35) as well as containing the 
consequences of failures in collective action brought about by free riding, restricts the 
sphere of influence of institutional action to an unjustifiably limited area. In the 
present approach, institutional action is extended to include a vast set of (material and 
immaterial) goods, with constraints of continuity and non-excludability, which are 
subject to collective action failure owing to coordination costs. In addition to norms 
and legal codes, and the administration of justice and defence, other fields that can be 
classified as public goods useful for economic development include interventions in 
the field of professional development, education, scientific research, infrastructure, 
the collection and dissemination of economic information, and the provision of social 
and cultural services.
116
 
The limits of public intervention 
So far we have said that to encourage development in a lagging area State 
interventions play a useful role, alongside markets and firms, and can become 
important examples of the way to go forward. The kind of institutional bodies we are 
talking about should be built „for ever‟, involve everyone, not just those that want to 
take part, and be endowed with coercive power. From this point of view, institutional 
bodies are very different from markets and private organisations that are by definition 
temporary, based on voluntary participation, and lacking in coercive power.  
Using this basic difference as his starting point, Stiglitz (1991) presented an 
analysis of public institutions (from now on, for simplicity‟s sake, we shall refer to 
them as „State‟) that highlighted their limits compared to the greater efficiency of 
private organisations. He then went on, however, to claim that private organisations 
are unable to satisfy the demand for essential public and collective goods. The limits 
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 While this approach has had little attention in economic literature, it is widely adopted in other 
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the organizational tasks involved in these labours is certainly considerable. But the planners of a major 
hydraulic enterprise are confronted with problems of a much more complex kind. […] Even in its 
simplest form, agro hydraulic operations necessitate substantial integrative action. In their more 
elaborate variations, they involve extensive and complex organizational planning.” (Harris, 1977). 
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of the State must be examined in detail not because we wish to conclude that private 
action is preferable to public, but in order to propose that development policies should 
be conceived hand in hand with policies that reinforce the administrative capacity of 
the State, thus reducing – as far as possible – its inefficiency. 
The very nature of the State makes three aspects important: the choice of managers 
and political leaders, attending to fiduciary duties, and both planning and control. 
Choice of managers 
In conditions of imperfect information, the choice of managers is an „agency 
problem‟ in all organisations. The interests of a „principle‟ are carried out by „agents‟ 
who are placed in control over resources that are not their own and who, for this 
reason, possess information the principle does not. Agents with delegated authority 
can therefore exploit their „private‟ knowledge to feather their own nest at the expense 
of those whose interests they are supposed to be serving. There are many examples: a 
shipbuilder and a captain of his ship; a producer and a director of a film; partners and 
managers of a firm. In private organisations (which are voluntary and temporary) 
there are two circumstances or mechanisms that help reduce the agency problem in 
choosing managers, though they do not solve the problem altogether. For 
organisations this means focussing (or limiting) their final aims and subsequently the 
tasks of those in charge; for partners, it means acquiring the same – or at least similar 
- skills and knowledge as their managers in order to control them. In this way 
managers are selected to carry out a limited number of well-defined tasks, and they 
are accountable to a higher level that shares their knowledge. Private organisations are 
easier to focus and control because they are temporary and have a limited number of 
participants. If partners are unhappy with their managers they can leave the company, 
and managers would lose their job. 
The State („for everyone‟ and „for ever‟) is much harder to focus and control 
because it serves an unlimited number of purposes and no group of citizens can know 
enough to supervise its functioning. The Public Good is a public good, and there is no 
interest in spending in order to raise awareness. Moreover, a vote carries little weight. 
Internal incentives, such as those used in private organisations, are less effective in 
recruiting and keeping good administrators and political leaders, which means that 
external conditioning and pressure take over. At that point a situation well described 
by Hirschman (1970) is established: in a State, where participation is universal and 
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involuntary, there is a way of „defecting‟ that replaces Exit, which is not allowed, or 
very costly. In a democratic State it is formally sanctioned by the possibility of 
abstaining from voting in elections. In any case „defection‟ is expressed by disinterest, 
disenchantment, a low consideration of politics and politicians, and, ultimately, by 
boycotting the system. Defecting thus lends strength to loyalty; and a mechanism 
similar to Axelrod‟s is established. As we have said, positive attitudes to establishing 
a norm generally survive alongside eccentric positions. Except that the State, being an 
organisation „outside‟ civil society, provides no guarantee that the evolutionary 
mechanism will kick in. Those interested in politics can actively construct attitudes 
that valorise or devalue it, thus creating self-fulfilling prophecies. If the attitude 
cultivated places value on loyalty or approves of a policy, then competent, incorrupt 
managers (inasmuch as there are any) will be selected, and they, in their turn, will 
make politics more attractive. If, on the other hand, the prevailing attitude is one of 
disaffection that socially devalues politics, then incompetent and corrupt managers 
will be chosen, their policies will be mediocre or even reprehensible, and this will 
confirm the prevailing opinion that politics is by definition corrupt and incompetent. 
In backward areas, then, there can be obstacles to development – which are very 
had to avoid - when dominant and socially privileged social groups, whose aim is to 
protect their own interests, on the one hand do not let behavioural norms that would 
benefit everyone be established, and, on the other, cultivate and encourage negative 
attitudes towards politics, and thus manipulate its outcomes. And yet, members of so-
called „civil society‟ can (and often do) commit the error of trying to be a foil to 
politics, cultivating the idea that where they are involved they are doing good and 
wherever politics is involved there is only rot. In this way, civil society deprives itself 
of the chance to select good politicians and good managers, and therefore to have the 
public goods and services that civil society is unable to achieve. 
Figure 15 represents this situation. The horizontal axis is the level of inclusion, 
which is lower for private firms than for State firms. The vertical axis represents 
managers‟ competence. The graph shows the hypothesis that demand for competent 
managers grows according to the level of inclusion (dimension of the organisation 
and therefore complexity of their managerial tasks) when the organisational formulas 
are the same, but that it is higher in the private sector than in the public. This is 
because when we say „competent managers‟ we mean competent in an economic 
sense. If we shift our attention to the State, a manager‟s skills are less focussed and 
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they are required to take on a wider variety of tasks. The graph therefore indicates 
„supply‟, which presents a bifurcation that widens as inclusion increases. The 
hypothesis that what counts is the perceived quality of politics is the most convincing: 
a high social opinion of politics allows better managers to be selected. By contrast, 
when the common view is that politics is degraded, it is much harder to find 
competent managers (the best managers are not willing to work for the State). As the 
graph shows, there are three states of supply-demand equilibrium: one in the case of 
private firms and two in that of the State. As we have said, the prophecies are self-
fulfilling: when politics is perceived as valuable (greater loyalty), better managers are 
recruited. The quality of political life will improve, there will be greater inclusion, 
and the functions of the State will be amplified. When the opposite is true, worse 
managers will come forward; politics will be worse, there will be more disaffection, 
less inclusion and a „minimal state‟. 
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Fig. 15 - Supply and demand of competent managers 
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Fiduciary duties 
In a condition of uncertainty, the legitimation of the authority of the State in the 
production of public goods and services cannot come about simply on the basis of 
results, which are still unavailable when the State must take action. The State, and 
institutions in general, must take on fiduciary duties. Responsible institutions demand, 
and citizens call for, constraints. As far as economic activity is concerned, there are 
employment constraints and constraints of equity. 
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Employment constraints 
Every organisation functions on the basis of leadership (managers, agency 
problems) and the executive apparatus (hierarchy). The executive apparatus of a 
private organisation usually has incentives to carry out orders efficiently on the basis 
of a relationship whereby salary depends on performance and there is a credible threat 
of losing the job  (or of the firm going bankrupt). In the State there are constraints on 
public spending and tax revenues that make it impossible to pay wages that are 
commensurate with performance, making the wage relationship very different from 
that in the private sector. The State pays less but guarantees a job (generally States 
don‟t go bankrupt). Wages in the State sector play an arbitrary role, and the threat of 
losing your job is less credible. The executive apparatus thus has fewer incentives to 
create efficiency. 
Equity constraints 
Constraints on public spending and tax revenues in the State are not only 
quantitative but also qualitative: public spending and tax revenues must be distributed 
fairly. This is the other side of fiduciary duties. Establishing what is considered a fair 
distribution of spending and revenues in a way that is accepted by the entire 
community is impossible and everyone knows it. The State therefore exploits the 
circumstance that what it does must be perceived as fair, even if it is not. This 
inevitably leads to institutional hypocrisy, greater spending for communication and 
the manipulation of consensus. In its turn, this leads to hierarchical inefficiency: 
managers (politics) could be tempted to place greater value on semblance than action. 
Efficient hierarchical relationships 
Once we have identified the variable „efficient hierarchical relationships‟, we can 
represent in a graph the consequences of State fiduciary duties as employment and 
equity constraints. What we mean by efficient hierarchical relationships is the extent 
to which managers are able to obtain active collaboration from the people they are in 
charge of, given the characteristics of the organisation. In private organisations, 
hierarchical relationships are e more efficient than in the State, which, because of the 
constraints on public spending and tax revenues, cannot pay its employees according 
to productivity and tends to value appearance more than (or at least as much as) 
action. We can therefore imagine that there is an inverse ratio between the variable we 
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use to characterise organisations – inclusion – and the variable of hierarchical 
relationships. Moreover, because in the case of the State (and in general for inclusive 
institutions) employment and equity constraints are both important, we can imagine 
that this inverse ratio increases with inclusion, as in Figure 16. 
Fig. 16 - Efficiency of the hierarchical relationship 
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Let us now put Figures 15 and 16 together. In Figure 15 we saw a decreasing ratio 
between inclusion and management skills with a bifurcation that identified three 
different levels of competency in correspondence with the State, the „minimum State‟ 
(when politics is devalued), and private organisations. In Figure 16 we saw another 
decreasing ratio between hierarchical relationship and inclusion. If we put the two 
graphs together, as in Figure 17, there is an association between the three competency 
levels (the State, the „minimum State‟, and private organisations) and three distinct 
levels of efficiency in the hierarchical relationship. The result is very interesting. 
While it is predictable (given the assumptions we have made, which are evident a 
priori) that private organisations can attract better managers and at the same time 
enjoy greater hierarchical efficiency, what is surprising is that the State has the lowest 
level of hierarchical efficiency but an intermediate level of competence in its 
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managers, higher than in the „minimum State‟. This result is not immediately evident 
a priori and is the specific consequence of the cumulative effects of the appreciation 
or depreciation of politics. 
Fig. 17 - Quality of managers and hierarchical relationships 
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The graph suggests an outline for a micro-economic theory of the State. We have so 
far established three variables: competence of managers, inclusion, and hierarchical 
efficiency. We have also defined two relations: between competence and inclusion, 
and between inclusion and hierarchical efficiency. We need two more variables: the 
ultimate aim (for example, efficiency-effectiveness, or the extent to which what is 
needed for the public good is obtained at the lowest possible cost), and an 
intermediate measure of whether results are being obtained (planning and control). 
We also need two more relations: between hierarchical efficiency and a results-
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oriented approach, and between different combinations of results-orientation, 
competence and the ultimate aim of efficiency-effectiveness (the problem of public 
interest). 
The measurement of results and the problem of planning and 
control 
Difficult dilemmas about how to allocate resources without adequate information, 
and especially about results, arise in every organisation; decisions can turn out to be 
wrong when it is too late to do anything about them. That is why planning and control 
are important. Centralised planning and control requires rigid organisations within 
which specialised organisms are responsible for each and every function according to 
a sectorial strategy. Every sector of State activity is organised vertically. The centre 
administers its periphery by means of separate commands with no links between 
them. There are three disadvantages to this logic. First, rigid organisations tend to 
reduce or hide available information rather than reveal it. Second, they allow for less 
diversification of risk, and, finally, they cramp the learning process because 
experimentation is not encouraged. At the same time, there are advantages for 
„degenerate‟ and decentralised organisations.117 In these bodies, the strategy is 
horizontal, and sectorial interventions take place within a framework that provides a 
common outlook for every area, and involves local administrations to a greater 
degree. This kind of organisation in public institutions is apparently more chaotic and 
less specialised, thus more „degenerate‟. 
Where information is incomplete, we can only talk about a results-oriented 
approach, while in rigid organisations there is - by their very nature - a great deal of 
resistance to this approach. We could even say that by their nature they are oriented 
towards the procedure or the process rather than results – in short, that they are 
bureaucratised. Maintaining a sectorial logic, we can envisage an inverse ratio 
between a results-oriented and a procedure-oriented organisation. The inefficiency of 
a wage relationship (you are paid less in exchange for a guaranteed job and you are 
paid to seem you are doing something rather than actually doing it) requires strong 
                                                 
117
 „Degenerate‟ organizations are those where every department or organ is potentially able to 
undertake many tasks (in contrast to „redundant‟ organisations). In Lane and Maxfield‟s approach 
(2005), degenerate firms are better able to innovate and are less prisoners to routine. The results of 
complexity theories (Van der Leeuw, Aschan-Leygonie, 2000) and of biology (Edelman, Sporns, 
Tononi, 1999; Edelman, Gally, 2001) take on new value in this light. 
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incentives for a procedure-oriented rather than a results-oriented approach. An 
inefficient hierarchical relationship in terms of incentives is defended (in the joint 
interest of the managers and the organisation) by means of a highly formalised set of 
norms – a fixed procedure – that can easily be manipulated by the organisation for its 
own interests. This can be represented in a graph, where the right side of the Figure is 
the same as in Figure 17, and the new context is added in the bottom left-hand corner. 
In Figure 18, the two variables are results-orientation and hierarchical efficiency, with 
a direct relation between them.  
Fig. 18 – Results - orientation 
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As we can see, results-orientation rises as procedure-orientation diminishes, and 
procedure-orientation diminishes as the hierarchical relationship becomes more 
efficient. Our three focal points (private organisations, State and „minimal State‟) are 
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thus transformed. Until now these three points were characterised by different levels 
of managerial competence and hierarchical efficiency; we now have three different 
levels of results-orientation. The order is the same as before, but private organisations 
are the most results-oriented, followed by the „minimal State‟ while the State is the 
least results-oriented. 
In order to complete the model we need to add a relation between 
combinations of managerial competence, results-orientation and efficiency-
effectiveness (the problem of public interest). It can be observed that incompetent 
managers and procedure-orientation give rise to public organisations that act 
according to private interests and are therefore against public interest. Similarly 
detrimental to public interest, however, are competent managers in a procedure-
oriented organisation (prisoners to the apparatus), and results-oriented organisations 
with incompetent managers (absence of strategy). 
The last piece of the mosaic needs to be added. Figure 19 completes Figure 18 
adding the top left-hand corner, which illustrates the function of efficiency-
effectiveness, and which, in its turn, depends on two variables: the competence of 
managers and results-orientation. We thus have E=E(C,O) where E stands for 
efficiency-effectiveness (ultimate aim), C for managerial competence, and O for 
orientation to results.  
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Fig. 19 – Efficiency-effectiveness (a) 
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In this graph we obtain that private organizations achieve the best results in terms 
of the ultimate aim of efficiency-effectiveness when they have competent managers 
and when they are more results-oriented. The most interesting result, however, 
regards the State. There is, in fact, a chance that State and „minimum State‟ achieve 
the same objectives: the State by means of more competent managers, and the 
„minimum State‟ by increasing their results-orientation. To conclude, when 
institutions and, in particular, public institutions intervene in the same fields and with 
the same aims as private ones, in a centralised and sectorial manner, the State is 
bound to fail. This failure is equally serious in the case of a „minimum State‟, which 
is usually lacking in strategy. As we have seen in the early sections of this chapter, 
however, there are goods and services that private companies are not able to provide 
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and that cannot be achieved even through bottom-up collective action. Figure 19 is 
therefore not quite complete. 
One way to indicate that the State can achieve what private organisations cannot 
achieve is to modify the ratio between hierarchical efficiency and results-orientation 
in the third quadrant, identifying two ratios – one for private organisations and one for 
the state. In Figure 20 the graph is finally complete.  
Fig. 20 – Efficiency-effectiveness (b) 
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A new line has been drawn in the third quadrant indicating a ratio between results-
orientation and efficiency in the hierarchical relationship shifted upwards in the case 
of the State. The idea that the State can achieve what private organisations cannot 
achieve is thus depicted graphically. As a result, the fourth quadrant shows a possible 
consequence: that the State can reach the same objectives at the same level as those 
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reached by private organisations. In this case, the inefficiency of the State is 
compensated by the fact that it can intervene and act in environments in which private 
organisations cannot function. It is important to stress, however, that this 
compensation does not mean that the micro-economic inefficiency of the State is 
cancelled out. In short, the „minimum State‟ appears to be the worst of both worlds: 
more inefficient than private organisations in fields where the private sphere can 
achieve results, and less effective than the State in fields where the private sphere is 
less compelling. 
Conclusions 
In the presence of incomplete markets owing to incomplete information, which are 
particularly serious in lagging areas, an increase in productivity of resources requires 
public goods to be set up. Generally speaking these public goods cannot be realised 
by means of bottom-up collective action, because of the obstacles in the path of 
collective action, which include adverse selection, moral hazard, and coordination 
costs. A centralised State, on the other hand, is highly inefficient compared to private 
organisations. It is hard for the State to recruit competent managers, the executive 
apparatus is less results-oriented, and managers and apparatus can collude to feather 
their own nests against public interest. And yet, public intervention is inevitable. We 
thus need to take into account that, in addition to development policies that actively 
realise public goods, specific action must be taken to address this inefficiency. The 
analysis we have undertaken suggests two ways. First, politics should be sustained 
and valorised, and those who predicate its devaluation should be countered. Second, 
an institutional framework and examples of best practice should contribute to making 
the State less rigid and centralised, and more flexible, „degenerate‟ and decentralised. 
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Chapter 3 Appendix 1 - Misiones: a case study of 
collective action failure 
 
Yerba mate is not just a plant and exotic hot drink few people know in Europe; it is 
a symbol of identity for Argentina and neighbouring Latin American countries such 
as Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, where it was drunk in pre-Columbian times. The 
plant and its brewed infusion (mate) maintained and even increased its importance 
after the conquest, becoming a profitable economic activity, in particular for the Jesuit 
missions who earned significant revenues from the trade. Its spread, and the creation 
of industries to transform the leaves coincided with the birth of Argentina as a nation. 
A new nation with a mixed population needed unifying symbols to represent the spirit 
and life-style of the emerging State. Drinking mate with friends is a common and 
time-consuming social ritual that represents just such a symbol. The brewed yerba 
mate is steeped in a decorated hollow gourd (also called a mate), and the metal straw 
(bombilla) is often preciously carved. Initially the brew was consumed in the 
countryside as a social pastime, but the habit soon caught on in the cities and 
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throughout all social classes. Candidates for political elections can be seen 
campaigning with a mate in their hands, and historical figures are depicted after their 
heroic conquests sipping the drink with their comrades. 
From the point of view of local development studies, it is hard to find a product that 
incarnates as effectively the idea that valorising a relevant immobile resource can set 
development processes in motion.  Owing to the particular nature of the climate and 
soil, the Yerba mate plant can only grow in a limited area, the northernmost province 
of Argentina called Misiones. The product thus has a guaranteed market, anchored in 
the creation of a national identity, and at the same time a territorial monopoly. It is 
interesting, therefore, to investigate why these factors have not led to development in 
the region, which, on the contrary, is one of the poorest in Argentina. The marked 
contrast between potential and results has led to a certain amount of research and 
documentation undertaken, in particular by academics in the University of Posadas, 
the capital of the Misiones region. Together with field research and on-site 
interviews
118
, the reasons for this failure can be delineated fairly clearly. 
What is clear from the start is that Yerba mate could have been valorised to the 
extent that it could have become a factor of development; for a while it was even 
known as „green gold‟. There are also two very clear tendencies: first, the production 
process became increasingly vertical (without a significant or growing presence of 
cooperatives, which would have sustained the producers‟ income); second, large 
distribution companies slowly bought out independent industries (molinos) with their 
own brand name. These twin processes have contributed to worsening the living 
conditions of vast swathes of the population. A third factor is that the social actors 
involved in the production process have never been able to come to an agreement 
over how to valorise the resource, even though benefits would accrue to all of them if 
they could. Even with a recent opportunity, afforded by a new negotiation tool 
envisaged by a new law, which was passed in order to obviate the serious damage 
inflicted on the sector by deregulation during the last decade, agreement cannot be 
reached. Owing in part to a fall in prices, relations between different actors in the 
production process have soured even further, and the new measures fail to live up to 
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 Apart from written material, this study is based on interviews with small producers, managers of 
organizations defending the category of producers, aid workers involved in development projects, and 
academics. Direct contact with these participants was essential for understanding the context and 
mentality of the actors involved, as well as appreciating their point of view and attitudes.  
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their expectations and do not present solutions to the underlying structural problems. 
The very subsistence of small producers – the majority of the population - is at stake, 
but each component of the production process clings to the short-sighted view. Small 
producers consider the renewed promise of a minimum price level an important 
victory, even though the level does not guarantee them a dignified standard of living. 
The middle-sized firms and transformers defend their profit margins and try to keep 
prices down, at the cost of damaging the prospects of the small producers and salaried 
farm hands, by employing illegal, unprotected workers. None of the parties realise 
that they need to organise in order to keep large distribution companies at bay. 
Finally, cooperatives fail to appear although this form of organisation could be the 
winning card in the context. 
Cooperation represents the only possible solution for small producers. Cooperative 
management of funds would provide access to inputs that individual farmers cannot 
even strive for. Similarly, the creation of integrated cooperatives to oversee all the 
transformation stages would create greater transparency and justice in labour and 
production relations. Moreover, it would be the only way to hold back the advance of 
large distribution, because it would allow producers to compete by means of quality 
and diversification rather than through price reduction. There are a few integrated 
cooperatives in the region, the Santa Pipa, is a good example. It soon became clear, 
however, in the interviews conducted, that cooperatives were a last resort. Small 
producers are harried by life‟s daily necessities and struggle to sell their products at 
the best possible price. Managers of their organisations are committed to the battle to 
obtain an acceptable basic price, and do not get round to debating the structural 
position of the molineros or the commercialisation of mate. Both groups support the 
idea that wide participation is important because increased funds and large quantities 
of raw materials are necessary. In view of these requirements, agreements should 
include the molinos, and extend to packaging and distribution firms. And yet the 
financial risks of entering a cooperative project of this kind are so great -, especially 
for the packaging and distribution sectors - that no agreement is possible without a 
significant contribution from the government, which would need to create the 
necessary structures. The government, of course, has no intention of intervening, and 
limits its scope to regulating markets. 
The situation clearly illustrates a textbook failure of bottom-up collective action. 
Vertically integrated cooperatives, or networks of firms, need to be set up with the 
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following characteristics: a minimum endowment (big enough or numerous enough to 
involve a significant number of small producers and farm hands); critical mass 
(molinos and packagers must be involved); external dominance (the cooperatives 
must be able to compete against large distribution and run significant risks, with the 
support of outside contributions. Although the region has had experience with 
cooperatives, there has been no evolution in this direction, despite the fact that all 
parties know that they represent perhaps the only structural solution to their recurrent 
problems. As Axelrod described so well, the reason why this evolution has not come 
about is that dominant groups (molineros) are convinced they do not need them. The 
textbook problems of information and coordination costs are also present in this 
example: none of the parties involved in production appreciates the overall process, 
and nobody commits to making it more efficient.  
It is also interesting to note that this failure of bottom-up collective failure appears 
to be caused mainly by one unassailable factor: the short-term profit mentality that is 
widespread at all levels and all social classes and that has been ascertained not to be 
attributable only to a state of emergency. This would seem to call for a cultural 
explanation, but in this case the explanation is not cultural but institutional. The 
failure of collective action was determined by the lack of state interventions to 
promote and support production. State initiatives have always been limited to 
regulating quantities by restricting harvests; they have never dealt with the structural 
problems behind production instability and over-supply. There is another historical, 
political and institutional factor to consider. At the crucial time when the province of 
Misiones was established within the State of Argentina, land was divided up 
following the logic of exploitation rather than of long-term valorisation. This created 
a deep-rooted “robber” mentality, whereby mate production was not perceived as an 
opportunity, and certainly not as a collective opportunity to preserve and develop. Just 
as collective action theory dictates, a strong heterogeneity of agents, owing to an 
unbalanced distribution of resources (as we shall see when we look at the pyramid 
structure of Yerba mate production), together with a context lacking in institutional 
interventions, has created mechanisms regulating economic and social activity which 
are far from efficient but nonetheless surprisingly tenacious. 
The following sections will argue this synthesis. The first section examines salient 
moments in the history of the province that led to the fragmentation of production 
activity and interest groups. The second section outlines briefly the current situation, 
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stressing the tragic level of poverty in the majority of the population. The third section 
illustrates the production cycle of Yerba mate and the relationships that have been 
established among the various actors, evidencing the reasons why so many small 
producers are unable to obtain fair dues for their labour. The fourth section describes 
the new giant that has become part of the production process: large distribution 
companies that supply the market under their own brand-names and have huge 
bargaining power, allowing them to cut producer prices. The fifth section analyses the 
role of decades of regulation. The sixth and final section looks at the political ad 
social actors participating in the debate over the recent law and its implementation, 
and shows that its claims and its potential results cannot be considered sufficient to 
bring about a significant change in the economic outlook of small producers. 
A little history 
The territory included in today‟s Misiones, as well as neighbouring regions, were 
settled in pre-Columbian times by tribes belonging to the Tupì-Guaranì linguistic 
family. The Guaranì tribe achieved considerable social and production levels of 
development, and their cultivation techniques were well suited to the climate and soil. 
Colonial occupation changed this picture completely: the pattern of domination in the 
Latin American subcontinent considered conquered terrains as exclusively in the 
service of the conquering power. Colonisation in the region of Misiones was 
organised with one aim in mind – exploiting the rich seams of precious metal already 
mined in Peru. This required absolute control over the territory in order to guarantee 
the safe road transport of valuables to and from Potosì. The agricultural system also 
needed to be reorganised as a satellite economy for mining. The region was thus 
inevitably subordinated to the interests of the city of Potosì, though it was still 
regarded as highly strategic. The region became a breadbasket for the mining district, 
which meant a lot of ready labour was needed. The system of encomiendas
119
 
established with the first land distribution in 1555 considered the natives free citizens, 
but they were obliged to work in construction, or in defending colonial 
infrastructures. They were also forced to share the benefits of producing Yerba 
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 This is translated literally as a „commission‟ or „task‟, but in the spoken Spanish of  Latin America 
it means „the assignation of a group of Indios to a colonial master.‟ 
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mate
120
 with their colonial masters. Thirty years later, the system was partly replaced 
by the more modern system known as reducciones
121
. First introduced by the 
Franciscans in 1585, it was improved by the Jesuits in the following century. 
Surprisingly advanced for the time, the system proved to be the most efficient way of 
exploiting native labour in exchange for protection from marauding Brazilian slave 
traders and from the exhausting obligations imposed by the conquistadores. The drop 
in population after the early conquests caused by wars, exposure to new illnesses, 
arbitrary killing and inhuman working conditions was thus stemmed. The enclosure of 
Indians in reducciones, or stable villages, and the exploitation of their labour, created 
what could be called local development. By the year 1707, a century after the royal 
decree bestowing the Company of Jesus with the opportunity for peaceful 
colonisation, the system counted 30 villages, 8 in Paraguay, 15 in Argentina and the 
rest in Brazil. These reducciones constituted the Christian province of Misiones, 
under the name “misiones del Paranà, Uruguay e Tapè”, with a government headed by 
a Father Superior resident in the village of Candeleria (today Posadas). The missions‟ 
most important product was Yerba mate, at first gathered in the wild then cultivated, 
but they also grew wheat and reared cattle. 
As far as mate was concerned, the Jesuits introduced an important innovation. 
Gathering the plant had always been a complicated, uncertain and dangerous activity, 
because in the wild it grew in the most impervious regions. Expeditions to search for 
the shrub and harvest its leaves and twigs were exhausting trials of resistance lasting 
months and decimating its native Indian participants. When the Jesuits took over the 
Franciscans‟ activities, they were sufficiently powerful and self-sufficient to protect 
the Indians within their reducciones from the obligations imposed by the 
encomiendas. This meant that the Jesuits had enough labourers to begin cultivating 
the shrub by planting seeds near the villages. A better quality Yerba mate could thus 
be harvested with less effort and a lower mortality rate than before, and the leaves 
could be sold on the market at a higher price. Since the reducciones were all linked, a 
harmonious system of complementary activities was created, allowing for self-
sufficiency and export of excess production. In this case, up to 30-40% of the 
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 According to Garavaglia (1983), the natives worked for their Spanish masters six days a week, with 
only Sunday and holidays to work in their own fields where they grew corn, manioc, and beans for 
their own subsistence. 
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 Reduccion is translated literally as “a village of Indians converted to Christianity.” 
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production of Yerba mate was sold, making the Jesuits strong competitors against the 
encomienderos, and explaining both the success of the Jesuit missions, compared to 
the Franciscans who were more subservient to the system of encomienderos, and the 
constant pressure exerted by the authorities on the Jesuits to hand over the natives 
living in their protected villages. It was precisely this battle for control over the 
workforce that led to Charles III‟s expulsion of the Jesuit order on October 27, 1767, 
which was carried out without resistance the year after. The Jesuit fathers were 
replaced by Franciscans or by private administrators representing the interests of the 
encomienderos and traders who were more interested in turning a quick profit than 
supporting the village organisations. While the Guaranì Indians conferred almost 
magic powers and prestige on the Jesuits, and were extremely grateful for their 
protection, the new managers were only able to exploit the workforce by means of the 
whip. Without the Jesuits, the exaggeratedly exploited Indios began to abandon the 
villages, and the production system built and maintained by the Company of Jesus fell 
into ruin. 
From then onwards, a long process that led to a complete re-mixing of the ethnic, 
cultural and social makeup of the population and to the fragmentation of the 
agricultural structure began. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the 
formation of Nation States, former colonies radically changed their systems of 
relations and ties. Regions lost their autonomy and were required to answer to new, 
centralised powers. A national bourgeoisie was not yet influential in economic terms, 
but eager to make the most of the newly liberated territories, above all to control them 
in order to ward off the territorial claims of neighbouring powers. The area of 
Misiones was appetising because it was strategically important, for its wealth of 
natural resources, and for its abundant Creole workforce.
122
 The battles that took 
place to gain control in the area were between members of the dominant elites in the 
cities of Asunciòn, Buenos Aires, Corrientes and in Brazil.  
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 Between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a long process revising social and production 
relations brought about a simultaneous process of racial mixing, with marriages between Spaniards and 
Indios. At the same time there was a process of destruction and re-construction of society: Indians who 
fled from the encomiendas or from the villages allied themselves with a powerful Spaniard who 
protected them in exchange first for almost slave labour, then for salaried work. Changes that started 
with the expulsion of the Jesuits culminated in the arrival of a new social figure: a Creole of Guaranì 
culture, who made up the basic labour force of the new production system. See Garavaglia, 1973. In 
addition there was immigration from Paraguay and Brazil, escaping from wars in their respective 
countries, and later by Argentinians.  
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The political and military situation was complex: the region was to start with 
relatively autonomous, but was then partly or wholly occupied by Brazil, Argentina 
then Paraguay. In 1882, the province of Misiones was split from that of Corrientes 
and was administered from the central government based in Buenos Aires. From an 
economic point of view, there was no long-term attempt to re-launch the province 
after the colonial administration, not even from the point of view of exploiting the 
workforce. The territory was highly contended but economically backward, which 
made it easy for the ruling class to appropriate its resources (wood and Yerba mate) 
and consider it an “extractive front” (Unam, 1993). The system that characterised the 
region from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards was different from previous 
systems for exploiting the region‟s resources, and the centre of economic power was 
Buenos Aires not Asunciòn. The region was no longer considered a breadbasket to 
feed the mining industry, but a source in its own right of wealth. Invested capital 
provided quick returns. The production processes adopted a hunter-gatherer approach, 
relying above all on an abundant workforce and basic technology. With the collapse 
of the Jesuit reducciones, mate was no longer cultivated near the villages and had to 
be collected in the wild. Through a system of permits and regulations, the government 
guaranteed selected entrepreneurs legal harvesting rights for the shrub. Villages were 
not allowed to be established, and cattle, sheep and goats could not be raised, so that 
the free exploitation of the workforce could be maintained (in the regions of 
Misiones, northern Paranà and northern Uruguay). A tax calculated on the quantities 
of yerba harvested was then levied on every impresario.  
There were many disadvantages for the region. Conflicts over concessions 
continued until the Buenos Aires government established its project of land 
distribution. Natural resources were impoverished, and the region underwent a 
gradual process of desertification. The only resource left was land, for which property 
rights had never been established; the region thus became a natural destination for 
repopulation in the early decades of the twentieth century, in particular for settlers 
from Europe. The government of Buenos Aires approved of this redistribution of 
immigrants, as the damp Pampas areas were filling up fast, despite local government 
disapproval. The absentee landlord system of latifundia
123
 was partly replaced by 
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 All the land in Misiones was sold to a restricted number of buyers: 38 landowners divided up a total 
of 750 square leagues (in Argentina a league is about 5 kms) and created vast unproductive latifundia. 
The price they paid was minimal, and this superficial division of land was the first step towards the 
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successive waves of settlers establishing small farmsteads that more or less 
guaranteed them a living
124
. Land rights, however, were never well defined. 
In 1937, 60% of cultivated lands were in the hands of families with no official title 
to the land.  Land distribution created many different kinds of production units: there 
were foreign settlers, whose families farmed small or medium-sized lots; Creoles 
from neighbouring regions who settled on tiny strips of land, just survived off the land 
and worked as labourers during the harvest; a few land-owners and impresarios who 
mostly raised cattle in the southern region; and, finally, absentee landlords, mostly 
from Corrientes and Buenos Aires, who owned the huge latifundia in the north and 
either cultivated it extensively , or left the land largely uncultivated. In the 1940s, the 
re-population process was terminated, and all the productive land was assigned. As a 
result of this variegated process, combining official colonisation, private settlers, and 
unofficial squatters, the demographic and production structure of the province today 
began to take shape. Its main features are: the high percentage of rural population; 
extreme cultural and ethnic heterogeneity
125
; a predominance of small family 
homesteads over other forms of production organisation; and the presence of large 
latifundia especially in the area of northern Paranà. 
Poverty 
The province of Misiones extends over 29,801 square kilometres, with a population 
in 2001 of almost a million. The population growth rate, owing in part to the 
colonisation policies enacted, is one of the highest in Argentina: 2.1% average growth 
per year from 1961 to 2001. Only forty years before, the population was little over 
400,000. While the population in the province represents 2.6% of the national 
population, only 1.6% of Argentina‟s GDP is devoted to it. The per capita income of 
he province is just over half the national average. In 1993, the Senate commission for 
ecology and development calculated the human development index (HDI) of the 
province of Misiones – which can range from zero to one, with one being the lowest 
                                                                                                                                           
creation of the enormous private agricultural and animal husbandry businesses still present in the 
Misiones area. The sale was the last act by the government of Corrientes before the nationalization of 
Misiones, and took place so precipitately that often the land was not even measured, and land rights 
were granted with a great number of irregularities. 
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 After nationalization, the irregularities committed in the bills of sale allowed the new government to 
regain much of the land in the middle of the province, which set off a process of colonization of public 
land starting with the area known as „del campo‟ and then extending to the whole of the central region. 
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 In the Oberà region alone there are more than 40 different religions. 
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possible level of development, and which takes into account key factors such as life 
expectancy, literacy rates, school attendance, and per capita income according to 
purchasing parity - as 0.842, one of the worst levels in all the provinces of Argentina. 
In 1991, 80% of families were unable to satisfy their basic needs (Ipec, 1999) and 
suffered variously from overcrowding, precarious housing conditions, lack of basic 
services, truancy and food shortage. In the years that followed, life conditions 
worsened further. In 1996, nearly 30% of the population in the province lived under 
the absolute poverty line, double the percentage of ten years before (Lopez, Romeo, 
1999). Research undertaken at the University of Misiones, which focussed on income 
distribution, showed that inequality has increased. While in 1985 in the city of 
Posadas 40% of the poorest inhabitants had access to 15.5% of the total income, in 
1996 they only had 14.6%. At the same time, 20% of the wealthiest citizens enjoyed 
50.9% of the total income, three more percentage points than in 1985. The labour 
market has also deteriorated. In 1980 there was still a protectionist regime, in 1991 
liberalisation started to take effect, and in 1996, the system underwent total 
deregulation, privatisation and opening to outside markets. This process increased 
both unemployment and underemployment, reaching the double figures. 
The main economic activities in the region are agro-industries. This creates four 
different sets of consequences.  
I. A great number of small producers supplying raw materials have to 
contend with a concentrated demand, which means they have little 
bargaining power, made even weaker by the absence of both union support 
and solid cooperatives; 
II. Perennial or semi-perennial cultivation needs long-term investments which 
take longer to yield results; in the case of Yerba mate, it takes four years 
before the shrub can be harvested; 
III. Alternative products to Yerba mate are mostly destined to foreign markets 
(almost all the Tung oil, 80% of the tea, more than half of the tobacco, and 
about 30% of the cellulose paste) creating strong pressure on prices and 
instability; 
IV. Most of the products are cultivated or transformed only in the province of 
Misiones, or at most in the region, meaning that their relevance in the 
national economy is low, as is the attention of central government. 
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The first two characteristics – a buyers‟ market and long-term investments that 
penalise small producers and farm labourers in particular – need specific 
counterweights such as employment alternatives or support policies. The dominance 
of agro-industries depends on the fact that the manufacturing sector has shrunk (in 
terms of value added from 27% of total production to 21%), as well as becoming 
more concentrated, with a reduction in the number of production units, and a 37% 
drop in employment share. Tourism could provide a valid alternative, but it is as yet 
unable to employ enough people. The vast majority of the local population depends 
on producing Yerba mate, tea, tobacco, wood and its by-products. In this context, 
Yerba mate represents the most important opportunity, because the other products are 
negatively affected by points III and IV (dominance of foreign markets and 
irrelevance in the national economy). 
Yerba mate 
The area where the Yerba mate plant grows is limited to the East by the Atlantic 
Ocean, the West by the River Paraguay, and to the north and south by the parallels 
18° and 30° in the Southern latitude. The sub-tropical shrub requires the high 
temperatures, damp soil and heavy rainfall, sand and clay soils rich in potassium, iron 
and phosphorous acid offered by the red soil of Misiones. Gortari (1997) calculated 
that the total world production of Yerba mate is approximately 500,000 metric tonnes 
per year, 260,000 of which in Argentina (57%), 180,000 in Brazil (38%) and the 
remaining 30,000 in Paraguay (5%). In Argentina 200,000 tonnes of Yerba Mate are 
consumed per year, and the rest of the production is exported; 70% goes to countries 
belonging to Mercosur, and the rest to Chile and Bolivia. Outside Latin America, 
Yerba mate is becoming popular in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Germany 
and the US. Ninety percent of Argentina‟s production is from the province of  
Misiones, while the rest is harvested in the north-eastern province of Corrientes. In 
Misiones, 24,000 producers cultivate the shrub, of which 16,000 are small producers, 
called colonos, with plots no bigger than ten hectares (1 ha = 10,000 msq). At harvest 
time (cosecha), the activity employs about 4,000 extra labourers, or about 22% of the 
agricultural workforce. The industrial transformation of the leaves and twigs employs 
about 15% of the workforce in the manufacturing sector. The production structure 
comprises 24,000 producers, 300 secaderos, 200 acopiadores, and 124 molinos. 
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The land 
Data on the quantity of land currently under cultivation for Yerba mate is hard to 
come by owing to large discrepancies between satellite pictures, declared quantities 
and the findings of surveys. The main culprit is no doubt the black market.
126
 The 
most reliable figures derive from satellite imaging, most recently undertaken between 
March and April 2001. Fifty percent of the Agricultural Surface Used in the province 
of Misiones is cultivated with mate. The images are divided according to density of 
cultivation into three categories: high (more than 1,800 plants per hectare), medium 
(between 1,000 and 1,800) and low (less than 1,000). The intensity of cultivation also 
reveals information about the technologies adopted, the relevance of the cultivation 
for family economies, and the workers‟ standard of living. In order to absorb the 
working capacity of two adult members of a family, taking into account alternative 
production that is also needed, 10-15 hectares of land are necessary. Surveys into the 
number and size of smallholdings of this kind, known as chacras
127
, provide the 
following data: 21,000 are less than ten hectares (with 116,000 ha cultivated all 
together), 2,400 are between 10 and 25 hectares (38,980 ha total), 597 are 25-50 
hectares (21,163 ha total), and 179 are bigger than 50 hectares (20,542 ha total).  
The graph in Figure 21 shows that the distribution of land in the province of 
Misiones is less unbalanced than average in the country. This is important because it 
shows that, while the very survival of small producers is at risk, this is not only owing 
to the enormous imbalance between the limited amounts of land available for small 
farmers and the vast latifundia in the rest of the region. In the production of mate, as 
we have seen, less than 10 hectares of land cannot be considered sufficient to feed a 
family. At the same time, the amount of land available for smallholders is not 
irrelevant: more land means potential cooperative behaviour, a chance of increasing 
productivity and thus sustaining the population, product diversification and 
economies of scale. 
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 Satellite images produced the figure of 24,000 producers, while official surveys only counted 
17,000. 
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 A chacra is a unit of mixed farmland, typical of the province of Misiones. One chacra of 25ha 
usually mixes perennials (mate, tea, tung), annuals or biennials (corn, soy, tobacco, manioc, sugar cane 
or pineapple) and cattle or pig raising.  
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Fig. 21 – Distribution of land cultivated  with mate in the province of Misiones and 
Corrientes, compared to the distribution of cultivated land on average in Argentina – 
“Lorenz curve” 
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The production process 
The food code established by Argentina‟s Ministry of Agriculture (MAG, 1971) 
defines Yerba mate as a product made out of the dried and lightly toasted leaves and 
twigs of the Ilex paraguariensis
128
, which are then chopped or ground. In order to be 
fit for consumption, the industry regulations require it to: contain less than 11% 
humidity, be well conserved and free of harmful or alien substances; contain less than 
9% ash, 1.5% of which should be insoluble in chloridric acid; have a minimum of 
85% of broken, dried or ground leaves with no more than 15% twigs in the blend. The 
food code also considers it necessary for the product to contain more than 0.6% of 
caffeine, and for the watery extract to be more than 25%. Over thirty years, when the 
tree reaches full maturity, it can grow up to 15 metres tall, but cultivation techniques 
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 This is a species of holly native to Latin America. Ilex aquifolium was used a great deal in the 
seventeenth century for medicinal purposes. The earliest records go back to the sixteenth century, 
which mention its use in an infusion. 
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introduced over the years keep the shrubs down to the more practical height of 3-6 
metres. 
The first operation in the production process is the cosecha, or harvesting of leaves 
and twigs. This is generally carried out with scissors, machetes or little saws, except 
in the large, integrated firms with wider areas cultivated and greater capital 
investment, which have undertaken research and bought machinery. The first picking, 
with a low harvest, takes place four or five years after planting; from then on the 
shrubs can be picked annually, and in some cases twice a year. Under favourable 
conditions, a plant can yield up to 20-25 kilos of green leaves. The first cleaning takes 
place on the spot, leaves are separated from unsuitable twigs and the product is then 
wrapped in jute cloths for transport. Until several decades ago, it was the tarefero
129
 
(seasonal or daily farmhand) who transported the leaves and twigs to the place where 
phase two – the sale - begins. Nowadays the yerba mate is loaded onto trucks, which 
generally belong to the buyer. The protagonists of phase one are farmhands on a 
medium-sized chacra, the families of smallholders on small farms, or employees in 
large, integrated firms; once the harvest is over, about 73% ends up on the market. 
Only about 27% belongs to the few operational cooperatives, which manage both the 
harvest and the successive stages of transformation. 
The first stage of commercialisation is highly fragmented: 24,000 producers enter 
into contact with 300 secaderos (who buy about 53% of total production). Added to 
this, there are 200 intermediaries: the acopiadores
130
, who buy about 13% of the 
product, and the molinos, who buy the remaining 7%.
131
 It is at this point that small 
producers are at a disadvantage because they cannot impose their own conditions, 
being at the base of a pryramid where the summit has much higher bargaining power. 
In addition to fragmentation and the number of producers, there is also the problem of 
the precarious financial condition of an average family of colonos. With the pressure 
created by the bottleneck that keeps demand and supply apart, it is easy to see why the 
basic price of the raw material is insufficient to inject capital into the company. The 
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 There are several versions of the meaning of this word, which means a farmhand employed by the 
hour or day by the plantation owner during the harvest. One origin of the word could be the Spanish for 
„tariff‟, meaning the agreement between the labourer and his employer. Another etymology is from the 
Portuguese, meaning „task‟ or „job‟.  
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 The word acopiar means literally „to pile up‟; his task is to buy and amass leaves and twigs from 
different producers in order to sell them to the secadero. 
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 Ieral, 1998. This study regards a very limited area but is representative of the whole production 
sector in the province of Misiones. The figures are based on a survey. 
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higher levels of the pyramid, the secadores and acopiadores, similarly have little 
leverage; they too have to negotiate with the far more powerful distribution 
companies. This pyramid structure is one of the causes of the poor standard of living 
of small producers. 
 
Fig 22 – The pyramid structure of the production process of yerba mate 
 
 
24 ,000 producers 
500 acopiadores and secaderos 
1 24 molinos 
1 0 distributors 
 
The next stage of production is the drying process (sapecado
132
, secado or secanza, 
and canchado). This process must be undertaken within 24 hours of the harvest in 
order to avoid fermentation and the consequent waste of the substance. This technical 
requirement is relevant because it explains why the secaderos play an important 
intermediary role between producers and molinos, thus creating two sets of 
exchanges: between producers and secadores, and between secadores and molinos. 
The lack of adequate infrastructures, transport, and preservation techniques means 
that the secadores must be physically located near the harvesting areas. Straight after 
the harvest, the product is subject to fermentation and weighs a great deal, whereas 
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 The word is Guaranì for „exposing leaves to a source of heat‟. Generally this is a live flame, where 
the leaves are exposed for a few seconds. This stabilises the leaves chemically. 
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after the drying process it is stabilised – and can therefore be stored - and weighs 
about one third. After the live flame, which destroys the ferments, stops oxygenation 
of the tannin, and ensures that the leaves stay green, the product is further dried and 
lightly (secado or secanza) in order to reduce humidity to 5 or 6%, and finally ground 
down (canchado) in order to facilitate transportation. The yerba is then left to season, 
originally for one year, but nowadays for 9 months, or even less with the more moder 
machinery. At this stage the product is called yerba mate canchada and provides the 
raw material for the molinos to transform.  
At the Molino, the product is selected according to its provenance and its features, 
and cleaned, eliminating some of the excessive twigs. It is then further ground, at 
varying levels, sieved and then sorted into two types of mate: con palos and sin palos, 
according to the percentage of twigs in the blend. At this point it is called yerba 
molida, and it is ready to go to the 124 molinos, who are high up on the pyramid and 
take advantage of the bottleneck. Only 10% of production goes to cooperatives, 30% 
to independent firms and the remaining 60% to twenty large molinos. Moreover, their 
location reflects the concentration of the production regions: there are 95 in the 
province of Misiones, 11 in the neighbouring Corrientes, 6 in the capital, Buenos 
Aires and another 10 in other provinces (Freaza, 2002). This is true despite the fact 
that the molineros need technologies subject to scale economies and that the 
seasoning period separates the drying stage from the molinero stage. The fact is that 
there is no need for the factories to be physically located near production. 
Historically, between the two alternatives – integrating commercialisation with 
necessary investments in their distribution networks, or integrating, or interacting 
with the secaderos – the molineros have always chosen the latter. It is easier for them 
to exploit the highly scattered and small-scale producers. The consequence, especially 
today, is a further shrinking of the summit of the pyramid during distribution. 
Large distribution 
While traditionally the molineros –who sold the product under their own label – 
were at the top of the pyramid, since the end of the 1980s owing to the liberalisation 
process underway in the country, their privileged position has been undermined, and 
supermarkets and large distribution chains have become dominant. The increase in 
competition without an agro-industrial national policy has had several consequences. 
There has been a concentration of the commercialisation of the product: 80% ends up 
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in the hands of only six firms, and 20% in four others, who compete by means of 
massive advertising campaigns. Many traditional labels linked to the molinos have 
disappeared, and the product has been standardised. The production process is thus 
pyramidal, with an extremely small summit, and many different qualities and types of 
product can no longer be found. 
Demand 
The demand for yerba mate is inelastic: increased consumption depends neither on 
a reduction in prices nor on an increase in income in the population. And yet some 
properties of the plant are as yet unexplored: its energetic, nutritive and preventive 
qualities, as well as its potential as a preservative, colorant, deodorant, antioxidant 
and bactericide. In short, while currently demand is static, there is nothing to say that 
its potential could not be tapped, with the support of appropriate policies, especially in 
research and development. 
Supply: the end of the line 
On the supply side, the most important phenomenon has been the increased 
dominance of large distribution. Its disproportionate economic force, however, does 
not invest in research to improve the quality of the product: its main aim is to promote 
yerba mate commercially. Profit margins are mostly sought by squeezing the 
production process, thus leading to even greater concentration of the molinos, only the 
biggest and best equipped logistically are able to compete and stay on the market. The 
result for the weakest links of the production process is a deterioration of their 
bargaining power and therefore of their standard of living. 
Supply: the beginning of the line 
By contrast, producers of yerba mate have always had problems in satisfying 
demand. Because it is a perennial, and can only be harvested after a cycle of four 
years, when higher prices would suggest increasing supplies, it is hard to increase 
production accordingly. By the same token, it is hard to contract the supply when 
prices drop. To leave the market is very costly, both in terms of loss of investment 
and in terms of expenses incurred. Producers often leave the plantation and resign 
themselves to low prices. The result is a structural regime of excess production and 
lack of demand, diminishing producers‟ bargaining power even further. This situation 
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justified State control, when excess production was stockpiled according to a 
government policy – that was ineffective but doubtless better than no policy at all - 
called mercado consignatario. In short, in the last decades, producers have seen their 
profit margins diminish owing to the arrival of large distribution and the abandonment 
of government policies that tried to control and stabilise supply.  
 
Fig. 23 – The traditional structure of the sector (until the mid eighties) 
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Fig. 24 – The structure of the sector, current trends 
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A vicious circle 
This situation has aggravated another significant phenomenon: illegal labour. As 
their profit margins shrink, many producers, secaderos and molinos have begun to 
evade taxes, as well as administrative and contractual obligations, contributing to the 
black market. This makes it impossible to draw up a clear map of who works and sells 
what and where, which at the same time makes it difficult to draft a law that supports 
certification of the product, or of the production process, in order to improve quality 
and diversification. At the same time the black market reduces income for small 
producers, as informal agreements, especially between producers on one side and 
secadores and acopiadores on the other, replace legislation. Agreements whereby 
yerba is exchanged under a barter system are not rare, and price variations, as well as 
credit extensions, are equally common. Producers have no defence against this lack of 
transparency: there are no detailed, reliable facts available about prices, the extent of 
cultivations, production or stocks. Decisions regarding investments, harvests, or sales, 
are made on the basis of limited information, especially since liberalisation (Ieral, 
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1998). Without adequate interventions, it is easy to imagine the sector evolving 
towards a progressive domination of large distribution over the entire production 
process, with subsequent loss of employment, small producers being reduced to 
becoming farmhands, and small firms that could resist with the support of 
cooperatives, dying out. 
State interventions 
Public interventions have followed several paths. At one time, the government tried 
limiting supply by fixing quotas and restricting harvests in order to sustain prices. The 
result was often an increase in the final sales price rather than in the price paid to 
small producers for raw materials. Moreover, price-sustaining policies led to higher 
administrative costs, which, in the long run were unsustainable given the budget 
constraints of such an economically instable country. Excess production was then 
absorbed by government funds (Mercado Consignatario). The next step was to 
subsidise the product, but on the one hand this was difficult to sustain financially, and, 
on the other, it encouraged farmers to increase production and thus aggravate the 
situation of over-supply. Another attempt was to support producer cooperatives, but 
with little continuity and determination.
133
  
Following Argentina‟s general economic approach - and unlike experiences in 
some countries that succeeded in emerging from underdevelopment by abandoning 
protectionism for open markets - institutional interventions in support of mate 
production were structurally instable and in continual flux between liberalism and 
protectionism through state intervention. Setting up state production and 
commercialisation companies was a solution that worked well from the mid-1970s to 
the late 1980s because they worked in a protected market in a regime of import duties. 
When the markets were opened, however, large, private firms started to compete, the 
state companies were forced to privatise. In recent years, round tables were set up to 
negotiate agreement among the various interest groups. In order for this bargaining 
tool to be effective, state functionaries as a rule need to be completely impartial 
referees, and their prime aim must be to distribute gains fairly. The obvious problem 
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 The reform that took place at the beginning of the 1990s eliminated the preference that had been 
accorded to cooperatives by imposing a capital tax of 2% on cooperative funds and creating more 
intransigent regulations than for private firms, which can always resort to double accounting. The few 
cooperatives that there were at that point started to fail. Today there are only three significant 
cooperatives producing yerba mate: the Santa Pipà, Montecarlo and Colonia Liebig. 
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is that the state did not absolve this function with absolute transparency, thus 
generating a lack of trust and a failure of the negotiations: the state representative at 
the round table was in fact a Senator, owner of one of the biggest molinos. A recent 
attempt at re-negotiating agreement through a law that created the Istituto Nazional 
del la Yerba Mate (INYM) needs further examination. 
The 2001 law aimed to “promote and reinforce development of the production, 
transformation, industrialisation, commercialisation and consumption of yerba mate 
and its derivatives for different uses, stimulating the sustainability of the various 
sectors involved in the activity” (Scdra, 2002), and therefore improve and stabilise 
producer prices. The law envisages a directive organ comprising 11 members: one 
representative appointed by the central government resident in the province of 
Misiones for at least five years; one representative of local government from Misiones 
and one from Corrientes; one representative from industry, three from producers, two 
from agricultural cooperatives, one from the category of farmhands, and one from that 
of the secaderos. This composition aims to represent all the parties involved in the 
production process, but clearly the central and local government representatives are 
simply two more votes for the molineros and industry. The substance of the law is no 
different from previous government initiatives: it is an attempt to propose a method to 
negotiate price stabilisation. 
For decades, structural changes have been mentioned but never implemented 
because of the failure of collective action
134
. The closest the government has got to 
taking concrete action in support of producers is to fix guaranteed minimum prices, 
estimate quantities of the plant that are produced and, if necessary, restrict harvests. 
Other actions that are potentially envisaged by the law include certifying quality and 
supporting cooperatives. Since 2001, conflicts between producers and industrialists 
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 The functions of the Institute were very similar to those of the previous Crym: control the 
implementation of regulations; support producers, transformers, industries and shopkeepers with 
incentives; identify and draft strategies to support competition in the sector; plan, organize and 
participate in promotional activities for yerba mate and its derivatives both at home and abroad; 
conduct research and innovation in order to diversify its uses and increase consumption; coordinate 
improvement plans with competent food organisms; create a data bank for disseminating information 
about hygiene laws and quality requisites; disseminate statistics and surveys in order to sustain demand 
and supply, and, if necessary, collaborate with the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fishing to 
establish norms to restrict production; create registers to identify all participants in the production 
process; provide technical  assistance; facilitate training and updating of technical and professional 
personnel with conferences and scholarships in Italian and foreign universities; promote forms of 
networking between producers and in particular cooperatives in the production area; include those who 
work in the sector among the beneficiaries of the national unemployment fund; attempt to find a 
common agreement on the price of the raw material. 
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have made its implementation very difficult. Strikes, debates and demonstrations have 
characterised the political climate since then. 
The debate 
Small producers are, as we have seen, at the wide base of the production pyramid. 
Their standard of living has never been high, but if during their lifetime they had 
earned enough to set aside a few savings, the whole economy of the region would 
probably be wealthier and more dynamic. The return of democracy in 1983 also 
marked the return of trade unions, as well as of the Movimento Agrario de Misiones 
(Mam
135
), though the political climate was still fraught with tension and fear. After 
the precipitate price drops owing to over-production, in the early 1990s workers‟ and 
producers‟ associations again became active.  Despite the climate of fear, there was 
optimism in the air, as union leaders realised that the sheer fact of meeting again 
meant a new opportunity to rebuild the country, starting with their own history, and 
their individual and collective identity. This enthusiasm, however, blinded some 
activists to the fact that the context had changed and that perhaps a new form of 
organisation was called for (Goldsberg, 1999). Apart from the absence of the smallest 
producers, too frightened and mistrustful after long years of repression, one of the 
reasons collective action did not take off immediately was that the provincial 
government supported the creation of sectorial associations for different products, 
with the final aim of atomising the producers‟ demands. In this period, by way of 
example, this policy led to the creation of the Aptm, an association of small tobacco 
producers, and the Atém, an association of tea produces from Misiones. 
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 Born in 1971, this trade union of Obertà small producers shared the usual aim of stemming a new 
price slump. It was very influenced by the Movimento Cristiano de la Acciòn Catolica, a Catholic 
organization that provided leaders for the Mam and imposed its ideology. The structure was made up 
of 20 producers who elected one representative every 100 farms who participated in the general 
assembly. The movement was funded by membership fees and by contribution from the Catholic 
church. Farms with over 25 hectares, considered medium-sized farms , formed the majority of its 
members, meaning that they were not on the lowest rung of the social scale but were anyway unable to 
accumulate capital. During the 1973 elections, Mam decided not to support any particular candidate, 
and this decision sparked disagreement within the movement. Some members accused the union 
leaders of being Peronist and subsequently split off, forming the union Agricultores Misioneros 
Agremiadas (Ama), which did not aim to subvert social order in any way. Another splinter group  was 
the Ligas Agrarias Misioneras (Lam). No agreement was reached between the groups and in the 1975 
elections Mam supported the Frejuli party, Lam the Partido Autentico of the Montoneros, and Ama the 
U.Ce.De. Colonos who protested were violently repressed after the 1975 crisis, as the interests of the 
agro-industrial groups were threatened. The government declared Mam and Lam subversive. In 1976, 
with the military coup the army occupied the province, and many union activists died or disappeared 
mysteriously, effectively suffocating union activity. 
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The important demonstrations at the end of the eighties, such as the tea strike, 
gradually led both sides to consider a less conflictual approach and negotiate solutions 
between producer associations and government institutions. Starting in August 1991, 
Mam proposed that the State should once again play a role in exploiting natural 
resources, financing commercial activities, and experimenting and developing new 
products, within the existing production structure. In 1999, when prices once again 
precipitated, there were renewed protests. The associations active at the time, in 
addition to Mam were: the Union de Trabajadores Rurales y Estibadores (Uatre); the 
Federacion de Cooperativas Agricolas de Misiones (Fedecoop); the Asociacion de 
Productores Agrarios de Misiones (Apam); and, for the industrialists, the Camara de 
Molineros deYerba Mate de la zona Productora (Cmyzp). All these organisations 
participated in the discussions leading to the new law concerning Yerba mate. 
The new law that instituted the national institute governing Yerba mate production 
(Inym) was considered indispensable after the liberalist wave had hit producers and 
left havoc in its wake not only for the weakest links in the production line, but also for 
medium-sized producers and – perhaps decisively - even for the traditionally strongest 
subjects, the molinos, who were increasingly threatened by supermarkets and large 
distribution chains. The various associations have differing views regarding how well 
the new (old) system of regulations works. 
Apam, which represents medium-sized farms and which is represented in the 
bargaining organ of the national institute, supported the logic behind the law: the only 
thing that really counts is fixing a guaranteed minimum price for raw material. 
Despite obvious differences between the various approaches, this point of view was - 
either tacitly or openly - a lowest common denominator for all parties involved. The 
mobilisation, including a six-week peaceful occupation of the main square in the city 
by the families of small producers and tareferos, to implement the law - at least in 
these minimum terms – finally brought about an agreement for a guaranteed 
minimum price of 13.5 cents per kilo for the raw product, and 50 cents per kilo for 
ground yerba canchada 
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Table 2 – Production costs for Yerba mate per hectare in pesos in the province of 
Misiones 
Factors Medium 
Technology 
Low 
Technology 
Manual work 6 6 
Tractor 16 16 
Ploughing 7 7 
Raking 22 22 
Grinding 12 6 
Pesticides 18 - 
Herbicides 24 24 
Fertilisers 90 - 
Covering 21 - 
Total 216 81 
 
Table 3 – Producer spending per hectare in 2001 in the province of Misones 
Factors Spending per hectare 
(excluding harvest*) 
In pesos 
Spending 
per Kilo 
(excluding 
harvest*) 
In cents 
Spending 
per Kilo 
(including 
harvest) 
In cents 
Total direct costs  220 5,5 8,0 
Ammortisation machinery 114 2,9 2,9 
Ammortisation plantations 142 3,6 3,6 
Interest on loans 77 1,9 1,9 
Total without margins 553 13,6 16,4 
Earnings 10% 55 1,4 1,6 
Total  608 15,0 18,0 
Note (*): Our evaluation comparing various sources. 
Source: MAM (2001). 
 
Fig. 25 – Ups and downs in production of Yerba mate in tonnes 
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Sources: MAG (1971), Ieral (1998), our interpolations. 
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Chapter Four - Institutional Action 
In lagging regions, resources have the potential to set a process of development in 
motion. The process is difficult to trigger, however, and it cannot be left to entirely to 
private economic agents; public goods and services must be established by means of 
institutional action. Institutions, on the other hand, especially state institutions, are not 
particularly efficient. Even when they are not prey to specific interest groups, whose 
aims are often anti-development, they suffer from any number of inefficiencies: in 
recruiting managers, in being procedure-oriented rather than results-oriented, in their 
tendency to privilege apparatuses over the common good. It is often said that 
decentralisation, which relies on local institutions, resources and skills, is a way to 
minimise the inefficiencies that are so much more evident at a central government 
level. A State that has many different levels of government is seen as being more 
flexible, more innovative; at the same time, local institutions are considered closer to 
the people and easier to control. 
And yet, when this approach is adopted it is easy to lose sight of an important 
element. Precisely because they are closer to people‟s concrete interests, local 
institutions are subject to consensus. The considerations made in this chapter stem 
from the conviction that, even when institutions behave virtuously and in a non-
predatory manner
136, there is always a „consensus constraint‟ that long-term future 
results cannot satisfy. Institutional action, under these uncertain circumstances, does 
not necessarily weigh the whole package of features that make up the history of any 
given economic and social context – its resources, social structure, competence of the 
managerial class, political regime, collective experience and traditions. These 
historical conditions count, but they are not sufficient to determine what actions will 
be undertaken; there is always a margin of indeterminacy. Institutions must be seen as 
being „entrepreneurial‟: their behaviour as „intentional‟. Why in some conditions 
institutions take the right steps in the right direction for development, and why – even 
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 „Virtuous‟ in the sense that they act for their own good by means of the collective good. Predatory 
institutions aim to satisfy their own interests to the detriment of the common good. The emergence and 
consolidation of predatory institutions that are anti-development has been analyzed by Acemoglu 
(2006). The model he presents is very interesting: he stresses that institutions against development are 
seen as persistent and hard to dismantle once they have become established, and that they tend to 
establish themselves when powerful social groups are convinced that their personal advantages would 
be endangered by changes that would distribute economic benefits more widely. Acemoglu‟s model 
therefore lends support to our argument. 
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in similar circumstances – they either do not act, or the steps they do take are in the 
wrong direction, or ineffective, must have something to do with the quality of the 
managerial class (their competence and experience). It also has to do, however, with 
their ability or desire to take risks, or their inability or reticence to do so, given the 
fact that future or uncertain results fail to legitimise their decisions.  
The first section analyses briefly the issue of political and administrative 
decentralisation, and finds that the available literature does not come to a definitive 
conclusion that decentralisation provides a solution to the problem of consensus. The 
second and third sections present the main focus of the chapter: local institutions are 
in closer contact with the interests of different groups, and whatever they do, even 
when it is justified by the common good, their actions generate differentiated 
advantages and disadvantages and maintain a high level of uncertainty. This means 
that local governments have to sustain high costs to draft complex development 
projects as well as high costs related to gaining consensus. Their actions are 
conditioned by the history of the territory, by the experience and competence of the 
managerial class, but there is always an element of indeterminacy. The chapter closes 
with a conclusion and two appendices. The first appendix describes the experiences of 
local development in Italy and shows that local action did play a role but achieved 
highly differentiated results even in the provinces that started out in the 1950s with 
similar per capita income levels. The second appendix provides a critique of a 
widespread idea that managers and administrators are as impregnated with the cultural 
attitudes of their territories as their subjects are, and therefore have no real autonomy.  
Development policies and decentralisation 
The issue of institutional decentralisation is a complex one. Simply adopting the 
paradigm of an inefficient central State does not necessarily lead one to believe in the 
virtues of policies that are drafted and decided locally. The limits of local 
governments need to be taken into account, as well as the difficulties they face. 
Let us examine, to start with, some of the arguments in favour of decentralisation 
that add something to the basic paradigm of an inefficient central State. The first 
indirect argument is supported for the same reasons that two typical options of a 
centralised State approach to local development - automatic incentives and large-sale 
public works – are considered inadequate.  As regards incentives, the argument is 
based on the concept of „temporal inconsistency‟. That is, in order to be effective any 
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form of incentive must be conditional and temporary; automatic incentives tend to be 
unconditional and become permanent (Middleton, 2001). Their dubious effectiveness 
is well documented by experience, both in industrialised countries (Bradshow, 
Blakely, 1999; Middleton, 2001) and in developing countries (Amsden, 2001; 
Amsden, Wan-Wen, 2003). There is less literature on the perplexities regarding large-
scale public works as a solution for local development (Flyvbierg, Bruzelius, 
Rothengatter, 2003), but there is ample documentation of the systematically vast gap 
between estimated costs at the planning stage and final costs
137
 and it has been shown 
that this gap hides all manner of interests, outside the sphere of legitimacy or 
functionality (Premchand, 2003, p.15). 
The second argument in favour of local policies is that they are often able to set in 
motion positive expectations and behaviour that set development in motion. That is, 
active and capable local institutions indirectly create and support the kind of attitudes 
that are more common in private economic agents, as well as in the population at 
large, such as respecting common and collective goods and being willing to take risks 
and innovate. It is also important to stress, moreover, that the idea that the dynamic 
capacity of a given territory is dictated by its history, or its „civic‟ heritage, is 
inaccurate, if not downright ideological. This culturally dominated approach generally 
cites Putnam (1995) with regard to Italy; but, as the appendix will show, there are 
many doubts as to the reliability of his results, not to mention his underlying 
hypothesis.  
These two arguments are powerful, but not sufficiently persuasive if we are to 
discuss the actual realisation of local development policies. Azfar, Kahkonen, Lanyi, 
Meagher, and Rutherford (1999) demonstrate that available empirical research is 
inconclusive because it reveals highly variegated outcomes - in terms of efficiency 
and development - of decentralising reforms in different countries (Jutting, 
Kauffmann, McDonnell, Osterrieder, Pinaud, Wegner, 2004). The emphasis must be 
shifted at this point to the conditions under which the reforms were implemented, 
comparing them to the conditions that at least in theory
138
 call for decentralisation. 
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 The Suez Canal, for example, cost 1900 times the estimated price. This is an extreme example, but 
there are many others: the new EU offices (400 times), the Hem motorway tunnel in Holland (444 
times), Denver Airport (253 times). See http://home.planet.nl/viss1197/underest.htm 
 
138
 Especially public finance theory, for example from Hayek, 1945; Musgrave, 1959; and Tiebout, 
1956 to Oates, 1968, and Ostrom, Schroeder, Wynne, 1993. 
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The authors mentioned above underline that decentralisation increases efficiency in 
allocating resources, the responsibility of institutions (reducing corruption), and the 
capacity for initiative if the following conditions are satisfied. If: I) the constitutional 
framework is stable and the various levels of government are distinct; II) the political 
and electoral system guarantees real participation for its electorate as well as effective 
sanctions; III) there is effective coordination between different levels of government, 
avoiding the twin risks of extreme vertical control and anarchic decentralisation; IV) 
there is a sophisticated system of decentralisation in taxing and spending; V) 
information regarding spending and results is transparent; VI) civil society is mature 
and human capital abundant. 
Looking at this list an obvious objection is that decentralisation is a good idea in 
situations where development has already taken place, or is at least well underway; 
not in areas where development must be set in motion. This objection can be 
attenuated
139
, but not entirely rejected. In the model we are going to examine, the 
objection holds, to a certain extent. The local institution called upon to set 
development in motion faces a dilemma: to act or not to act? The ever-present risk is 
losing consensus. This dilemma is the result of two causes, both related to the list of 
conditions above: first, spending and results are uncertain and not very transparent; 
second, local society is not mature enough to allow „losers‟ to see through the 
promises of social groups representing the „winners‟. 
The basic model 
As we have already said, one explanation for the marked differences in the success 
rates of local development policies is that local institutions come into closer contact 
with highly differentiated interest groups. Under uncertain conditions, there could be 
a particularly delicate problem of consensus. 
A useful starting point for examining this issue is provided by Fernandez and 
Rodrick (1991). Let us assume that there is a clearly identified institutional action 
with a guaranteed positive impact worth a total of B (benefit) and with a guaranteed 
cost totalling L (loss). Let us also say that this action is economically justifiable from 
the point of view of the common good, in that (B/L)=b>1. The action, however, in this 
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 Shah (1998), for example, laments that the debate has been too schematic; while Seddon (1999) 
stresses that the list contains features with different levels of importance, and that what counts is the 
overall design of decentralization.  
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hypothetical situation, can only be undertaken is there is consensus inside the majority 
interest group, while the distribution of net benefits among the various groups is 
uncertain. It is assumed that institutions are virtuous; that is, it is assumed that if an 
action is collectively useful it will be undertaken as long as there is ex ante social 
consensus for undertaking it. We could call this a regime of „deliberative democracy‟ 
(Cersosimo, Wolleb, 2006). A decentralised government, in more direct contact with 
the real interests of different interest groups, however, does not generally fall into this 
category. Usually, consensus is gained in order to implement specific policies rather 
than to uphold the rules of representation.
140
 
To continue the hypothesis, let us assume that in the system we are describing there 
are three interest groups S1, S2, S3, whose relative weight is d1=d2=d for S1 e S2, and 
(1-2d) for S3, with 0.5>d>0.25 and then 0<(1-2d)<0,5. In this case, none of the three 
groups constitutes a majority on its own, but two groups together are quite consistent. 
Let us assume that the benefits and losses (costs) are distributed as follows: I) 
guaranteed B benefits for group S1; II) guaranteed L losses for group S3; III) uncertain 
benefits and losses for group S2. Let us also assume that the uncertainty of the benefits 
or losses for the social group S2, derives from the fact that ex post a quota p of S2 will 
have a benefit B, while a quota of 1-p will have a loss of L. Thus individual members 
of the group have the probability p of gaining something, and the probability 1-p of 
losing something, but they do not know what these probabilities are. Taken all 
together, these assumptions concerning the social composition and distribution of the 
gains and losses distributed by means of public action are the simplest way of 
representing the problem of uncertainty in the distribution of benefits and therefore 
the problem of consensus. To put it simply, the future results of today‟s public action 
are uncertain ex ante for a significant segment of local society. 
Regarding the institutional action that has been identified, group S1 plus pS2 (the 
share of the second group that stands to gain) should be interested, but ex ante only S1 
is interested because individually each member of S2 has no idea who stands to gain 
or to lose. There is no chance, then, of gaining consensus or dissent before the action 
is implemented. Group S1, which has guaranteed benefits, is not a majority, but 
neither is group S3, which certainly stands to lose. Ex ante consensus or dissent 
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 Sartori (1993) remarks that in a representative democracy consensus is by definition guaranteed by 
rules so that governments are not subject to the problem of gaining consensus over specific issues 
because they gained it (and must continue to earn it) through elections. 
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depends on the influence that group S2 decides to exert by joining the ranks 
respectively of group S1 or group S3.  
Since  10  p , if the institutional action is implemented, ex ante consensus will 
be higher than ex post consensus; if the action is not implemented, the opposite will 
be true. This means that there could be actions that are justifiable both economically 
and socially and that are implemented on the basis of social consensus but which will 
accrue advantages to a smaller number of beneficiaries than the number that 
supported the action in the first place. There could also be actions, by contrast, that 
are not implemented even though they would have given benefits to the majority. 
A hypothetical solution to this institutional dilemma would be if the social group 
that stood to gain guaranteed benefits (the winners) succeeded in acquiring the 
support of a sufficient share of those who were uncertain as to their benefits by 
promising to cover possible losses. The total benefits in this hypothetical solution 
would outweigh total losses. The group of those with uncertain outcomes would thus 
be divided up and ex ante consensus would realign with ex post consensus. However, 
this solution is not realistic, since a promise to cover another group‟s losses would not 
be credible. Those who were uncertain would surely think that the ex post winners 
would form a majority and would thus be unlikely to keep the promises they made 
when they were a minority.
141
 
This institutional dilemma is illustrated in Figure 26. 
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 If the winners‟ promises were considered credible by the losers there would be no dilemma and 
the institutional action would automatically follow from the ex post effectiveness of the project (even 
though it was only imagined by many). A great deal of the literature (especially among sociologists) 
claims that these promises are credible on the basis of  the idea of „social capital‟: credible promises 
made by single agents (Bourdieu, 1983), made by groups of winners or social components (Coleman, 
1988, 1990), promises considered credible because a diffuse social group believes this (Putnam, 1993, 
Fukuyama, 1999). The problem is that social capital is insufficient in a context of backwardness, while 
it becomes relevant after development has taken place.  
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Figure 26 - Institutional dilemma when an action is socially beneficial but there is a 
substantial gap between ex ante and ex post consensus. 
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The number of votes that can be obtained when a decision to implement an action 
or not (ex ante consensus A) is indicated on the vertical axis. Ex post consensus P, or 
the number of people that would vote in favour of the action if they knew its result, is 
shown on the horizontal axis. Ex post consensus measures the entity of the group that 
would benefit if the action were implemented. The bisector A=P is the optimal 
position, where ex post and ex ante consensus are equal. The points along this line 
show the various equilibriums that would arise if there were rational choice and 
perfect information; that is, if those who voted ex ante for taking action were the ones 
to benefit from it ex post.  
Given that we assumed that the action was beneficial for a majority of the social 
body, ex post consensus is indicated in correspondence with the value d(1+p)>0.5. 
Since this utility is unknown ex ante, and only the utility for interest group S1, which 
is d > 0.5, is known, one possibility is that ex ante consensus for implementing the 
action has a value of d, voting only for group S1. This corresponds to point Z, which 
identifies a situation in which ex ante consensus is among a group smaller than the 
majority and therefore the action will not be implemented. The institutional dilemma 
arises because there is only one alternative, on point H, which indicates a situation 
where the action is implemented to the benefit of a majority that is even greater than 
the number of those who will have ex post benefits. In this case, ex post, the action 
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will leave many dissatisfied: all those who voted in favour of the action but gained 
nothing from it. Point H corresponds to the ex ante consensus that interest group S1 
(with guaranteed advantages) gains by convincing group S2 to vote in its favour even 
though its members do not know whether they will gain benefits or not.  
The graph shows that if the action under consideration gains ex ante consensus to a 
value of d<0.5 it is not implemented, while if it gains 2d>0.5 it will be implemented 
even though it is such that it could gain ex post consensus equal to d(1+p)>0.5, which 
is a majority but still less than 2d.  Ex post consensus is thus smaller than ex ante 
consensus if the action is implemented (point H in the graph) and greater if it is not 
(point Z). 
At this point we can take another step forward as suggested by Dur and Swank 
(1997). This consists in assuming that different actions are identified, each of which 
presents in isolation the same institutional dilemma (for each of them the condition of 
ex ante consensus is violated, and the condition of ex post consensus is verified).  
When these different actions are proposed together in the form of a project, they can 
align ex ante and ex post consensus if the guaranteed benefits and losses are 
distributed among different interest groups. Dur and Swank demonstrate that when 
this happens the condition of ex ante majority consensus is the more probably 
satisfied the greater number of actions that comprise the project and the greater 
equilibrium there is in the distribution of overall net utilities. 
This last point is illustrated in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27a - Solution to the institutional dilemma where different actions (n) 
combined (project) each of which is socially convenient but taken singly, present a 
substantial gap between ex ante and ex post consensus. 
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Solutions H (implementation) and Z (non implementation) in the hypothetical 
situation with only one institutional action, have been abandoned. Where in the 
previous graph there were two points (H and Z) indicating only two alternatives, in 
Figure 27 there are two curves, shown as functions of the number of actions that 
comprise the project (n): H(n), Z(n). The hypothesis is that the more complementary 
actions comprise a complex, articulated project (the higher the value of n), the more 
the solutions will approach equality between ex ante and ex post consensus along the 
curves, and the closer they will lie to the bisector A=P.
142
 
The two curves are oriented towards the Cartesian origin.  The hypothesis is thus 
that the project comprising different actions acquires ex ante consensus but loses it ex 
post, and therefore becomes less effective overall. This assumption makes sense, 
though it is not strictly necessary. It makes sense because a project that satisfies an ex 
ante majority is likely to be less innovative and/or more expensive. It is not strictly 
necessary, however, because if the curves were oriented towards the right there would 
be the same result with converging consensus. In this case the hypothesis would be 
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 It is thus assumed that, while interest groups cooperate when they make decisions concerning 
institutional actions in conditions of uncertainty, they tend to express themselves separately when the 
benefits likely to accrue to them are clear in their minds. We have seen that group S2 votes all together 
for or against an action that gives the group uncertain results, but in this context it is assumed that the 
group splits and individuals vote for or against different actions comprising the project according to the 
benefits they are certain to obtain. This is another example of deliberative democracy, and illustrates 
well why it is supported. 
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that different actions comprising a complex, articulated project give rise to greater ex 
post collective utilities than actions taken singly (see Figure 27b). 
Fig. 27b - Solution to the institutional dilemma where different actions (n) combined 
(project) each of which is socially convenient but taken singly, present a substantial 
gap between ex ante and ex post consensus. A case where the project is overall more 
effective than the single actions it comprises.  
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Lagging regions 
We have until now assumed two hypotheses that evidently have no basis in real 
life, especially in lagging regions. The first was that institutional action couldn‟t be 
implemented without ex ante consensus that was precisely defined as belonging to a 
majority (more than 50%) and that was a direct consequence of the distribution of 
benefits among the various social groups. The second was that the institutions called 
upon to take action were capable of identifying, formulating and implementing a 
project without sustaining costs.  
In real life, and especially in backward regions, however, forms of government are 
not particularly democratic, nor are they deliberative. Certain groups, even when they 
represent a significant portion of the population, continue to count for little and 
decisions are based on anything but majority consensus. On the other hand, there are 
few dictatorial regimes where social consensus can be done anyway with altogether. 
More realistically, in most cases, either by manipulating consensus and/or owing to 
undemocratic constitutions – be they formal or informal – institutions can implement 
projects even when there is no majority consensus. What this means, however, is that 
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governments need to support the costs in order to manipulate consensus or produce 
propaganda. Moreover, identifying and formulating actions to set development in 
motion, especially if these are articulated in a complex project, require local 
bureaucrats and politicians to have superior technical and administrative skills, which 
is rare in backward areas. This again means that governments need to sustain the 
significant project costs entailed in a complex project.  
Government institutions are thus called upon to support the costs of identifying and 
formulating projects, the dimensions of which regulate the possibility of envisaging a 
complex project and therefore guide „spontaneous‟ ex ante consensus. At the same 
time, they are called upon to support the costs of gaining consensus, which regulates 
„induced‟ ex ante consensus. Consequently, the hypothesis implicit in the basic model 
examined in section 2, according to which institutions do not have intentions of their 
own, is no longer valid. In the basic model, institutions automatically translate 
opportunities into projects, with socially distributed gains and losses, and 
automatically gain consensus for doing so. That is, they do not have their own utility 
function. And yet, if there are costs for institutions which, as we have been reminded, 
are neither perfectly democratic nor perfectly competent, it is not up to the interest 
groups to decide whether, and to what extent, to sustain these costs, especially if they 
do not know how much they will be called upon to pay. It is the institutions that must 
sustain these costs, making it necessary at this point to ascribe an objective function to 
them. 
If institutions are required to spend resources, it can no longer be assumed that the 
perfect alignment between ex ante and ex post consensus illustrated in the model can 
be achieved. Resources are always limited.
143
 Let us assume then that ex ante and ex 
post consensus can be close but not aligned. In this case, given their stock of available 
resources, institutions decide how much to spend in order to implement the project (to 
cover both propaganda and project-building costs), and by doing so they also decide 
how innovative the project will be. Let us assume, in conclusion, that the project 
maintains significant margins of uncertainty regarding the outcome, which is anyway 
a long-term outcome. 
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 Assume that the stock of available institutional resources is given and does not depend on the results 
of the project. 
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We can now divide the analysis into two stages. In the first, we assume that the 
distribution of institutional resources between propaganda and project-building costs 
is given. In this stage, then, institutions only have to decide how much to spend and 
what projects to adopt. Let us assume, as we did in the basic model, that institutions 
are virtuous, but now let us specify that for any given project they will try to 
maximize its level of innovativeness. We could thus define a project drafted by 
institutions on the basis of an already existing social demand as „conservative‟, while 
a project drafted to satisfy a demand that has not yet been formulated could be defined 
as „innovative‟. Let us assume, again, that this feature can be placed on a continuum, 
so that we can talk about a „degree of innovativeness‟. And let us assume, finally, that 
institutions, again as in the basic model, are required to submit to a consensus 
constraint, but now let us specify that this constraint is the result of the difference 
between two terms: one that depends directly on how many resources are used in 
what way, and that depends inversely on the degree of innovativeness of the project; 
the other that depends inversely on the resources used. The hypothesis we are testing 
is that by spending resources, institutes promote consensus, which depends negatively 
and to an unknown extent, however, on how many resources are used – precisely 
because these resources will be taken away from other projects.
144
 Uncertainty affects 
both these terms. It affects the first because institutions know and can manipulate ex 
ante consensus in order to maximize it, but they cannot predict the degree of 
consensus they will obtain. It affects the second because institutions cannot know 
what consensus they are losing (owing to the subtraction of resources from other 
projects) because this is only revealed ex post, when it becomes possible to compare 
the net benefits of the project that was implemented with the losses attributable to the 
implementation of that project rather than any another within the economic system as 
a whole.  
If we indicate consensus with the letter A then, we could say that: 
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 Notice that these losses are not the same as the ones accounted for in the project (which already 
envisages socially distributed gains and losses). This is a matter of taking into account the social losses 
owing to the subtraction of resources from other alternative uses. For example, building a bridge 
benefits those who have to cross a river, but causes losses for the ferryboat owners. The bridge, 
however, could also be a source of additional losses, for example the recipient of subsidies if the 
construction subtracted resources from subsidies, etc. Giving incentives to organic farm producers, to 
provide another example, damages those producers who cannot farm organically, but also takes 
resources away from other possible beneficiaries.  
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)(

  a
T
A      [19] 
 
with: 
>0 = Scale parameter (unknown) that regulates the level of ex ante consensus, 
10    = Variable indicating the share of (given) resources used; 
0T  = Variable indicating innovativeness (1/T degree of conservatism) of the 
project; 
0a  = Resulting variable in terms of consensus in the distribution of resources to 
cover propaganda and/or project complexity; 
0)(   = Scale value (unknown) that regulates the subtraction of consensus, as a 
function (with a positive first derivative) of the share of resources used and subtracted 
from other uses. 
 
We can assume, for simplicity‟s sake, that: 
 
 )(  
 
Thus: 
 


 2 a
T
A      [20] 
 
The ex ante consensus constraint, for example, 0 AA , will oblige institutions, 
when they do not know the value of  and , first to maximize a, and then to take 
inspiration from the experience around them to decide on which project T to choose. 
Let us imagine that collective experience derives from the outcomes of projects of 
the same kind as these we have schematized, and that they can be observed as values. 
Let us also imagine that T is associated with A=0, that is with projects whose ex post 
outcome has not been considered positively in terms of net consensus gained by 
subtracting from ex ante consensus the loss of consensus ex post owing to the change 
of destination for resources from previous to new uses. 
From [20] we thus get to: 
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
 T


     [21] 
Collective experience thus shows that, for every /, the more innovative a project 
is (increasing T), and the greater the ex ante consensus a is in relation to the resources 
used, the more sustainable it is from the consensus side because [21] indicates a 
directly proportional ratio between T and a/β along the line which separates 
sustainable from unsustainable projects. 
In reality, however, this consideration does not help institutions decide. What they 
would be interested in would be an indication of the relationship between T and new 
tools for consensus. Taking as given that these new generations of consensus depend 
on the features of the institutions (their history and structure), collective experience 
could be relied upon if it provided an indication as to what kind of innovations to 
introduce under what circumstances. This would almost certainly take place if the 
relation between what determines a and T were monotonous. In this case, it is easy to 
imagine that collective experience would soon indicate the correct path to follow: a 
project that is as innovative as the number of factors that determine a, which a 
specific institution would easily be able to identify. And yet, if this were the case, 
they would no longer have any freedom of choice; their intentionality, their very 
entrepreneurial spirit, would be lost. 
It is a matter, then, of discussing whether the value of a can be such that it 
progresses monotonously whatever variety of factors determine it. If, for example, we 
should conclude that first it decreases then it increases as the factors that determine it 
vary, hypothesis [21] would be verified for both low and high values of these factors. 
Collective experience would then be hard to interpret. This is precisely what happens, 
as we shall now see.  
Let us go on to the second step. We have said that consensus can be promoted in 
two different ways that we assume are not strictly complementary and can thus to a 
certain extent be substituted: by supporting the cost of manipulating consensus, and 
/or by supporting the costs related to making the project complex enough to be useful 
for a wide number of beneficiaries. We can thus imagine an output that depends on 
two inputs, propaganda and project building, whose costs are related respectively to 
the costs of manipulating consensus and the costs of building a complex project. The 
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hypothesis we are testing is that institutions are capable of making a choice that 
maximizes the joint result, combining propaganda and project building. 
We thus have: 
 
10:;1     conFM     [22]  
 
The result (M) for institutions is the geometric mean
145
 for propaganda (Ψ) and 
project building (F)
146
, with a weight of α and 1-α that is positive and less than 1. The 
parameter α indicates the weight of propaganda costs compared to project building 
costs from the side of consensus. It could be claimed that this value will be high if the 
managerial class is „new‟ and eager to show what it is capable of, and low if the 
managers have already been tried and tested. 
 
Now the function of institutional cost becomes: 
 
KFccC F   ; with 0<β<1   [23] 
 
In this formula cΨ e cF are unit costs, C the overall resources that institutions decide 
to use, a share β of available stock (K).  
It is hard to define what the unit cost of propaganda (cΨ) depends on; it could 
depend on the extent to which the media are controlled. Let us assume that it is a 
given, and that it is the same in all cases. The project building cost (cF) rises as the 
competence of institutional apparatuses drops. 
 
The problem of what the maximum constraint is can be resolved given the identity:  
  

c
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F
F


1
     [24] 
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 The geometric mean is a value that substitutes all the terms that comprise it but leave the product 
unvaried. The geometric average is zero if any of the terms are zero. Because of these properties, it 
represents very well the average intensity of values that compete as factors that determine a result. 
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 Notice that F indicates a different character of the project from T. While F indicates its complexity, 
according to the number of actions that comprise it, T indicates its innovativeness, meaning the extent 
to which (whatever its complexity) the actions have yet been demanded by interest groups. The project 
thus anticipates explicit social demand. 
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Institutions will tend to opt for a ratio between propaganda and project-building 
equal to the ratio between their returns multiplied by the inverse of their costs. This 
proportion will be high with a new but incompetent managerial class ( high, cF 
high), and low with tried and tested, competent managers who will use their 
experience to spend more on complex project-building and less on propaganda. 
Equations [22, 23, 24] can be resolved for M, obtaining: 
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The term between the square brackets is a as in equation [21]. 
It assumes positive values that however decrease as α drops and cF, rises, or to put it 
another way, going from new, competent managers to tried and tested but 
incompetent managers.
147
 And yet, for every given value of cF, (for every given level 
of competence), the relation between a and α is not monotonous. Its progress forms a 
parabola with its high points corresponding to very new or very experienced 
managers and its nadir corresponding to α=0.5. 
Fig.28 Ratio between a and α, for every given K, cΨ and cF  
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 Notice the distinction between the „experience‟ of the managerial class and their „competence‟. We 
assume here that these two features are independent, i.e. that there can be competent new managers 
with no experience at all, and incompetent but extremely experienced ones. 
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What we find is that among the factors that determine a, there is at least one (α, or 
inexperience/experience of managers) that does not have a monotonous relation with 
a. This factor is also probably the most recognizable (compared to that of the 
competence of institutional apparatuses, which is harder to evaluate from outside) and 
it therefore plays an important role in interpreting collective experience. Thus 
collective experience is anyway hard to interpret because it shows that consensus can 
be won by innovative projects promoted by institutions whose managers are either 
experienced or inexperienced. 
In conclusion, institutions should, as a rule, be capable of making decisions and 
risking unpopularity even in conditions of uncertainty. While their decisions are 
naturally influenced by historical and structural factors (K institutional resources; cΨ 
media control, cF apparatuses‟ competence; α managers‟ experience), their results 
depend on choices that have nothing to do with history, economic or social structures, 
or collective experience. These decisions are genuinely intentional and they are the 
result of an institutional and entrepreneurial attitude,
148
which guides decisions 
regarding how much to spend on what projects. 
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 This approach, envisaging intentionality that is not predetermined and therefore exogenous, is 
akin to Keynes‟ animal spirits. These mysterious animal spirits explain investments that are not an 
endogenous part of neoclassical economics. Keynes‟ aim was methodologically important. He wanted 
to build an economic theory with a beginning and an end, rather than a circular structure, interpreted 
along human lines. In Keynes‟ view there was a role for free will in the economy; it was not a self 
sufficient natural phenomenon with its own rules like the inanimate physical world. 
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Chapter 4 Appendix 1 - The Historical Role of Local 
Institutions in Italy. 
We have said that decentralizing development policies is not necessarily a solution 
in itself; what is more important is the local institution‟s real capacity to govern. This 
conclusion is borne out by the history of local development in Italy from the 1950s to 
the 1990s. On the basis of the per capita value added growth rate in the Italian 
provinces between 1950 and 1996
149
, as well as of 18 other indicators that have 
influenced this main one
150
, the provinces can be classified into groups
151
 as in the 
map in Figure 29. 
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 The data stops at 1996. However, since 1996 there has been a new cycle and therefore the post-war 
cycle could be said to come to an end at about that time. The new cycle is also due to new countries 
coming onto the international market, the gap created by new technologies, and reforms implemented 
in Italy (Barca, 2006). 
150
 See Arrighetti, Seravalli, 1999 and Arrighetti, Lasagni, Raimondi, 2000). The classification is more 
complex (by about 5 groups), but the essential message is clear in this simplified version. 
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 These variables include, as well as those indicated: an index of completeness of the original 
production structure, productive sectors and services to firms (1951), obtained on the basis of Utton‟s 
diversification index, modified taking into account the effect of sectorial specialization, number of 
firms with more than 50 employees (1961); an index of infrastructure endowments (1980s); a factorial 
index for cultural and economic association building (1982); a factorial index of social capital 
endowments (1960s-1970s); indices of civic maturity, measured by literacy, political activism, 
participation in referendums (1970s); a factorial index of activities supporting the economy on behalf 
of the chambers of commerce, local banks, professional training, territorial administration (1950s); a 
factorial index of infrastructure endowment regarding cultural services and social services (1950s); 
distance as the crow flies from Milan; proportion of mountainous territory; state incentives for 
agriculture (1972-81); state incentives for industry (1972-81). Using regressions and semi-parametric 
methods (tree-like classifications), the most significant independent variables were in order: distance 
from Milan, number of firms with more than 50 employees in 1961, social infrastructure, local 
institutions, completeness of the industrial structure, professional training, and civic sense. 
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Fig. 29 - Geography of development per province in Italy (1950-1996) The darker 
grey tones indicate provinces in group 1; light grey group 2; white group 3. 
 
Source: Our elaboration using data from ISL (Databank Department of Economics, University of 
Parma). 
 
Let us examine some of the data for these three macro-areas. 
Table 4 - Italian provinces by group, per capita value added growth rate, role of local 
institutions, and maximum growth of neighbouring provinces. 
 Growth 
Index of per 
capita income 
to start with 
Local 
institutions 
(professional 
training) 
Maximum 
growth in 
neighbouring 
provinces 
Gruppo 1 (Industrial Triangle) 2.6% 0.41 0.23 3.46% 
Gruppo 2 (Centre-North-East) 3.5% 0.26 5.27 3.82% 
Gruppo 3 (South) 3.1% 0.20 -7.97 3.52% 
 
Source: Our elaborations with ISL data. 
 
 
Massa-Carrara
Lucca
Pisa
Pesaro E Urbino
Viterbo
Terni
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The provinces in the first group belong to the industrial triangle with the addition of 
Florence, Livorno and Rome. All together, these provinces had a higher per capita 
income in the 1950s, while the other two groups had a lower per capita income that 
was quite similar. In the fifty years that followed, there was greater growth in group 2 
and lower growth in group 1. It is interesting to observe that this difference between 
growth and starting conditions corresponds to a marked difference – above all 
between groups 2 and 3, spread throughout the country but prevalently in the South – 
in the local institutions and professional training available to them. This variable was 
constructed by considering (in the 1950s) the proportion of the population of a similar 
age that attended schools, technical institutes or professional training centres, and by 
using the value of this variable that exceeds the share that in the regression is 
explained by the industrialisation rate at the time. It is therefore a proxy of the 
activism of local institutions in the field of professional training, which goes beyond 
what firms would have called for. Entrepreneurial spirit appears to be an important 
factor in the development of these provinces. 
The last variable in the table (maximum growth of neighbouring provinces) was 
constructed by calculating the average per group of the maximum growth rate in 
neighbouring provinces for each of the provinces in the group. It therefore picks up 
the spill-over effect of development and also evidences the extent that agglomeration 
takes place. The highest values are to be found in the provinces of group 2 that are 
quite well distributed over the country but tend to be mostly in the central and north-
eastern provinces. 
The most relevant consideration for the analysis we have conducted in this chapter 
regards the partial but significant dissemination of group 2 towards the south. This 
shows that even in some backward southern regions there have been high rates of 
growth, such as in Avellino (3.9%), Potenza (3.6%), Matera (3.3%), and that this 
growth corresponds to positive values in the column that measures the activism of 
local institutions in professional training (Avellino +1.5; Potenza +1.8; Matera +6.2). 
By contrast, in other southern provinces with lower growth rates, this variable is 
negative, such as Naples (growth 2.2%, activism -5.9), Brindisi (growth 2.5%, 
activism -7.9) and Massa Carrara (growth 2.6%, activism – 8.7) 
This data confirms that the hypothesis we have presented is plausible. Local 
institutions have a role in economic development but this role does not necessarily 
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depend on the existing economic conditions. It would seem, in fact, that we must 
consider their role as autonomous, and their policies as decidedly intentional.  
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Chapter 4 Appendix 2 - A Critique of the Cultural 
Approach. 
In his observations of cross-national data, Dani Rodrik (2000) has shown that 
“democracy has no systematic effect on long-run growth rates.”152 Today, as in the 
past, undemocratic regimes have often enjoyed extraordinary economic success. For 
one case where democracy and growth correlate (Ireland), there are many others 
where growth and dictatorship seem to go hand in hand, such as many of the countries 
in South-East Asia, and China. In the past, development took place in a democracy in 
the cases of Holland, Britain, France and the US, but Germany, Japan and Italy 
underwent development under dictatorships
153
. These findings are in line with a long 
tradition
154
, which thought the causes of economic development lay with individuals 
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 He highlights, however, that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
democracy and growth stability, and that there are good reasons to believe there is a causal relationship 
between democracy and stability rather than vice versa. 
153
 Historians claim that Italy began to develop in the 1920s. 
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 Max Weber (1904-05) observed that “Protestants (especially certain branches of the movement to 
be fully discussed later) both as ruling classes and as ruled, both as majority and as minority, have 
shown a special tendency to develop economic rationalism which cannot be observed to the same 
extent among Catholics either in the one situation or in the other. Thus the principal explanation of this 
difference must be sought in the permanent intrinsic character of their religious beliefs, and not only in 
their temporary external historico-political” He then explains this tendency with an elaborate analysis 
based on the doctrine of predestination: “Thus, however useless good works might be as a means of 
attaining salvation, for even the elect remain beings of the flesh, and everything they do falls infinitely 
short of divine standards, nevertheless, they are indispensable as a sign of election They are the 
technical means, not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation. In this sense 
they are occasionally referred to as directly necessary for salvation or the possessio salutis is made 
conditional on them.” (p.115-6). He adds, with real anxiety: God's grace is, since His decrees cannot 
change, as impossible for those to whom He has granted it to lose as it is unattainable for those to 
whom He has denied it… In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine must above all have had one 
consequence for the life of a generation, which surrendered to its magnificent consistency. That was a 
feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual. In what was for the man of the age of 
the Reformation the most important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path 
alone to meet a destiny, which had been decreed for him from eternity. No one could help him.”  
Deepak Lal (1998) presents a reconstruction according to which “The instrumental rationalism that 
individualism bred was responsible for the scientific and industrial revolutions […] But individualism 
has paradoxically undermined the very cement of the prosperous societies it has created. […] this 
cement has been provided by the emotions of “guilt” or “shame” engendered in the process of 
socialization. The triumph of science that individualism has wrought has led to the death of God in the 
West, and thus of the guilt that underwrote its personal morality, whereas the democratization 
promoted by individualism has undermined the traditional hierarchical bases of these societies and 
erode the set of “manners” based on deference, which evinced shame in these societies in their process 
of socialization. […] By contrast, as Japan has showed, and as India e China are beginning to show 
[…] it is possible for these non-Western societies to adopt the West‟s means to attain prosperity 
without giving up their souls. Their social cement is unlikely to be undermined by secularization, 
insofar as it does not depend on a belief in God. In these hierarchically ordered societies, the social 
cement was provided by ancient processes of socialization based on shame. “(p. 174, 176, 178). 
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and their inclinations rather than with relations between people and interests. If 
relationships are a cornerstone of an approach, then regimes are important, but if what 
counts in your approach is entrepreneurial spirit, creativity, hard work, saving, 
studying, loyalty, commitment and discipline, then these inclinations could be 
considered compatible with any regime since they depend on the history and culture 
of a given area. This „culturalist‟ paradigm also adopts the approach that the 
competence of institutional apparatuses has to do with the general culture of a people 
and can therefore in no way be considered a factor in local development. In their 
view, development can take place even when political institutions are incompetent if 
society is all in all ready for it. 
Criticism of this approach has been directed against Max Weber (Hirschman, 
1977), and, more recently, against Deepak Lal (1998)
155
, claiming that causal 
relationships between culture, tradition, religion and virtuous behaviour for 
development have often been invented outright.
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 The opposite approach would be 
that relatively competent institutional apparatuses (technically equipped and capable 
of decision making) are able to conceive and conduct sophisticated and complex 
development projects, which even contemplate the ability to exploit local culture 
intentionally and influence individual attitudes. 
Wherever the truth lies, there is no doubt that the competence of institutional 
apparatuses was a decisive factor in the economic success of South-East Asia 
(Amsden, 2001). It is true that in the better-known experiences constructing and 
implementing projects was made easier by a centralised relationship between the State 
and big firms. There are nonetheless other experiences, such as in Taiwan, and South 
Korea after the mid-eighties (Seravalli, 1992), in which local political institutions and 
productive systems were the protagonists of development. In general, it can be 
claimed, as we have said, that competence in institutional apparatuses is required 
above all when complex projects need to be drawn up (Rodrik, 1995). 
As regards the importance of local institutions being able to conceive and construct 
complex projects, the example of Italy could be a case in point. Table 8 shows the 
results for the various indices elaborated from ISL data. 
                                                                                                                                           
Calvinism, at the end of the seventeenth century, for Weber, and Confuciansim today for Lal, are the 
true motors of development. 
155
 In particular by Jones (2002) 
156
 The fact that the managerial class has always tried to make their general behaviour appear 
„traditional‟ and therefore „morally necessary‟ has often been observed (Hobsbawm, Ranger, 1983). 
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Table 5 - Cross-section regressions at provincial level, dependent variable growth of 
per capita value added 1951-1996, ordinary list square (OLS)
157
 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 0.44 
32.5 
0.44 
35.9 
0.38 
8.2 
0.40 
8.4 
0.40 
8.4 
Distance from Milan   -7E-6 
-2.9 
-10E-6 
-4.3 
-1E-5 
-4.4 
Starting income (1951-63) -0.07 
-10.2 
-0.06 
-10.4 
-0.06 
-8.3 
-0.06 
-8.2 
-0.06 
-8.2 
Index of disarticulation (1960s – 1980s)   -0.0007 
-2.3 
-0.001 
-3.5 
-0.01 
-3.5 
Spill-over (1951-1996)   0.2 
2.3 
0.2 
2.1 
0.2 
2.1 
Professional training excluding local institutions (1950s 
– 1960s) 
    7.8E-5 
1.7 
Professional training (1950s)    8.1E-5 
1.9 
 
Local institutions (1950s  – 1960s)  0.002 
5.7 
0.001 
2.6 
  
Civic sense  (1960s  – 1970s) 0.003 
6.7 
0.002 
2.9 
-0.0002 
-0.3 
-0.0005 
-0.7 
-0.005 
-0.7 
      
R adjusted 0.55 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.71 
 
It would seem from column 1 that cultural conditions (civic sense) have had a 
significant impact on subsequent growth. This appearance is attenuated, however in 
column 2, even if you consider only local institutions; it disappears altogether if you 
consider the other variables, though local institutions continue to play a role. 
Development has been more affected by local initiatives that are inter-connected, 
rather than concentrated, even in a field as influential as professional training (see 
columns 4-5).
158
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 The independent variables were obtained as follows. Distance from Milan: as the crow flies 
kilometers from each provincial capital to Milan; Starting income: average per capita value added 
1951-1963; Index of disarticulation: factor built by factorial analysis with high points for motorways 
and train lines, low and negative points for council and provincial roads and water supply (1965-1980); 
Spill-over: maximum rate of growth of per capita value added 1951-1996 in neighbouring provinces; 
Professional training: residual of specific rate of attendance for technical and professional schools 
regressed for rate of industrialization (1950-51); Local institutions: factor from principal components 
such as loans from local banks, cooperatives, savings banks and other local banking institutions as a 
share of loans from all credit institutions in 1960 by level of specialisation of manufacturing activity 
(1951), factor relative to the Chambers of Commerce, presence and activity (1951-53); Professional 
training , average 1961-63 of council payments for public works and education over ordinary spending; 
Civic sense: factor (Putnam, 1995) with high points for the share of population that habitually reads 
(1965) and voters for the referendum on divorce (1974) out of total number on electoral roll, low or 
negative points for preference votes out of total number on electoral roll in political elections 1953, 
1958, 1963. Source: ISL data. 
158
 Di Giacinto and Nuzzo (2004) in an econometric study based similarly on a provincial study come 
to the conclusion that: “There was no significant intervention on the part of local bodies in promoting 
local development.” And yet, even though they had the same database as we had (ISL), they use only 
one variable to test the role of local institutions: city council payments for public works and education 
on the ordinary budget. Our results are different (with a significant role for local institutions in 
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Chapter Five - Institutional Frameworks159 
Local institutions, called upon to provide public goods and services in order to 
trigger and sustain development, would be better equipped to do so if they had more 
resources than the ones they can obtain from local taxation. Faced with the problem of 
uncertain results and the probable asymmetry of advantages and disadvantages for 
different interest groups in the community, their task would also be less arduous if the 
resources needed for a complex project were guaranteed not to be redirected to other 
more consolidated uses. Surveys and case studies have shown this to be true, and the 
international literature has accepted the principle that when decentralising 
development policies, it is a good thing if there is some external funding from central 
governments or international bodies, and that this funding should not cover the entire 
costs (in order to avoid dependence) but should be quite sizeable. It has also been 
agreed that the way funds are spent should be at the discretion of local governments, 
but that the principle of „additionality‟160 should be maintained. 
The resulting institutional frameworks, however, can be quite cumbersome. Central 
governments find it difficult to come up with criteria that have been agreed upon for 
transferring resources directly and distributing them among highly variegated 
localities. Generally, intermediate levels of administration or institution step in, with 
the result that in almost all experiences of decentralisation there is an institutional 
framework comprising at least three levels: national, regional and infra-regional local. 
This structure, in its turn, generates specific problems. The structures providing funds 
are not able to control directly the nature and effectiveness of the policies that have 
been adopted, which leaves significant margins of freedom at a local level. This 
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 Many points made in this chapter were inspired by a seminar held at the Department for 
Development and Cohesion (DPS) at the Italian Ministry of the Economy in February 2005, and in 
particular by a paper given by Paola Casavola on the effectiveness of simple rules in development 
policy making, and by the contributions of Paolo Bertoletti from the University of Pavia and of other 
DPS researchers, including Giorgio Pugliese and Paolo Praticò. Other ideas were generated in 
discussions with Paola Casavola, Giampiero Marchesi, Anna Natali and Tito Bianchi. For parts of 
section 3 and the introduction to section 4 I am indebted to Domenico Cersosimo and Guglielmo 
Wolleb.  
160
 A system of transfers from central to local powers based on decentralized fiscal structures. Shah 
(2003) recommends this system “because information requirements and transaction costs are lower at 
lower levels of government and the government can be more responsive to the citizenry.” Shah and 
others (see, for example, Von Braun, Grote, 2002) stress that local governments must be able to decide 
how to use resources, but at the same time they must avoid using them for ordinary administrative 
purposes, maintaining the idea of their „additionality‟. 
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creates a need for rules to be imposed on the beneficiaries of funding in order to 
„protect‟ the resources from misuse.  Often these rules are dictated from the centre, 
but accepted ex ante by local governments in order to receive the funding. Because 
they must follow the rules, however, local governments could easily become prey to 
incentives for implementing projects that are not particularly effective in their case, 
receiving indiscriminate funding for superficial projects with no particular priorities. 
Institutional arrangements can provide a solution to these problems; in particular by 
ensuring that tasks and responsibilities are clearly identified at all levels. A good 
starting point for development, we have found throughout our analysis, is to design 
institutional frameworks so that these tasks and responsibilities are clearly identified 
and attributed. This is a necessary, but insufficient, condition. Even more important 
are: explicit and implicit rules, premiality systems, minimum standards for public 
goods and services, and, above all, valorising high level functionaries and institutional 
leaders so that they are capable of exerting authority in a coordinated way at all 
levels. All these mechanisms present a contrast with the „naïve‟ idea of development, 
which believes all you need to do is bring resources and skills to the citizenry. Local 
development policies, in fact, require an authoritative and competent executive 
directorship. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section we examine the topic 
of the availability and protection of resources for development policies in the context 
of institutional decentralisation. It emerges that explicit rules agreed upon by both 
donors and beneficiaries are necessary in order to avoid the risk of inactivity at a local 
level. In the second section, we show that simple rules are advantageous. In the third 
section, we underline, however, that in a multi-level institutional arrangement, even 
simple rules tend to generate significant costs for project building and 
implementation. If learning costs are relevant in relation to the possible benefits, 
projects tend to be insipid. If learning costs, on the other hand, could be contained, 
with a more rapid learning process, there would be very different final outcomes. As 
we show in section four, some local governments would spend on development and 
use their resources wisely, while others would not spend anything, or use their 
resources wastefully. In section five, in conclusion, we provide a few indications as to 
how to design a „sophisticated‟ decentralised institutional framework, and we show 
that this requires strong commitment on the part of central government. 
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Decentralisation and resources for local policies 
Many developing and emerging countries have in recent years adopted 
decentralised development policies, and numerous case studies have studied the 
phenomenon. An OECD synthesis regarding 19 countries
161
 sketches a highly varied 
picture. There are, as yet, it seems, few examples of outright success
162
 (these include 
Bolivia, the Philippines, and West Bengal), especially when public goods and 
services, essential for development, are taken into account. The most relevant 
observation for our purposes, however, is that a vital factor in explaining failure or 
success is the intentionality with which reforms are enacted by central and local 
governments. Apart from cases where there is no intentionality at all, and reforms are 
merely apparent (or, worse, designed to fragment discontent by distributing despotism 
and authoritarianism throughout the territory), in other cases success seems to depend 
on the transparency and effectiveness of the rules adopted by central governments for 
assigning resources, and on the capability of local governments to put them to good 
use. Looking at the last eight years
163
 of „regional‟ development policies, the Italian 
experience seems to confirm this observation
164
.  
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 The countries are: Bolivia, Philippines, India (W. Bengal), China, S.Africa, Mexico, Ghana, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Nepal, Vietnam, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Guinea, 
Mozambique, Malesia, India (Andrah Pradesh and Madyar Pradesh). The study was conducted by the 
OECD (Jutting, Kauffman, McDonnel, Osterrieder, Pinaud, Wagner, 2004).  
162
 The countries selected in the survey have either introduced in the last decade institutional 
decentralization reforms, or have reinforced existing mechanisms. The evidence shows that these 
reforms take a long time to bring results. 
163
 Italy set up its „New Programming‟ after the end of the „extraordinary intervention‟ in 1988. In 1999 
the new territorial pacts came into force, together with the new Strategic Project for the Mezzogiorno. 
At the same time the procedure to include the new strategy in the Community Support Framework 
(CSF) 2000-2006 was set in motion. 
164
.The preliminary national strategic document (DSPN) produced by the DPS in November 2005 
provides a survey of this experience. The document was compiled on behalf of the government 
economic planning committee (CIPE). “On the basis of guidelines established by the central 
government, regions and local authorities in agreement with the unified conference of Feb 2005 
(according to Art.8 of Law 5/June 2003, n.131), Italy must establish before September 2006a National 
Strategic Framework (QSN) for the 2007-2013 period in order to programme spending for social and 
economic cohesion (EU Treaty, Art. 158-162) both for national funds and for regional policies (Fund 
for underutilized areas, Constitutional Charter Art. 119.5). Once the document is approved, the 
Community component must implement the indications established for 2007-13 cohesion policies and 
their relative strategic orientations established by the Council. In order to start writing the document, 
the CIPE deliberation n- 77/2005 implementing the guidelines established a coordination committee 
made up of 12 central government administrations coordinated by the DPS at the Ministry of the 
Economy in order to publish a technical and administrative report. This mandate was discharged in 
partnership with institutional representatives from local authorities and with the trades unions. The 
economic and social partnership, representing all the associations that had participated in the 2000-
2006 round of programming and implementing the Community Support Framework for Objective 1 
(Mezzogiorno) and Objective 3 (Social Fund for the areas of the Centre and the North), also drafted 
documents, discussed specific parts and participated in seminars on topics related to the DSPN. They 
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What we need to do, then, is to examine the incentives and behaviour of the various 
institutional levels, starting – for simplicity‟s sake – with only two levels: the centre 
(fund donors) and the periphery (local decentralised institutions). The aim of the 
central level in donating resources could be assumed to be development and social 
cohesion. And yet, if this is the ultimate aim, when there is tension between budget 
stringency and spending objectives (as there generally has been in most developing 
and advanced countries in recent years) there is urgent need for certainty regarding 
when and how much is to be spent. Limited financial resources and the pressure on 
public spending exerted by various interest groups make credible agreements 
necessary. Programming must therefore be well anchored in reality. A gap of months 
(or years) between budgeting and spending is not acceptable. A reasonable guarantee 
of certainty regarding when and how much is to be spent is needed in order to defend 
the resources destined for regional policies. If there is no such guarantee, temporal 
instability and quantitative uncertainty regarding transfers to regions and local 
institutions increase. In the political market, in fact, interest groups scattered over the 
various territories can easily take second place compared to concentrated interest 
groups, such as those in central administration or in „vertical‟ associations and unions. 
It is in the interest of donors to be certain when resources can be used, but also of 
beneficiaries because uncertain timing can jeopardise both the regularity of payments, 
and the overall amount available. The kind of joint payoff that can be gained through 
institutional cooperation, however, contrasts with the desire to keep local institutions 
                                                                                                                                           
also took part in four collegiate meetings devoted to discussing the chapters organized jointly by the 
Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (holder of the two funds, 
FESR and FSE). At the conclusion of these sessions, the resulting document was agreed upon, both in 
terms of content and in terms of methodology. Together with regional strategic documents drafted by 
individual regions, and the strategic document for the Mezzogiorno, written by the eight southern 
regions and the DPS, this document will be useful for establishing contact between the various levels 
of government, trades unions and associations which, according to the guide lines, will allow in the 
early months of 2006 an initial „plan‟ for the national strategic framework to be draw up. “(DPS, 2005, 
p.II). “In Italy, in the current language of  official documents, and therefore even in this document 
(DSPN), regional policies mean those development policies aimed at cohesion, redressing economic 
and social imbalances, and competitiveness in specific territories. In line with the indications of the EU 
Treaty and the Italian Constitution, the emphasis is thus on the intentionality and additionality of  funds 
used for specific areas. In other European countries (UK, Austria, France, Germany, etc) where there is 
a similar conceptual and operative framework, this more modern form of policy is called territorial 
policy. Regional policy, therefore, does not coincide either with overall development policies (most of 
which are aimed at achieveing national objectives, not for specific territories) or with the set of 
interventions for development implemented by Regions. Regions implement on their territory ordinary 
interventions which are not additional, wohle part of „regional policy‟ can be implemented by the 
Centre. Regional policy in this document, to conclude, means those development policies that are 
added to ordinary action undertaken both by the Centre and by the Regions.” (DPS, 2005, pp.II-III). 
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inactive. Later on we will illustrate some cases where explicit and cogent rules to 
accelerate spending were introduced after it became clear that the gap between 
earmarked funds and actual spending was getting wider.
165
 The fact that the rules 
introduced were relatively effective shows that inactivity was not the result of local 
institutions being unable to spend, but rather of low motivation. We could call this an 
implicit incentive for inactivity on the part of local institutions receiving funds 
earmarked for development policies from the centre. This incentive could derive from 
the fact that local administrations have always distributed benefits to local interest 
groups, and any new policies aiming to bring about change and propel development in 
a backward area are likely to challenge this traditional form of cake sharing. On the 
other hand, donors generally impose programming and monitoring procedures on 
fund beneficiaries, and require funds to be spent on the basis of dialogue and 
consensus among the various interest groups.
166
 Local interest groups, then, should 
prefer incisive policies that bring about change, but, at the same time, they are tied 
down by the need for the consensus of those who do not want things to change. Local 
governments often find it preferable to wait. The payoff of cooperation thus goes 
hand in hand with a payoff of defection. Local authorities can easily gain advantage 
by obtaining funds transferred from the centre, not paying for the organisation or 
learning costs required by the project, and waiting for the various local interest groups 
to come to some sort of agreement so that the benefits of the resources just made 
available can be shared out without conflict. 
 It is like a game of strategy, in a context where reiteration
167
 is expected, but 
where, without explicit rules, there is a great deal of „noise‟- or rather, the constant 
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 Both in the EU choices regarding 1997-98 Structural Funds, and in those of the government 
regarding 2002 FAS spending (Funding for Under-Utilised Areas), the imperative soon became clear to 
move on from programming on the basis of financial commitments but on the basis of cash flow. The 
Commission stated this aim because it had always got the balance wrong between earmarked funds and 
actual spending, with the result that the European Parliament repeatedly made more resources available 
than were actually used. When the Italian government chose to contribute to the compliance of the 
Maastricht rules, by holding the level of capital expenditure through the use of EU resources, it had to 
find out from the General Accounting Office the precise distinction between domestic and EU sources.   
166
 Not only is there a consensus constraint for local politics because they are more visible for single 
interest groups, but there is also a request for cooperation on the part of central institutions donating 
funds. The reason for this request is that central institutions do not want to take the blame for 
interventions that have not been agreed upon at a local level. The result of this blame would be gradual 
but widespread delegitimisation. 
167
 In time but also in different territories, assuming realistically that local institutions watch and take 
into consideration the experience of others. This is thus more like a networked game of strategy. 
Lippert and Spagnolo (2004) show that cooperation among agents can be easy, but it is precisely the 
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risk of interpretative errors. These can easily come about when donors and 
beneficiaries do not know the conditions that would induce one party or the other to 
defect; for one party defection could be unavoidable, but the other party might 
interpret it as opportunistic. Both sides are perfectly aware that this can happen. In a 
similar context, Axelrod (1997, ch.1-2) shows that on the basis of adaptive behaviour, 
the traditionally efficient result (when a cooperative act is followed by a tit for tat 
action – cooperation for cooperation, and defection for defection) can be replaced by 
another strategy. This consists in repeated acts of defection in order to find out what 
the implicit rules are; or, rather, to see how far they can be forgiven, or how much 
they can delay action, without losing the funding. If various local institutions behave 
this way, to start with there is a widespread tendency to wait and see (local 
institutions do not spend, donors forgive them). Soon, however, the system of 
transfers begins to feel the crisis (as EU Structural Funds did, and as the Fund for 
Under-Utilised Areas did in Italy). 
There are good reasons, then, for introducing explicit rules, such as the rule of 
„automatic disengagement‟, n+2168, in the case of EU Structural Funds, and, in the 
Italian case, the rules defined by the inter-ministerial programming body, CIPE, 
concerning the earmarking and use of resources for the Fund for Under-Utilised Areas 
(FAS).
169
 These rules are reinforced with penalties, which generally eliminate those 
                                                                                                                                           
conditions that allow this to take place give rise to a form of cooperation that does not always end up 
on the same side as the aims of the donors (Picci, 2004). 
168
 In order to receive Structural Funds the Commission must certify beneficiaries‟ spending 
(Regulation 1260/99, art.9). This certification consists in a series of verifications (admissibility, 
conformity, timing) conducted by the Certification Authority. The n+2 rule intervenes in the sense that 
at the end of this process, the member States ask for resources which are financed to the extent that the 
temporal limit between earmarking funds and actual spending does not exceed 2 years and 8 months 
(funds earmarked April 30, 2001, are automatically disengaged if they are not spent by December 31, 
2003, etc). Resources that do not comply with this procedure are automatically withdrawn. They are 
not transferred from one year to the next; they are taken out of the budget and result in a lower EU 
budget and a lower level of contributions by the States to the overall EU budget. 
169
 With reference to the CIPE deliberation n.20/2004 (the system was changed after the introduction of 
a disengagement clause for the first time in deliberation 36/2004), the budget assigned every year a 
certain amount to FAS, which substitutes law 208/1998, in order to finance material and immaterial 
infrastructures and to use as incentives. CIPE allocated these funds to various objectives and different 
tools (incentives, infrastructure, regional programmes, agreements and specific projects). With a later 
deliberation, the government body distributed regional funds, according to consolidated practice, but 
this time it spelt out clearly the way the funds should be used (General and Operative Agreements) as 
well as establishing rules. These rules include the fact that FAS resources must be engaged year by 
year, by means of legally binding acts, by the final beneficiaries within a certain period of time. The 
government programming committee, CIPE, will reprogram any resources not used. The rule, 
established every year, has so far had the following deadlines: resources financed by deliberation 
36/2003 must be spent by December 31, 2004; by 17/2003 by December 31, 2005; for 20/2004 by 
December 31, 2007. 
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who have disregarded them from their right to use resources that have already been 
assigned. Results have been consistent. In the case of FAS, for example, from 1999-
2001 the share of resources
170
 actually spent out of those available was about 30%, 
while from 2002 onwards the share increased dramatically (together with a hefty 
increase in total resources made available): 48% in 2002, 77% in 2003, 95% in 2004, 
97% in 2005 (DPS data). 
Simple rules 
Explicit rules introduced in order to avoid inactivity in decentralised institutions 
must be simple, like the ones we have given as examples. This consideration is 
important because, as we shall see, even though they are necessarily simple, there are 
still difficulties in programming, spending and implementing effective development 
policies. What happens is that, in order to avert one risk – local inactivity that 
jeopardises the regularity of funding as well as the overall quantity of resources to be 
made available - further risks are generated owing to the poor quality of the 
interventions. On the other hand, as we have seen, leaving the distribution 
mechanisms without any rules does not avert these risks either. Consequently, it 
becomes necessary to identify specific measures to avert or reduce the effects of these 
risks. 
First, however, let us examine why rules, such as „automatic disengagement‟, need 
to be simple. Simple rules are easy to communicate; beneficiaries know what donors 
require of them. They also know the time-line that indicates when a certain action 
must be taken. Similarly, they can appreciate the kind of behaviour that is expected of 
them. Rules are simple if, and only if, those who have to follow them can answer the 
following questions without thinking: „What do they expect us to do?‟ and „What 
reaction will they have if we behave differently?‟  Simple rules, which must also be 
inflexible, are required when there is contractual incompleteness; that is, when it is 
not possible to know and specify in advance all the possible contingencies that may 
take place after the event. In a situation of this kind, rules that were complex, and 
therefore complete, would be inapplicable because they could never specify every 
possible case and the rules‟ enforcers would be lost if any situations came up that had 
not been envisaged. Put in another way, implementing complex rules in circumstances 
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 The „final beneficiaries‟ by means of legally binding acts programmed this share. 
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of contractual incompleteness would give rise to exorbitant costs as well as to 
constant legal challenges. Simple rules – in the sense that they are not complex and 
not rigid – can be written down with a limited number of phrases that contain 
„principles‟ and refer to figures that can be identified and quantified in an 
unambiguous manner (Glaeser, Shleifer, 2001). In the real examples we are citing, for 
example, concepts such as „the state of advancement of works‟, or „legally binding 
commitment‟ are devised and the rule is then written, with precision but without 
aiming for completeness. If the CIPE deliberation had tried to define the concept of 
„legally binding commitment‟ in all its possible specifications, it would have been 
obliged to write down n of the n+m possible cases, and it would therefore have been 
impossible to enforce.  
Another requisite of simple rules becomes clear when we consider not just 
contractual incompleteness but also asymmetric information. People who set and 
enforce rules generally lack the information that those who have to obey the rules 
hold. If we imagine a situation where rules are not simple (without an aggregate 
financial objective), but where they aim to list specific results and create incentives 
for achieving them. If some results have incentives (the ones that can be identified 
and checked), other objectives will be sacrificed (usually the ones that are less easily 
identified and checked by donors). Take a more general example: when quantity and 
quality becomes the object of incentives. If quality is hard to measure, and quantity is 
the object of incentives, quantity can easily override quality. What is needed is a 
system of equal incentives in order to avoid the danger of certain objectives becoming 
more important than others. If it is not possible to include all the objectives in the 
rules, then it is best not to try and put in just a few. If it is impossible to measure all 
the objectives, if, indeed, it is hard even to define them, but they are considered 
anyway important aims, then a system of articulated rules risks becoming counter-
productive (Milgrom, Roberts, 1992). Simple rules are preferable, in the sense that 
they should have a composite objective. Nor are simple rules naïve because they limit 
themselves, for example, to financial measures and deadlines.  
To sum up so far: simple rules aiming to avert inactivity and to maintain the flow of 
resources, should be rigid and non-complex, as far as contractual incompleteness of 
concerned; non-articulated and composite, as far as asymmetry of information is 
concerned. The merit of this simplicity is that rules that observe these conditions are 
credible and appreciated. They are credible because they are linked to an objective in 
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a transparent fashion. They are appreciated because their mechanisms are easy to 
recognise and comprehend. Simple rules are also precise. That is, they do not allow 
room for interpretation; or rather, as we have seen, they do require interpretation but 
they are less likely to be challenged than complex rules with a list of circumstances 
that is by definition incomplete.  
If we wanted to be more analytical about the credibility of simple rules we could 
introduce a further specification. We have seen that inactivity itself can be considered 
advantageous by those who should take action, and therefore disadvantageous to 
those who provide funds. We have also seen that in circumstances where there is 
asymmetry of information, those who hold information could have a stake in taking 
action against those who do not. Under these circumstances, there is a potential 
conflict of interest among those who should cooperate in order to achieve results that 
are useful for all sides. Where there is potential conflict, then, there is all the more 
need for credibility so that the rules create incentives to cooperate. In this case, 
credibility takes on the specific meaning of being capable of actually influencing 
behaviour. This connotation of credibility becomes strategically important because 
the realignment of plans that are potentially unaligned depends on it. To finish the 
analysis, then, the capacity to actually influence behaviour generally requires certain 
kinds of behaviour to be pre-determined (Kreps, 1990, pp.90-143), with the result that 
a certain amount of discretionary action is sacrificed. With this in mind, we can now 
add that rules must be non-renegotiable, and for this reason all the more simple. 
In conclusion, we have made an exhaustive list of reasons why rules must be 
simple, and why rules must be: I) easy to communicate and clear as to when they 
must be fulfilled; II) non-complex and inflexible (rigid); III) non-articulated 
according to objectives but based on a composite aim; IV) credible in the sense of 
being non-renegotiable, and therefore particularly simple. 
Simple rules with difficult final results 
Rules of this kind, however, for the same reasons as above (contractual 
incompleteness and asymmetry of information) may be able to counteract inactivity 
on the part of beneficiaries of funds, but they can play no role in guaranteeing that 
resources are well spent. 
For example, with reference to Italy, the experience of territorial development 
policies has been very mixed. The idea, generally shared by all those involved in local 
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development, is that economic development requires the intentional mobilisation of 
forces disseminated throughout the territory, and of a great number of people, 
institutions and organisation that share the firm intention of acting for the collective 
good. Mobilisation on this scale does not take place spontaneously either on the 
market or as a result of central policies.
171
 In order to come up with a definition of 
local policies that encourage development, we must thus include three considerations: 
decentralisation, diffuse involvement, and an inclination towards public and collective 
goods. Taking these three points into account, ten years of local development 
experience in Italy have been successful as far as decentralisation and participation is 
concerned, but less successful and decidedly more problematic regarding involvement 
and inclination towards public and collective goods (Cersosimo, Wolleb, 2006).  
Development policies contained in the „New Programming‟ adopted decision-
making procedures based on negotiation that increased dramatically the number of 
participants compared to previous experiments with central government policies, 
especially those concerning the Mezzogiorno.
172
 It cannot be denied that in certain 
circumstances there have been manipulations, partial inclusions, collusive coalitions, 
and negative externalities. In general, nonetheless, the procedures adopted have 
allowed different positions and interests to be aired, with a gradual alignment of the 
preferences of individual actors in the territory, leading to widely shared decisions. 
Negotiation has not been excessively manipulated and has been relatively inclusive, 
leading to collective decisions without overt conflict and free of negative 
externalities. Negotiation has also brought about marked improvement in the social 
and institutional quality of a territory. It has allowed tighter networks to be formed 
among institutional bodies, and created a more fruitful relationship between 
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 This idea is at the heart of the article by Fabrizio Barca (2005) who was DPS Department head. The 
article is an important testimony to an experience of local development policy in Italy. The idea is also 
supported by numerous theoretical and empirical results, in particular by those that stress the obstacles 
to development presented by market incompleteness and by agglomeration processes in mobile 
resources, as well as by those underlining the complementarity between accumulation of human 
capital, innovation and accessibility of immobile resources that requires public and collective goods to 
be earmarked and disseminated. 
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 There have been a number of analyses of previous development policies. An overall view would 
have to take into account five essential features: I) substitute and non-additional interventions 
compared to ordinary territorial policies; II)uncertain rules that change with little transparency; III) 
central policies with no responsibilities at regional level; IV) corruption and little administrative 
capability; V) only one dominant theory – development poles based on external investments. The „New 
Programming‟ envisaged, by contrast, symmetry in: I) additional interventions compared to ordinary 
investments; II) certainty of rules; III) responsibility for local governments; IV) administrative capacity 
building; V) attention to endogenous development mechanisms. This list was suggested by Paola 
Casavola. 
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institutions and civil society organisations. It has, moreover, encouraged capability 
building and passed on skills in the field of development policy making, generating 
new leadership and at least a partial renewal of the managerial class. These quite 
impressive results, of course, are not the same everywhere, but all in all, the 
negotiation method embodied in the local development policies has had the effect of 
increasing participation, as well as social and institutional cohesion. 
One problem, however, was the actors involved. Local institutions were always 
more dynamic than civil society, which either played a very partial role, or limited 
itself to consultancy. Another problem was that the rules laid the necessary 
groundwork, but did not go far enough to ensure success. The idea that there was a 
direct link between greater democracy and the quality of institutions on which 
development depends through the production of public goods has turned out to be 
simplistic.
173
 If we overlook the procedural and methodological aspects of 
negotiation, it is clear that this approach has not brought about the expected results; in 
short, not enough local public goods have been established. Moreover, various 
analyses of Territorial Pacts, and then later of Integrated Territorial Plans, have shown 
that most local projects were small, lacklustre, fragmented, and based excessively on 
aid for firms (Cersosimo, Wolleb, 2006).  
The next step in examining the way simple rules work, and analysing why results 
are not entirely satisfactory, is to introduce an element of realism into our argument. 
As we have already said, in most experiences of decentralised institutional 
frameworks, there are more than two levels. Very rarely is there a simple dualistic 
structure pitting the centre against the periphery, however. There is nearly always an 
intermediate level, which we could call „regional‟, that interacts both with the centre 
and with the periphery. Rules regarding spending deadlines are typically negotiated 
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 The Strategic Document for the Mezzogiorno 2006-13 reads: “The expectation of achieving early 
results in terms of increased growth, that the Strategic Framework (QCS) certainly envisaged, was 
linked to an idea that the policies (acting with determination in a general context in which citizens live 
and firms work and promoting direct actions to valorize existing comparative advantages) were so solid 
and credible as to persuade the private sector – that at the time seemed to be on an upward curve – to 
anticipate development (and thus „break‟ with the unsatisfactory economic tradition). Recent history 
has shown that this virtuous circle did not take place. During mid-term revisions for the Strategic 
Framework (QCS), which made a similar diagnosis, underlined that the failed achievement of this 
„break‟ with tradition was owing to three factors in particular. First, the potential of the private sector 
in such disadvantaged conditions was probably over-estimated. Second, to start with it was impossible 
to gauge how unprepared the administrations were to implement the policies. Third, the cultural and 
political confrontation at different levels was not strong enough to uphold the overall framework and 
apply the policies.” DPS 
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between the centre ad regions, while their implementation depends on the concrete 
actions of the various local sub-regional governments. Ideally, then, what we have 
said about the advantages of simple rules would be confirmed only if there were 
perfect information between regional and local governments, and if regional 
governments thus considered themselves part and parcel with local administrations in 
their dealings with central government. If this were so, there would indeed be a 
dualistic structure. 
If, on the other hand, there is asymmetric or no information in central- regional 
dealings, compounded by asymmetric or no information in regional-local dealings, 
then things get more complicated. Regional governments can find themselves in a 
position where they have to form an „alliance‟ either with central government or with 
local administrations.
174
 This rarely takes the form of a rational choice on the basis of 
long-term payoffs. With imperfect information, the de facto coalitions that emerge 
will do so on the basis of other considerations, having to do with short-term 
advantages and relying on a playing field which is anything but level and where the 
proximity of relationships counts more than anything.
175
 Axelrod (1997, ch.4) shows 
that the choice of alliance is usually determined in correspondence with a minimum 
local level of “energy” (the sum of the frustration of the actors involved, who are 
unhappy about having chosen certain allies rather than others). There can be any 
number of these minimum local levels, and different alliances do not necessarily 
establish themselves in a global minimum. Moreover, a minimum local level that 
depends on its starting conditions is not easy to escape from.  
This technical language is easy to translate: a choice of alliance underlines where 
you want to be considered friendly or obsequious and where you want to be seen as 
intransigent and unforgiving. In a concrete case, every institutional act in the three 
levels of the institutional framework always has two sides to deal with. Central 
government can decide to ally itself with the regions „against‟ local authorities, or 
vice versa; regions can decide to ally themselves with central or local governments; 
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 The hypothesis we have assumed is that it is frequently the case that one institutional level finds it 
hard to agree spontaneously and easily with the other levels. This is coherent with the assumption 
regarding the scarcity of resources and incentives for inactivity, both of which create conflicting 
interests among different levels. 
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 By relational proximity we mean, among other things, a proximity in size (which is why central 
governments find it easier to deal with regions than with individual local realities, and vice versa), 
organizational proximity (again to the advantage probably of central-regional dealings), the frequency 
of dealings, similarity of rhetoric, similarity in decentralization process.  
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local authorities can choose an alliance with central or regional governments. There 
are a multiplicity of combinations, taking into account that central government 
comprises many different ministries and departments, and that there are in Italy 21 
regions, 110 provinces and 8,100 local councils. Some of these combinations are 
stable, others are instable, depending on the level of discontent that the institutional 
actors express, either because their overtures have not been reciprocated, or because 
the alliance they have formed has not been particularly fruitful. Axelrod 
acknowledges that there could be many stable structures (expressing minimum 
general dissatisfaction), and that an optimal structure (with the lowest levels of 
dissatisfaction) may not even exist. Many unsatisfactory structures are surrounded by 
even less satisfactory ones, making them anyway the „best‟ local structure, from 
which it is hard to escape. 
Technically, regional governments can decide an alliance with central 
administrations and negotiate rules concerning spending deadlines without any 
discussion, and without taking on board the difficulties posed by these rules for local 
authorities. The outcome of these rules can only be their formal appliance, with 
regions leaning on local authorities to ensure they spend resources within the 
deadlines without considering quality. Adopting behavioural rules that have been 
agreed upon ex ante does not eliminate the root causes for which the rules were 
written. Rules usually transform these root causes into costs that need to be sustained. 
Costs, in this case, fall on local governments, forcing them to make the organisational 
investments needed in order to spend the resources both well and within the time 
limits. In view of the size of these costs, then, implicit or explicit agreements can 
come about between regions and local governments accelerating spending at the cost 
of sacrificing the quality of the interventions that could be useful for development. 
On the other hand, different alliances produce different costs, which are distributed 
differently. For example, a hypothetical alliance between regions and local authorities 
would presumably lead to less simple rules, with more controversial applications, 
which are more subject to re-negotiation. In this case, central government would be 
liable to have to cover the costs, and it would consequently offer regions an explicit or 
implicit pact allowing them to make less regular or lower payments, in particular by 
means of a higher regional co-financing. 
Transforming difficulties deriving from imperfect or asymmetric information into 
costs by means of rules presents another advantage, other than simply allowing things 
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that seemed impossible to get done, even if it is costly. This additional advantage can 
be evidenced more clearly if we adopt a more dynamic approach than the static one 
we have followed so far. From a dynamic point of view, supporting costs that are 
produced by rules allows learning to take place. In the institutional framework there is 
ample room and a great need for different players at different levels to learn as they 
go along. 
Learning processes would be supported if accurate monitoring and evaluation 
systems were able to pinpoint who or what is responsible for achieving good results 
when the rules are followed (as well as who or what is responsible for bad results). A 
system of ex post controls on the achievement of final objectives would also be a 
good idea, not so much to condition the assignation of resources (making the rules 
less simple), but more to feed into the learning process. This would require not only 
an efficient evaluation system (based on the identification of minimum standards and 
premiality indicators), but also a clear idea of who is responsible for what tasks. 
If learning processes were indeed encouraged by means of these mechanisms, there 
could be the risk that they become cumulative and therefore increase variation in 
results. Specific measures are needed to level the playing field all over the territory. In 
this respect, collaboration between the different levels of the institutional framework 
is particularly important, as is the presence of institutional leaders who are able to 
operate at different levels. All these elements (a clear institutional design with clearly 
identified tasks and responsibilities, monitoring and evaluation supported by 
minimum standards
176
 as well as premiality indicators, leaders who can operate at all 
levels) would allow decisive steps to be taken towards the ultimate aim of rules: to 
make sure resources are available, and that they are protected not only from inactivity 
but also from being spent badly. 
 
Costs and benefits of learning 
Simple rules in order to guarantee regular spending within well-defined time 
frames, guaranteed costs and a facilitated learning curve are three ingredients of a 
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 Particular attention must be paid here because fixing minimum standards (for example for the 
functioning of public services financed with transfers) can transform simple rules into complex ones. 
There is a certain amount of experience in this field that seems to show that it is possible, though the 
path is narrow, to preserve both simple rules and minimum standards as long as there are very few, 
they are agreed upon, precisely delineated and come with a clearly identified verification method.  
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package that can be represented by a simple model. The model should help us 
understand why it is important to have a clear institutional design, monitoring and 
evaluation, minimum standards, and professional figures who are able to work at all 
levels. But first we must define three types of local intervention that could 
schematically represent a whole range of cases. 
The first type (A) is an intervention that encourages development and that relies to 
a significant extent on public and collective goods. For this very reason, its results fall 
into one of the following four patterns. I) the benefits of A are distributed 
asymmetrically among local interest groups but while the collective benefits of A are 
higher than the collective benefits of B (the second type of intervention), the benefits 
of A for each specific interest group are not greater than those of B – or rather, the 
benefits of A are higher than those of B for the whole collectivity but to a different 
extent for each group; II) the benefits of A are greater than those of B but they are 
postponed in time; III) the benefits of A are less easy to appropriate, and therefore 
less easy to spend politically than those of B (with intervention B the link between 
action undertaken, good produced and benefit enjoyed is easier for citizens to 
perceive); IV) the benefits of A are greater than those of B but in the eyes of local 
actors they seem particularly uncertain – or rather, the benefits of A are greater than 
those of B but most local actors do not know it. 
The second type (B) is an intervention that does not contribute much to 
development prospects in the territory, does not rely to a significant extent on public 
and collective goods. Its results fall into the following four patterns: I) the collective 
benefits of B are lower than those of A, but individual benefits are distributed fairly 
symmetrically; II) the benefits of B are lower than those of A, but they are immediate 
or almost immediate; the benefits of B are easier to appropriate, and therefore the link 
between an intervention and its utility is easier to perceive; IV) the benefits of B are 
seen as being less uncertain than those of A. 
The third type (C) is an intervention that fails to be effective, wastes resources or 
leaves resources unused. This kind of intervention produces greater collective damage 
than good. 
As we have seen, a decentralised institutional framework, with rules in place to 
protect transferred resources and impose guaranteed time frames on spending, usually 
makes it possible to avoid the results of type C, but often at the cost of limited results 
of type A. Let us assume that a decentralised level of administration formulates 
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„programmes‟ comprising many different interventions. These programmes are often 
required by the planning procedures incorporated at the central level. It is also 
advisable for local administrations to formulate them, given the lack of public goods 
and services. In addition, a programme comprising many different interventions can 
also be met with greater consensus by the different local interest groups. 
Let: 
c = “standard” degree of efficiency;  
 
b = parameter b>0; 
 
e = degree of average efficiency in development for as set of local interventions 
assuming average interventions of type C in correspondence with values (c-r)>e≥0, of 
type B with values (c+r)>e≥(c-r), of type A with values c+b≥e≥(c+r), with a small r 
anyway definitely b>r>0. We also assume that type C interventions cannot be funded, 
and that the actual operative interval is c+b≥e≥(c-r); 
 
q = net project cost; 
 
q* = net cost of standard project (defined as one with efficiency e=c), as given 
average cost  considered. 
 
s = variable indicating relative net project cost, as ratio q/q*; 
 
The gross cost of the project includes the whole package of costs sustained by the 
territory in terms of organisation, administration, information, control for every single 
intervention, its approval, its funding and its implementation. By net cost we mean the 
gross cost minus the lower costs owing to the learning process. By learning process 
we mean the learning of skills and capabilities able to formulate and conduct 
interventions that allow administrations to avoid, at least in part, the total burden of 
costs for each intervention. 
 
e = c + b(1-s)      [26] 
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Equation [26] indicates the assumption that the degree of average efficiency in 
interventions, considering a continuous variable
177
, is decided so that:  
 
e – c = b(1-s)      [26b] 
 
It is, therefore, equal to c when s =1, better  [(e – c)>0] when s < 1, and worse [(e – 
c)<0] when s > 1, since s is the net cost of relative project building. 
Equation [26] thus assumes that interventions will on average be of the standard 
type, when the project costs of those who decide are the same as the costs of standard 
interventions, and that interventions will be chosen with greater efficiency for 
development when project costs are lower and with lower efficiency for development 
when project costs are higher than the costs of standard interventions. 
Let us assume that formulating, presenting, funding and implementing a set of 
interventions (a programme) takes time, which can only be defined as a „time span for 
project building‟. Along this time scale, we can now define the following dynamic 
variables: 
Let: 
a = the learning rate, or the rhythm at which skills and capabilities are accumulated; 
 
f, d = parameter >0 
 
a = f + de     [27] 
 
Equation [27] indicates the assumption, for linear simplicity, that the learning rate 
is an increasing function of the degree of efficiency of the intervention. The 
hypothesis is that every single intervention of type A gives rise to a significant 
amount of learning along the time span for project building, and therefore generates a 
high learning rate when the different interventions are on average of type A. This 
means that it is more difficult to reconcile the standard rules and procedures with the 
effectiveness of interventions for development, and therefore that more rapid learning 
of skills and capabilities takes place when interventions are more difficult. With 
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 From equation [26] and its discussion it is clear that the average efficiency depends on the cost of 
the project as well as on other parameters that are here considered non- variable. 
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simpler and less efficient interventions, less learning takes place for each intervention, 
and the learning rate is thus lower. 
 
Finally, let:  
 
p = rate of variation of the gross cost of the project on the time span of project 
building; 
m = parameter >0 
n = parameter >0.  
Parameter n is important in interpreting results, so let us anticipate that it is the 
parameter on which the progress of the gross cost of project building in proportion to 
the learning rate depends; 
q = rate of variation of the net cost of the project (derived logarithmically from the 
variable q) defined as the difference between p and a, or q = p – a 
q* = rate of variation of the net cost of a standard project. 
 
p = m + na      [28] 
 
Equation [28] indicates the assumption that the gross cost of project building rises 
according to the learning rate, but that learning reduces the net costs of the project, 
which is equal to the increase in gross cost minus the gross cost of learning. 
 A solution for the system of equations  could be given for ds/dt= s . 
 
s bd(1-n)(s2-s)     [29] 178 
 
This indicates the dynamics for the net project cost in relation to the standard net 
cost as the various interventions are identified and defined along the time span of 
project building. 
From equation [26] we can also obtain: 
b
e
s

        [30] 
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 Assuming that the proportional variation of the net cost of average planning for a standard 
intervention takes place according to the same mechanism as the one indicated in equation [28] for 
every given a.  
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Finally: 
 
b)ee)(c1)(cd(ne      [31] 
 
Equation [31] indicates the dynamics for the average degree of efficiency of 
interventions along the time span of project building. To the right of the equals sign, 
this is a parabola that possesses zeros in correspondence with values e=c and e=c+b, 
the direction of whose concavity is regulated by the value of (n), according to whether 
it is greater or less than one. 
Remembering that (n) is the parameter on which the movement of gross costs of 
project building in proportion to the learning rate depends, for a limited learning cost 
(n<1) the parabola cuts the horizontal axis of zeros from above. 
 
Figure 30 - The dynamics of average efficiency (e), with limited learning costs. 
 
 
e
 
e 
c c+b 
n<1 
 
In this case the point of equilibrium e=c is unstable, while the point of equilibrium 
e=c+b. 
In the other case, with high learning costs (n>1), the parabola faces the other way. 
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Figure 31. The dynamics of average efficiency (e) with high learning costs 
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Now the solution with a stable equilibrium lies in e=c. This result leads to the 
consequences we shall now examine. 
Limited learning costs 
If learning costs are limited within the institutional system, the project that comes 
about comprises interventions mostly of type A in areas where project-building 
capacity is already higher than the norm. The learning rate is high, overcoming 
learning costs and allowing constant improvements to be made. In areas, by contrast, 
where project-building capacity is lower than the norm (even when they are in the 
admissible interval in correspondence with c+b≥e≥c-r), the learning rate is slower and 
costs are also be reduced, but the losses owing to low learning levels are greater than 
the gains arising from reduced costs. The result is continuous worsening of quality. 
The movement of e (in the case included between c and c+b) is towards improvement.  
High learning costs 
If learning costs are high, in areas with superior project building capacities, 
interventions are mostly of type B, unlike in the previous case, because in the first 
interventions considered (of type A) learning is fast but learning costs are even 
higher, with the result that there is a worsening of quality of interventions (except in 
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cases that can realistically be excluded where project-building capacity is very high to 
start with). Even in areas where project-building capacity is lower than the norm, the 
movement is towards improvement, or towards interventions of type B. In these 
circumstances, there is not very much learning in the first interventions considered but 
learning costs are even lower, with the result that the quality of interventions can be 
improved. The movement of e (in the case included between c and c+b) is towards 
worsening. 
Learning, as we have seen, means accumulating skills and capabilities. Learning 
costs are high when obstacles and inertias that require spending to overcome hinder 
this kind of accumulation. Usually these hindrances are generated by a lack of 
information, which becomes more damaging, the greater the difference or distance 
between available information at each institutional level. We can therefore imagine 
that learning costs depend on a lack of transparency at every institutional level and at 
every stage of the process, from budgeting, to distributing, to actually implementing 
resources for local development. When there is no information, interpretation is 
necessary, as is trial and error, creating obstacles and inertias that hinder the 
accumulation of skills and capabilities. The model produces a result that allows us to 
explain why most local projects are oriented towards interventions of type B if the 
institutional framework, rules and practice bring about high learning costs or a lack of 
transparency. With high costs, there are incentives to homogenize behaviour by 
adopting interventions of type B, and thus to reduce variance at the cost of a possible 
lack of efficiency. In this case, local governments have to submit to strict rules 
regarding time limits for spending, which are established by central governments in 
agreement with regions, but which do not take into account local difficulties. These 
local difficulties, in other words, remain unexpressed and are not known by regions, 
not to mention by central government (denoting a lack of transparency). The 
difficulties arise from the political sustainability, or lack of same, of specific 
initiatives. If these projects are good, they bring results that are uncertain and 
postponed in time. Moreover, their benefits are distributed unevenly among local 
interest groups in contrast with consolidated patterns of distribution. Under these 
circumstances, local governments, whether they possess good project-building 
capabilities or not, risk adopting projects that scatter funds indiscriminately to please 
everyone just a little, rather than realizing effective development strategies. They also 
risk being captured by dominant interest groups resisting change. Regional 
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governments, on the other hand, are „allied‟ with the centre, as we have seen, and tend 
to keep their distance, encouraging this kind of behaviour.  
If rules and procedures are more transparent, on the other hand, if they are designed 
to take account of difficulties at every level, and if there are limited learning costs, 
then the results are more articulated: better in some areas (with interventions of type 
A) and much worse in other areas. In this case, local governments can more easily 
follow the rules regarding time limits for spending because the shared programming 
process comprises mechanisms that help them achieve their aims (if they want to). 
What counts, at this point, is the starting point and the first steps. If local governments 
possess good project-building and administrative capabilities, and if they set off down 
the path undertaking interventions that are useful for development, they create a 
virtuous circle in which the learning process allows increasingly efficient 
interventions to take place. By contrast, incapable local and regional governments that 
take on inefficient interventions generate a vicious circle in which the opposite takes 
place. 
There is thus a trade-off between unexceptional but homogeneous results and 
enhanced results that are more heterogeneous, which depends on the assumption that 
it is important to learn by doing. As far as the question of what measures to adopt is 
concerned, the suggestion is to contain learning costs by making the institutional 
framework more transparent, and to ensure that there is a more level playing field for 
all parties, especially in terms of project-building capabilities. We could say, in 
conclusion, that in order to avoid local policies that tend towards interventions of type 
B, which are not very useful for development, it is necessary to reduce learning costs 
by increasing the transparency of the institutional framework. However, if this is 
achieved, there will be a tendency towards a great variety of behaviour, only some of 
which is virtuous. At the same time, then, it is necessary to promote and sustain the 
project-building and organisational capabilities of the weaker local institutions.  
Designing institutional arrangements 
Let us go on to analyse how to reduce learning costs by introducing transparency in 
the institutional framework. In the international literature on decentralising 
development policies, the focus is on the design of the institutional framework, within 
which the tasks and responsibilities should be clearly delineated at every level 
following the principle of subsidiarity (see, for example, Shah, 2003). Our analysis 
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confirms this view, as do the available case studies (Jütting, Kauffman, McDonnel, 
Osterreider, Pinaud, Wagner, 2004, pp.17-29)- Clear tasks and responsibilities 
encourage equally clear indications from monitoring and evaluation systems; these, in 
their turn, encourage learning at all levels (Shah, 1998). Since the institutional design 
of decentralisation is necessarily complex
179
, each institutional level should have 
specific tasks, which should be kept distinct from other levels. For each level, the 
responsibilities should be clearly assigned. The central level should have the overall 
tasks of programming and finding the necessary resources, and be responsible for 
ensuring these resources are both guaranteed and supplied regularly. The regional 
level should have the task of territorial programming and should guarantee that the 
rules dictated by the centre are kept to by interacting with the local level. The local 
level should have the task of building projects and implementing them within the time 
limits and according to established guidelines; they should also ensure these projects 
are effective and useful for development in agreement with the regional level. 
From this analysis, it soon becomes clear that there are elements that go beyond this 
idea of specialisation at different institutional levels. In conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information at all levels, simple rules, which should be dictated by the 
central level in order to ensure regular resources within guaranteed spending time 
limits, there is a risk that learning costs will be high even in an institutional 
framework where tasks and responsibilities are clearly identified. The crucial question 
is thus one of inter-institutional collaboration. It is essential that skills and roles at one 
institutional level do not conflict or overlap with those of other levels, and that who 
has to decide what and how is established before the projects are assigned, and with 
great precision. It is equally important, however, that different levels coordinate their 
activities and integrate their functions. Different institutions should bring about forms 
of cooperation that encourage knowledge to be shared, administrations to adapt, and 
each level to be a little less self-referential (Barca, 2005; Sheuerman, 2004; Stato e 
Mercato. 2005) The problem is that protocols, agreements and negotiation tables are 
never enough. Not only is knowledge often concentrated in some areas or institutions, 
but also the kind of knowledge we are talking about  – whether it is codified or 
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 For the following reasons: I) it is better if funding for local development policies is partly from 
within the local system and mostly from outside; II) local authorities should be able to exercise 
discretion when spending resources, and yet be guided; III) collective goods and services are being 
established, and these are complex projects to build and implement. 
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uncodified – is the personal heritage of individuals. Taking this consideration hand in 
hand with the fact that designing development policies at all levels requires the 
exercise of margins of discretionality - if not the expression of „institutional 
entrepreneurship
180‟- we can translate the necessity for inter-institutional 
collaboration into a recommendation to train and support experienced institutional 
leaders who are able to take on authoritative roles at different levels 
simultaneously.
181
  
A third recommendation (in addition to clear institutional design and multi-level 
leaders) regards an evaluation system. Evaluating local development policies is 
difficult because many different actors with very different missions are involved and 
results are not easy to measure. And yet evaluation is critical. Evaluation ex ante 
allows alternative development programmes to be selected, with a consequent 
reduction in the failure rate. Evaluation in itinere allows shifts from the original plan 
to be verified, objectives to be re-assessed and actors to re-align themselves.  
Evaluation ex post allows the gap between aims and results to be measured, so that 
important lessons can be learnt for the future of the policy or similar policies and the 
results of different ways of implementing the same policy in dissimilar territories can 
be compared.  
In order to reinforce the evaluation system - once the institutional framework is 
clear and multi-level institutional leaders are successfully operating - premiality 
systems can be put in place after establishing standards for public goods and services. 
This issue is particularly sensitive since, as we said in section 2 (Simple rules), with 
imperfect information it is counter-productive to complicate rules for assigning 
resources.  Premiality systems that link additional resources for local authorities to the 
achievement of targets regarding the availability of goods and services
182
 for the 
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 In the Italian experience of local development policies, especially in successful cases, out of a group 
of local actors a particular individual or group emerges with greater power than others. These 
individuals or groups were able to make decisions against the will of others, solve conflicts even 
without consensus, and pursue innovative solutions before they had been identified by the majority 
(Cersosimo, Wolleb, 2006).  
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 This consideration, suggested by Anna Natali in the light of her experience at the DPS, is highly 
relevant for us. There are a number of theoretical works that evidence that the problems of inter-
institutional cooperation dealt with by means of game theory (Dahlby, 1996; Dixit, Londregan, 1998; 
Broadway, Marchand, Vigneault, 1998) either end up with assumptions that are distant from reality or 
achieve sub-optimal results (Bardhan, Mookherjee, 1999; Azfar, Kähkönen, Lanyi, Meagher, 
Rutherford, 1999) because they do not perceive the presence or role of a multi-level actor. 
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 For example, drinking water or a regular domestic electricity supply, functioning hospitals or day 
clinics, good teaching in schools, etc. 
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citizenry could have the negative effect of further complicating rules and thus making 
them inapplicable and less credible. If, on the other hand, there is a clear institutional 
framework, or one that is well on its way to being defined, as well as a functioning 
evaluation system and effective multi-level institutional leaders, then the lack of 
information is likely to be reduced, or on its way to being reduced. If this were the 
case, rules could evolve on the basis of experience, becoming gradually less 
complicated (Ahmad, Martinez, 2004).  
Standards for goods and services should preferably be identified by means of inter-
institutional agreements, rather than being top-down, so that there would only be a 
limited number of them, and priorities would be clear (for example, water, health, 
education, etc). Another advantage would be that the established standards would be 
high enough to create incentives for local authorities to commit to, but at the same 
time low enough to be credible and achievable (Martinez, Vazquez, 2001; Alm, 
Martinez, Vazquez, 2002). Finally, premiality systems and established standards are 
preferable to making the programming guidelines stricter for regional and local 
governments, for example by tightening up the list of sectors or compartments that are 
eligible for funds, or making spending more difficult (Barca, 2004). Empirical 
research bears this out. Majumdar, Marcus, 2001, stress that it is useful to adopt rules 
that indicate objectives, leaving decisions as to how to achieve these objectives to the 
protagonists, rather than imposing behaviour on them, because this reduces their 
innovative effort. 
Finally, the project-building capabilities of local institutions should be reinforced 
and their project implementation sustained, especially in lagging areas. Aside from 
wide experience in technical assistance, both internationally and abroad, which needs 
evaluating, the UN has also had some interesting experience.
183
 The UN Fund of 40 
million dollars a year created to encourage microfinance is less than a thousandth of 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds of 50 billion dollars per annum 
(UNCDF, 2002). With this limited budget, the Fund‟s administrators had a simple but 
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 There is not room here to list all the examples of institutional capacity building, including in the 
World Bank. Concrete experience, however, has not really been verified (Gillespie, 2003); there is a 
well-founded suspicion that in this field the significant amount of money that has been spent has 
benefited the donors rather than the recipients of funds. The case of UNCDF is different, mostly 
because of low level of funds. 
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perceptive idea: to devote most of their work to replicating „best practice‟.184 The UN 
Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) compiled a manual to help its functionaries 
share their experience, and to encourage other institutions involved in international 
cooperation to describe the technical assistance they were able to give. Once these 
promising, clear and replicable experiences have been identified, the UNCDF uses its 
funds to spread the word and disseminate best practice. This method needs further 
analysis to see whether this is indeed the right path to encourage development. 
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Chapter Six - Conclusion 
The number of academic publications documents produced by international and 
national organisms and programme frameworks devoted to local development is 
growing all the time.
185
 And yet actual results are few and far between. There is little 
documentation on local development, and research is often based on incomplete data. 
There is, however, one thing most people involved in development agree on: 
whatever results are currently available, they are as yet uncertain. Only time will tell. 
This is, in our view, true only in part. Results are disappointing because the theories 
to which reference is made - both explicitly and implicitly – in building expectations 
are often simplistic, if not downright wrong. The damaging effect of over-
expectations is clearly illustrated by the gap between the set of convictions possessed 
by those involved in development and the beliefs held by commentators (especially if 
they are economists). There is widespread scepticism among economist commentators 
regarding development policies in general, and local policies in particular – unless 
these policies are highly regulated, or, even better, deregulated. They have no 
expectations and are quick to point out that if there are no results so far it is probably 
because no results are forthcoming. On the other side of the divide, those who are 
involved directly in development are convinced that policies – especially local 
policies - are the key to future development. Their expectations are high: significant, 
rapid results in generous proportion to the resources employed. The combination of 
these two contrasting, and, we believe incorrect, approaches inevitably generates a 
view that results are inadequate: either because the few results that are achieved are 
under-estimated, thus confirming a prejudiced view, or because the expectation of 
results was too high in the first place. 
This assai came about from the idea that something needs to be done to avoid these 
two sides pitting themselves against each other. We felt that it would be a good idea if 
the expectations of those directly involved in development had more connection with 
the views of those undertaking research or social commentary. This book invites those 
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 For Italy alone, starting with a bibliography on local development that has been updated, more than 
1,000 publications have come out between 1990 and 2004, produced by over 200 researchers in over 
30 main groups based in universities in the faculties of Economics, Political Economics, Applied 
Economics, Business, Sociology, and, to a lesser extent, Economic History, Agrarian Economics, Law 
and Land Economics. 
 196 
directly involved in development to understand that even though results are uncertain, 
delayed in time, and disproportionate to the effort made and the resources employed, 
at the same time local policies are both needed and potentially effective. It also invites 
those who study the subject and comment on it in the press to consider the fact that 
there are many other models other than the deterministic ones in which development 
is either easy or impossible, and in which development takes place only where 
material conditions allow it to, as if intentionality had nothing to do with it. 
By now it will have become clear, as we announced in the Introduction, that the 
materials provided chapter by chapter tend to deconstruct rather than construct. 
Although there are many positive suggestions in the book, the arguments are more 
often against. To conclude, then, we would like to indicate some important subjects 
that need further investigation. 
There are two preliminary questions. One is related to the local nature of 
development, and the other to the local nature of policies. The questions are distinct, 
in that answering one does not necessarily mean there is an answer to the other. The 
first question is: can we claim that economic development is local? The second 
question is: are local development policies necessary? These are separate questions 
because it is legitimate to consider local development policies necessary even if you 
believe economic development is not local
186
, or to consider global policies necessary 
even if you are convinced development is local.
187
 The concepts presented in this 
book are grounded in a positive answer to the first question (economic development is 
local) inasmuch as the potential for development is linked to immobile resources that 
have been underutilised, or neglected all together. If there is such a thing as immobile 
resources, then by definition development is local, as long as (and this is the second 
condition that supports our view) different resources generate different development 
mechanisms. Which brings us to the third condition: that the concept of „local‟ 
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 It is possible to think of development as a process in which decisive elements work on a national 
scale, or even on a continental or global scale, and to believe that appropriate development policies for 
this process – including, for example, the accumulation of physical or human capital – should have a 
relevant local dimension because they depend on the efficiency of single organizations as well as on 
the general rules governing the various functions. An example of this could be intermediation in 
savings and knowledge for banks and schools. 
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 It is also possible to think development is local (i.e. that it responds to mechanisms that are specific 
to territories and therefore different from place to place, not secondary or less important) but at the 
same time believe that development policies should be national (European, global). An example of this 
could be national infrastructure that gives different local advantages in different places, but can only be 
organized at a central level. 
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corresponds to the concept of „differentiated‟.  We also answer question two (whether 
policies are local) in the affirmative, for three reasons: I) the constraints that impede 
the productive use of potential resources are specific to the territory; II) the 
difficulties inherent in individual and collective action are specific to the territory; III) 
the capabilities and difficulties of institutions are specific to the territory. 
Development projects therefore need to be specific, and different in each territory. 
These assumptions all need further exploration, of course. Any further discussion 
should include an analysis of the fact that policies need to be local mainly because 
local communities have become more aware and more capable of mobilisation. It is 
therefore a democratic imperative (or a state of necessity) to design and implement 
development policies grounded in the territory, or at least involving those who live 
and work in the territory, over and above considerations of effectiveness or efficiency. 
Further questions involve the nature of institutions. Should only rules be taken into 
consideration, or should institutional bodies also play a role in development? In this 
book we have adopted the latter view, in accordance with the hypothesis that public 
goods and services are an essential component of development, and that rules on their 
own are not enough. Our justification is that development always involves a transition 
towards a greater division of labour, in the widest sense, and that private agents, 
without the support of public goods and services, cannot sustain this transition. 
Another discussion point is the idea presented in the book that bottom up collective 
action in civil society without state intervention cannot deliver adequate solutions. 
There is, too, the matter of institutional entrepreneurship. In this book we insist on 
the partial and inevitably indeterminate nature of choices underlying development 
policies, to the extent that we consider institutional entrepreneurship a decisive factor 
in their success. An objection to this approach could be: what is intended by the term 
„undetermined‟?  Can choices really depend on chance? Our answer is that you can 
distinguish between something happening by chance and wanting something to 
happen, but this too is material for further discussion. 
Negotiation is another matter that needs further consideration. Usually there are 
three different arguments in favour of negotiation and concertation in local 
development policy building. These are:  I) the fact that interest groups are able to 
perceive the effects of single policies and are able thus to give or take away their 
consent according to their perception; II) the fact that useful knowledge for designing 
and implementing development policies is dispersed among local actors, which means 
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that concertation is needed to bring these actors‟ knowledge together and contribute to 
the decision making process; III) the fact that there are many different options for 
policies that are hard to prioritise, and that the problem is to align behaviour along 
one of these options. Analytically, a problem arises because it is not clear whether 
these reasons complement each other or are alternatives. There could be relevant 
consequences in terms of analysis and strategy for development. For example, if it 
was believed that there was such a thing as an optimal strategy that needs to be 
discovered and implemented, then perhaps the first two reasons (composition of 
interest groups, and reconstructing knowledge) should be considered complimentary 
and the third reason should be excluded. If this were the case, local capabilities and 
choices would become paramount.  If, on the other hand, it were believed that there is 
no such thing as an optimal strategy but that there were a series of options impossible 
to choose from a priori, then things would be quite different. In this case, the 
institutional framework and arrangements would be considered more important. 
Chapters 4 (the difficulties of local institutions) and 5 (institutional arrangements) try 
to maintain a certain balance, but in the end we recognise that interventions from the 
centre are important. One could of course object with an approach at the other 
extreme. 
There are many other issues that this assai has not tackled. The most obvious 
concerns the fact that when we talk about local development we do not only mean 
lagging areas taking off, but also re-launching areas that are already advanced so that 
growth can take place there too. It is possible that after an accurate analysis the role of 
intentional policies needs to be considered differently in these two different scenarios. 
In the case of development in advanced areas a important argument should concern 
innovation and the need to reconsider current paradigms critically. Another argument 
should regard the interaction between economic dynamics and international 
specialisation shifts.  
